A comparative study of Ta'ifa states c.1018-1094 with special reference to Valencia and Zaragoza.

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TA'IFA STATES C.1018-C.1094

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VALENCIA AND ZARAGOZA

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THESIS SUBMITTED FOR A PhD DEGREE

KING'S COLLEGE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of Muslim Spain following the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate. The events of the period are explored within a Zaragozan and Valencian context. The thesis examines the main themes that affected Muslim Spain. These include: relations between cities and their provinces; the mechanics of establishing a Ta'ifa state and problems relating to succession; concepts of the legitimacy of government; the tools of government; inter-province relations; the power of local elites; and the evolving idea of reconquest.

Chapter one explores the framework of the relationship between Cordova and the provinces which Spanish Muslims believed to have existed prior to the 'Amirid government and looks at the reality of this relationship. Chapter two discusses the changes instigated by the 'Amirids, the collapse of the Caliphate and the Zaragozan/Valencian reactions to this collapse.

Chapter three considers the development of Zaragoza and Valencia in the early stages of the Ta'ifa period. The chapter explores the relationship between them and their provinces. Chapter four looks at the way in which these provinces gradually developed into independent states.

In chapter five, some of the changes which took place within the Christian states are touched upon, including the growing power of Castile. The campaign against Barbastro (1064) is examined from a general viewpoint and from a Zaragozan perspective. The chapter also discusses the involvement of the Almoravids in Spain. Chapter six considers the fall of Toledo in 1085 and the Cid's capture of Valencia in 1094 within the framework of Zaragozan/Valencian politics.

Emphasis is placed on the use of contemporary Arab sources, especially Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira, which has recently become available and which includes quotes from Ibn Hayyan's al-Matin. These are supplemented by later texts, including Ibn 'Idhari's al-Bayan, which have traditionally been used for the study of the period.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations
Notes on Transliteration and Footnotes

AHR	American Historical Review
BHS	Bulletin of Hispanic Studies
EEMCA	Estudios de la Edad Media de la Corona de Aragón
JMH	Journal of Medieval History
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
JSS	Journal of Semitic Studies
RIEEI	Revista del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos
	which has changed its name to:
RIEI	Revista del Instituto de Estudios Islámicos
TRHS	Transactions of the Royal Historical Society

Footnotes: Shortened forms of references are given, with full references in the bibliography.

Transliteration: Regrettably, it was not possible to indicate all diacritical marks. I have therefore tried to use a simplified transliteration as far as possible. For the transliteration of names, I have followed as a guide Tibi's translation of The Tibyan, with some modifications.

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes to my two supervisors, Professor Patrick Harvey and Dr. Jinty Nelson. This thesis would not have been possible without their guidance, patience and encouragement.

It was a privilege for me to be supervised by Professor Harvey. His knowledge of Muslim Spain continues to be a constant inspiration to me. I am grateful for his guidance, his many ideas and for his attempts to instill in me a sense of scholarship.

It was an equal privilege for me to be supervised by Dr. Nelson. If this research has been at all successful in crossing the divide from Orientalism to medieval history, it is entirely due to her guidance and teaching.

I am particularly grateful for their courtesy over the years in not showing any signs of disbelief whenever I promised that the following chapter was "on its way".

To Maha, whose constant love, patience and unfaltering support sustained me through the difficult patches, I would like to express my gratitude and love. Without her strength, I would have faltered a long time ago.

I would like to express my gratitude to my mother, who taught me perseverance and who instilled in me a love of learning. My thanks also go to my family for their support, and especially to Zaki, without whose help this research would not have been started.

A word of thanks must go to all my teachers, in Jerusalem and the U.K., especially Jubran Khoury, who taught me to love Arabic literature.

Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank June Walker for all her cheerful help over the years.

PYRENEES

HUESCA

BARBASTRO

MONZÓN

TUDELA

ZARAGOZA

JALÓN

EBRO

CINCA

SEGRE

LERIDA

CATALAN HILLS

TARRAGONA

TORTOLA

CALATAYUD

MEDINACELI

IBERIAN MOUNTAINS

IBERIAN MOUNTAINS

CUENCA

MIJARES

PALANCIA

VALENCIA

TURIA

MAGRO

CABRIEL

JÚCAR

JÁTIVA

DENIA

BETIC CORDILLERA

MURCIA

إلى ذكرى المرحوم والدي

أنور إبن زكي، من بني غنم، من بني عوف، الخزرجي
المعروف بإبن نسيبه

آخر القلاقلة

Bism Allah Al-Rahman Al-Rahim

Introduction

1. Background.

The history of Muslim Spain during the Ta'ifa period is a particularly unusual episode in the history of the Islamic presence in the peninsula. The fall of the Umayyad Caliphate, or rather of the 'Amirid dictatorship that had come to rule in the Caliph's name, heralded a period of disintegration of the state called by Arab historians the period of the Berber Fitna, al-Fitna al-Barbariyya. This period of civil strife and chaos was followed by a period lasting for the best part of the C11, during which Muslim Spain fragmented into a collection of party states, each centred on a main city with its surrounding countryside ruled by the city's 'lord'; Muluk al-Tawa'if. This period was also perceived to be different from the one following the collapse of Almoravid rule, or the period of disintegration following the collapse of Almohad dominion and the rise of the Nasrids which some historians call the second and third Ta'ifa periods.

The era of the Ta'ifas in the eleventh century was particularly significant in that it marked the beginning of the reconquest of Muslim Spain by the Christian north. This push southwards was in part a

response to the political weakness of the south during this period of disunity. Indeed, for later medieval Muslim historians looking back at the period, the link between the disintegration of the unity of Muslim Spain under the Ta'ifas and the seemingly irreversible Christian advance was manifest and obvious. This link served to further increase later historians' antagonism towards the Ta'ifa rulers.

To a degree, this assessment was correct; while the Christian states in the north had faced a united, economically and militarily vibrant Muslim south in the C10, by the C11 it faced a disunited, economically weakened south, whose political and military structures had suffered severe damage. It faced a Muslim south, moreover, whose political and social structure had been destabilised with the advent of large numbers of north African Berber troops during the 'Amirid period and was suffering further instability due to the absence of a framework of legal government that would have instilled a sense of order and unity into the peninsula.

However, some of the reasons behind the northern advance were inherent in changes that had taken place within the Christian states themselves. This was partly to do with the evolution of the power of Castile and the charismatic leadership of Alfonso VI. It was also partly related to general changes in the north linked with the evolution of a reconquest mentality and an increase in the vitality, not only of Castilian power, but also of that

of other Christian states such as Aragón.

What was also of special significance about this period was not only the actual independence of the Ta'ifa states, as all over the Muslim world provinces were exercising independent rule to varying degrees, but that many of these states were seen to have become independent outside the legal framework of the Caliphate. In theory, the rulers of all Muslim provinces, no matter how independent, acknowledged the authority of the Caliph. The fact that by the C10, the Muslim world was in the unusual position of having three Caliphates (the 'Abbasid in Iraq, who in theory exercised authority over most of the Muslim world; the Shi'a Fatimids in Egypt who controlled parts of north Africa and of greater Syria al-Sham and the Umayyads who controlled Muslim Spain) made matters awkward, but the principle remained intact that all legal authority stemmed from the institution of the Caliphate, and that a particular governor or ruler derived legitimacy from his acknowledgement of the Caliphate. Eventually, the Muslim world reverted to a single Caliphate with the fall first of the Umayyads in Spain and later of the Fatimids.

The Ta'ifa states, however, managed to operate for a number of years either on the periphery or completely outside such a system, and as they did so, they had to grapple with concepts of what in a Western sense can be described as 'kingship'. This included issues of

succession, of the manifestation of central authority, of developing a framework for the relationship between the ruler and lesser lords, of formulating policies and so on. In one sense, this period can be seen as a forerunner of the complete disintegration of Caliphal authority in the east which became manifest by the mid C13 and lasted until the Ottomans established their hegemony over a large part of the Muslim world. However, even after the Mongols killed the Caliph al-Mu'tasim in Baghdad in 1258, there were attempts at keeping the office in existence in Cairo, where 'Abbasid Caliphs were kept with little real power until the office was transferred to Constantinople in 1517, where it remained until the early part of this century. [1] The revulsion of later Muslim medieval historians looking at this period was partly linked to this factor and to what they perceived to be the arrogance of such rulers in assuming such a mantle of independence. This arrogance was seen to be reflected in the adoption of Caliphal titles by the Ta'ifa rulers which became the object of scorn by these later historians.

Although concepts of Islamic legitimacy do not properly form a part of this study, it is worth briefly touching on the subject because of the ramifications it has on the understanding of the period. In theory, the entire Muslim community formed a single nation or ummah. This nation was seen to be a single entity ruled by the

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[1] For a short history of the office of Caliph and of the theological and political ideology which evolved around it see Encyclopedia of Islam:Vol.4, pp. 937-953, under Khalifa.

authoritative statements of the Qur'an and the corpus of religious teachings. The nation was ruled in the first instance by the Prophet according to religious law al-shari'a and, following his death, by his successors khulafa' or Caliphs, who supplemented the laws in the Qura'n by reference to the Prophet's statements or actions al-Sunna.

As the Muslim state spread it faced, among many others, problems relating to the ability of central government to control the outlying provinces, problems relating to the integration of the increasing non Arab part of the population, whose resentment at times found expression in anti-Arab movements Shu'ubiyya, and problems relating to the practicalities of the enforcement of government while keeping within the bounds of religious law.

In dealing with these problems, a compromise seems to have been reached, where there was a theoretical acknowledgement of the ideal, in modern terminology the de jure aspect, of the shari'a, but also an acceptance that day to day government demanded some flexibility in practice, which resulted in a de facto breaking of the shari'a. The tension between the ideal and the practicable, is reflected in various aspects of Muslim society in the C10 and C11. One example can be seen in the provinces that clearly exercised independence from the Caliphate, de facto, such as the Hamdanid dynasty in C10 Allepo or even the Almoravids in C11 north Africa, but who

nonetheless felt the need to acknowledge the authority of the Caliphate in a theoretical, or de jure, sense.

Another example can be seen in the issue of salb. The shari'a clearly does not specify crucifixion, salb, as a punishment other than for highway robbery resulting in murder.[2] Yet this punishment seems to have been widely used in the Muslim world for political crimes (for example, the punishment of rebels such as some of Ibn Hafsun's officers in 7 Ramadan 315/ 5 November 927,[3] or of the Commanding Officers responsible for the failed campaign against Galicia in the summer of 939 mentioned in chapter one [4]) as well as for civil crimes. Indeed, the power of maintaining law and order was often executed by an official sahib al-shurta who, although often trained in jurisprudence, does not seem to have exercised his authority within the bounds of the shari'a (there was even one case of a highway robber who was appointed by the 'Abbadids in Seville as a sahib al-shurta while still on the cross[5]).

Yet another example was the issue of taxes. Muslim governments clearly collected taxes not specified in religious law to pay for the expenses of government. Ibn Hazm raised this issue in his al-Muhalla [6]. However, this

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[2] Qur'an, 5:33-34.

[3] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, vol 2, p.194.

[4] Chapter 1: p.72.

[5] Al-Maqqari: Nafh al-Tib: Vol.4,p.128.

[6] Ibn Hazm: Al-Muhalla, 'Kitab al-Zakat', vol. 5 & 6.

did not stop jurists from ignoring the dichotomy of having parts of their salaries paid out of illegal taxes and continuing in government service.

Perhaps one factor which helped make this issue of legitimacy so central to Muslim government during the C10 and C11 was that the majority of those in governmental service Silk al-Khidma were trained in Fiqh or jurisprudence. Although these individuals formed the core of the educated 'men of the pen' who ran the affairs of the state, their education and outlook was essentially religious. Indeed, Fiqh involves both law and theology,[7] and for the jurists there was no de jure separation between religion and the state, although they could, most of the time, accommodate themselves to the state acting outside religious legality on a practical basis. For these jurists, there seem to have existed a proverbial 'Mu'awiyah's lock of hair' [8] which gave the world, as they seem to have seen it, cohesion ; this involved the belief that whatever the shortcomings of the practice of government, an acknowledgement of the ideal of the Muslim system in all its varied facets was essential. To break this mould and go beyond the Muslim world view, as it was seen to exist, on a de jure basis, would have therefore

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[7] For a good discussion of fiqh see Encyclopedia of Islam: vol.2, pp.886-891 under Fikh.

[8] It is commonly attributed to Mu'awiyah, the first Umayyad Caliph, to have said that a single lock of hair linked him to his people,ummah; if they pulled, he would loosen his hold, and if they loosened, he would pull, so that that single lock [holding the state together] would never break.

been seen as a shattering, highly disruptive, as well as theologically unsound, action.

Despite the significance of the period of Muluk al-Tawa'if, it had not, until fairly recently, received the same degree of attention as other episodes in the history of Muslim Spain.[9] The aim of this study is to trace the history of two inter-linked Ta'ifa states, those of Zaragoza and Valencia from their emergence as two independent Ta'ifa states through to their eventual fall. By looking in detail at the history of these two states, one would be able to examine aspects of Ta'ifa history which might be of use in helping understand the development of the history of the other Ta'ifas. In a sense, the study aims to look at these two Ta'ifas as a microcosm of the general history of the peninsula in the period and some time is therefore spent examining the early origins of the formation of the Ta'ifa states in the period preceding that of Muluk al-Tawa'if before going on to examine the Ta'ifa period proper.

For this study much reliance has been placed on the use of contemporary or near contemporary Spanish Muslim sources, notably those by Ibn Hayyan, Ibn Bassam, Ibn

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[9] The most recent full study of the period is D. Wasserstein: The Rise & Fall of the Party Kings. Politics & Society in Islamic Spain 1002-1086. Also R. Fletcher The Quest for El Cid. For a recent general history of the confrontation between the Muslim states in the south and the Christian states in the north in this period see B.F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031-1157. In all of these studies, however, the major contemporary Spanish Muslim source, al-Dhakhira, is barely used.

'Alqama, Ibn al-Kardabus and al-Turtushi (the various sources used are discussed in more detail in the third section of this introduction). It is particularly fortunate that the great work of Ibn Bassam, al-Dhakhira, written circa 1105, is now available edited and published in full by Dr. I. 'Abbas,[10] especially since this work gives one access to Ibn Bassam's own account of events in the latter part of the century and to some of the earliest excerpts from Ibn Hayyan's lost 'History', which formed the basis of much later histories of the period such as that by Ibn 'Idhari.

Chapter one aims to examine the background to Zaragoza and Valencia highlighting the difference in the geographical structure of the countryside surrounding them as well as in the makeup of their populations and the differences resulting from one being the centre of a march while the other was further south, nearer to central government and protected from the hostilities of the north. Because Spanish Muslims of the C11 tended to believe that the 'Amirid dictatorship had instigated major changes in the government of the peninsula, some time is spent examining what could have been seen to be the theoretical framework that governed the relationship between the provinces, especially the more independent march area, and the government in Cordova prior to the 'Amirid period.

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[10] The first full edition became available in March 1979. The 1979 edition is in four parts divided into eight volumes.

The chapter then goes on to look briefly at the reality of that relationship during the final stages of Umayyad government.

Chapter two aims to follow the process that led to the disintegration of the Cordovan government which led in turn to the rise of the Ta'ifas as independent states. Central to this collapse of Cordovan government is the role played by the 'Amirid dictatorship which had usurped the Caliph's power preceding the collapse. Because of the tarnished image of the Ta'ifa rulers, later Muslim historians have tended to be sympathetic in their treatment of Ibn Abi 'Amir. However, contemporary and near contemporary Spanish Muslims held a more critical view, and chapter two tries to re-examine the history of the dictatorship from their perspective, in particular the changes which he instigated and which they viewed as destabilising. The chapter then goes on to examine the way in which both Zaragoza and Valencia reacted to the collapse of the government in Cordova and tries to trace the reasons which explain the differences in their reactions.

Chapter three attempts to look at the way in which the states of Zaragoza and Valencia developed in the early stages of the Ta'ifa period. In particular it examines the way in which power was transferred to particular groups within these provinces (the ascension of the Hudids in Zaragoza and of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia). The chapter also tries to look at the way the main cities of these states were attempting to develop their

relationship with their A'mal or provinces, as well as with other provinces and how that latter behaviour became elevated to the sphere of 'foreign policy'. During these early years one also begins to gain an impression of the power of the ahl or 'people' of the major cities. The power of the 'people' of the major cities can be seen at certain main points of the history of the peninsula (for example, the 'people' of Toledo seem to have had the power to expel their ruler and later to enter into negotiations with Alfonso VI, as will be discussed in chapter six).

Chapter four traces the development of the states of Valencia and Zaragoza as they began to be transformed from being provinces which had an increased degree of independence, but still operating within the political ideology of a Spain that it was thought should be ruled under an over-all Caliphal order, preferably emanating from Cordova, to a situation by the 1060's where they had come to behave, on a practical and ideological basis, as totally independent states. The chapter also tries to look at some of the issues related to independent rule, especially those relating to succession, which the Ta'ifas were unable to resolve satisfactorily. A dichotomy that can be clearly seen in the reign of the Hudids in Zaragoza was that on the one hand, they exercised power as independent rulers, adopting Caliphal titles, but on the other, they continued to regard their state almost as personal property to be divided among their heirs as opposed to being passed on to a single successor. The

chapter also looks at the rise of the power of the north and its increasing dominance as reflected in the reversal of roles with the south, with the Christian states in the north beginning to force the Muslim south to pay tribute.

Chapter five touches upon the changes that took place within the northern Christian states, in terms of the rise of Castile to prominence, their increased contact with the rest of Christian Europe and the development of a mentality of reconquest and tries to relate that development to the growing ideal of the Crusade. With reference to this last point the campaign for Barbastro is examined both from a general viewpoint but also from a local 'Zaragozan' perspective. At the same time, the chapter aims to look at the growth of what in modern terminology could be called the fundamentalist, Almoravid movement in north Africa and their increasing involvement in the peninsula as well as the changes in perspective to the north/south confrontation which their involvement inevitably brought, at the same time looking at the way in which both Zaragoza and Valencia were reacting to the changing larger picture in the peninsula.

Chapter six attempts to examine the two major events of the latter half of the century in Muslim Spain. The fall of Toledo in 1085 represented a watershed both symbolically since it was the old Visigothic capital of Spain and from a practical point of view since it broke the back of the march defence system of Muslim Spain and marked the beginning of the retreat southwards (halted for a time

by the defeat at Zallaqa). However, on a more localised level the fall of Toledo represented a major set back for Zaragoza and that is also examined. The chapter also traces the reasons behind, and the events leading to, Rodrigo Diaz's campaign against and capture of Valencia in 1094 with the help of Zaragoza.

The study has tried throughout to use evidence now available through al-Dhakhira, so that often accepted versions of events are renarrated and supplemented by information provided by that source. At other times, there has been an effort to use material which is to be found only in al-Dhakhira. In both cases, the new information from al-Dhakhira has been used to analyse the events of the period in a fresh light.

Throughout the study, while the main themes that affected Muslim Spain are explored, an attempt is made to situate these themes and events within the context of a 'localised' Zaragozan or Valencian viewpoint. The close link between the two states, dictated by their proximity as well as by Zaragoza's increasing need to have Valencia within its sphere of influence, both in the context of inter-Ta'ifa politics as well as in that of Zaragoza's attempts to withstand the increasing pressure from the north, is a theme that can be seen to run throughout the history of this period and one which is followed throughout the thesis. The way in which Zaragoza attempted to deal with its strong Ta'ifa neighbours, such as Toledo, with the northern Christian states, as well with the state

of Valencia offers a glimpse into the workings of Ta'ifa politics as whole and an opportunity to look at the way in which the rulers of these states reacted to their independence and to the major changes that followed in the peninsula.

2. Arabic Terms

The aim throughout this thesis has been to use, as far as possible, the earliest extant Arabic sources. The study has therefore involved at times a translation of terms from Arabic into English. Some of these translations (in some instances) are not literal but aim to convey what the original source is perceived to have meant by the term. At other times a literal translation has been used.

However, in both cases, the English terms used have historical connotations of their own which perhaps were not intended either by the original source or by the translation. A good example of this would be the term 'lord' to describe the ruler, sahib, of a province. The term 'lord' although useful in describing this office, has in addition certain connotations in European history which were not necessarily intended to apply to their usage in the context of C11 Muslim Spain. To clarify the meanings of English terms as used in the thesis, I list below the main Arabic terms involved and the reasons behind the choice of the English equivalent. The list also includes some terms which are generally problematic as well as an explanation of certain concepts.

A'mal : Power in C10/C11 Muslim Spain clearly rested in the cities. The cities controlled the surrounding countryside, including, at times lesser or smaller cities (for example Zaragoza clearly controlled Lérida, while Valencia controlled Jativa). A good translation for A'mal would be 'province'. However, since the Muslim Spanish state as a whole disintegrated into its component provinces, the term could lead to some confusion. I have therefore tried to use the Arabic term when describing the countryside controlled by a city-state. The dictionary of Ibn Mandhur Lisan al-'Arab (died 711/ 20 May 1311-8 May 1312), lists one meaning of the verb 'Amala as: 'receiving authority to rule (wilaya) from the ruler.[11]

Ahl: The term can be literally translated as 'people of' as in, for example, ahlu kent, meaning the people of Kent (and this indeed seems to be the main meaning put forward by Ibn Mandhur). However, its use in the Arabic sources seems to have wider connotations. When used to describe ahlu Tulaitula, the people of Toledo, or ahlu Balancia, the people of Valencia, it clearly was not referring to the total population of the city involved. The way in which the term was used suggests that it was meant to refer to the influential part of the population. Who this segment of the population included is not clear, although one can guess that it included members of the important local families, senior members of 'local' government and

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[11] Muhammad ibn Mukkaram ibn Mandhur: Lisan al-Arab.

influential members of the merchant class. In translation the term 'people of' has been used, but has been placed in inverted commas to emphasise its special meaning. This influential segment of the population is also referred to at times as the elders, shuyukh, of a city. [12]

'Ammah: By contrast, this can be translated as commoners (which is one of the meanings put forward by Ibn Mandhur) and were at the other end of the social structure from the Khassa. It is used mostly, but not exclusively, when describing events in Cordova that seem to have involved elements of popular uprisings. For this reason, the term commoners has been used as a translation.

Caliphal Titles: The 'Abbasids started a tradition of each new Caliph adopting a title by which he would be known after taking office. These titles were particularly grand and it was generally acknowledged that they remained the exclusive prerogative of Caliphs. Examples of such titles include al-Mu'tasim and al-Musta'in. The Ta'ifa rulers' adoption of such Caliphal titles was seen to be a

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[12] Dr.T.A. Makki in his Dirasat 'an Ibn Hazm wa Kitabihi Tawq al-Hamamah, pp.23-26 lists the following class structure in Cordova at the end of the Umayyad period: 1) al-Khassa who were made up of those Arabs related to the ruling family; 2) Abna' al-Buyutat who were members of the important families and who inherited the important positions in government. These also included Abna' al-Khla'if Slavs (or their sons) who were freed and held important posts including Ibn Abi 'Amir; 3) al-Tabaqa al-Wusta who were members of important and rich families in various provinces, also called al-A'yan; and 4) al-Tabaqa al-Dunia who were made up of craftsmen and labourers and were also known as al-'Amah. The Ahl in the provinces would therefore probably refer to the second and third of these groups.

particularly unusual and vainglorious act.

Declaration of Allegiance to a Caliph: There were at least two ways in which a ruler of a province could show allegiance to a Caliph (declare for him) publicly. The most commonly used method was to have the Caliph's name mentioned in the Friday prayers, which was a way of informing all levels of the community of this allegiance. In the Ta'ifa period, when the different states minted their own coins, the Caliph's name was stamped on the province's coins, in addition to those of the ruler.

fitna: The best translation of the term fitna is sedition, yet the term denotes much more. It conjured up in the medieval Muslim mind images of civil war and lawlessness and wilful disruption of the orderly life which he should have been able to expect within Muslim territory (Dar al-Islam). Ibn Mandhur gives one meaning of the word as erring (dalal) and sin (ithm); the devil is described by him as the propagator of fitna:fattan. The threat of accusing a non-obedient subject of fitna was quite a powerful weapon in the hands of rulers. The Fatimids, for example, denounced the Ibn Ziri governor of Qairawan as an inciter of a fitna when he changed allegiance to the 'Abbasids in 1048. The term is also infused with this strong negative image, partly because of the importance of order in the medieval Muslim mind, and partly because of its historico-religious connotations. During the siege of

Yathrib by the alliance al-Ahzab in 627, some of the Prophet's followers doubted his ability to win. They asked to be excused from fighting and to return and defend their homes which they claimed were in danger. They are referred to in the Qur'an as hypocrites who would allow a fitna with little hindrance (33: 12-14). A fitna would therefore carry the stigma of being something sinful and anti-Islamic instigated by hypocrites.

Hajib: The literal meaning of the noun is veil. In the west, it was a title taken by the most influential member of government after the Caliph, such as for example, Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir. The term therefore describes the office of chief wazir. However, in the early part of the Ta'ifa period, the title was adopted by some Ta'ifa rulers as a form of self aggrandizement, while they continued to show in the early stages titular allegiance to certain Caliphs.

Hisn: The term is used in the sources to describe a town which seem to have had fortifications and an element of military personnel stationed in it. The best example of this usage is in the description of Barbastro. The term has therefore been translated as fort or fortified town. This is a separate term from Qal'a which seem to refer to a purely military fortified structure and which has been translated as castle (Ibn Mandhur lists one meaning as a fortified structure which is built in a prominent

position). There is at least one reference to al-Qila' (the plural of the term) as a country which is taken to mean Castile.[13]

Ifranj: The term literally means Franks. In medieval Muslim usage it came to denote most Europeans and indeed in common modern usage the term means 'western foreigner'. However, in Muslim Spanish usage the term is used specifically to describe Christians from Catalonia and also to Catalan and other western Christians present in other regions, as for example in Toledo.

Mawali/Fityan: Fata literally means young man, but Ibn Mandhur lists one meaning as slave. Mawla is derived from Milla meaning religion. In its origin it referred to children of free Arabs from slave mothers. However, in C10/C11 Muslim Spain it clearly meant slave. Both these words refer to slave soldiers.

The institution of slave soldiers was a feature of the medieval Muslim world.[14] In Muslim Spain, it is clear that the core of the professional army was made up of such slaves. Ibn Hawqal in his Kitab Surat al-Ard claims that at the time of his visit most were of Slav, Catalan (Ifranjja) or Galecian origin brought to Spain by Jewish

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[13] For a recent general study of forts(Husun) in the south east of Spain see Bazzana, Cressier and Guichard: Les Châteaux Ruraux d'Al-Andalus: Histoire et Archéologie des Husun du Sud-Est de l'Espagne.

[14] For a general study of slave soldiers in Islam see P. Crone:Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of Islamic Polity.

merchants.[15] However, his claim that most of these slaves were castrated has to be treated with caution. Ghalib, one of their more famous commanders who was dispatched to the upper march had a daughter whom Ibn Abi 'Amir married.

Mahalla: Literally camp site. The way in which the term is used during the description of the failed Almoravid attack on Valencia suggests that it was meant to refer to the central encampment or body of the army and this is confirmed by the sense of the loan word almofalla in, for example, the Poema de Mio Cid.

Muluk al-Tawa'if: The term can be literally translated as 'party kings'. However, the use of the term 'King' in this context is problematic. De las Cagigas believed that the term Muluk is best translated as governors, while the reference to their A'lat al-Mulukiyya or kingly paraphernalia, referred to their use of distinctive insignia of government such as banners and coinage.[16] The problem with using the term king is that it has implications for the way in which these rulers perceived themselves and their states and although later sources do refer to them in this way, it is not clear that they themselves used the term muluk.

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[15] Ibn Hawqal: Kitab Surat al-Ard, p.106.

[16] De Las Cagigas: Los Mozárabes, pp. 421-423.

In addition, the term muluk would imply that one describes their states as kingdoms. One can argue that it took the various rulers a long time to come to terms with their independence and that there were aspects of their government, particularly the issue of succession, which they failed to resolve. One also needs to take into account the fact that the term might have been used by the later sources in an attempt to discredit their "vainglorious" rule further and deny them legitimacy. For example, two civil servants who were using the term by the end of the century were Ibn Bassam and Ibn al-Qusayra.[17] However, both these men had declared their allegiance to the Almoravids and the use of the term (malik) by them reflected their official antagonism to these Ta'ifa rulers. This is particularly notable in the letter written by Ibn al-Qusayra referred to above, were he describes the ascendancy of the Christian enemy and blames it on the lords of the Tawa'if:

> Because the majority of the muluk of this region used to have dealings with the Tawa'if of the Rum, and each used to buy soldiers with some money which he would then use against his [Muslim] enemies.

The letter then goes on to describe how Yusuf Ibn Tashfin heeding the call of people of the peninsula crossed over to stop the Christian advance.

A much less problematic term would be to describe

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[17] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira part 2, pp.253-255 quotes a letter by Ibn al-Qusayra attacking the weakness of the Ta'ifa rulers before the Christians in which he describes these rulers as (Muluk).

them as 'lords' or 'governors'. In the same way, rather than describe their domains as 'kingdoms', it might be more accurate to describe them as city-states.

Numbers: The use of numbers by contemporary writers such as Ibn Hayyan poses some problems. It is not clear whether Ibn Hayyan used a number which he believed to be an approximation of the reality, or whether, especially when he used very large numbers, he simply wished to convey the feeling of enormity. An argument can be made that a civil servant familiar with the tax revenue of the Caliphate in Spain would be familiar with sums of this magnitude. When describing armies, Ibn Hayyan's numbers seem to be mostly reasonable. For example, to say that the upper and middle march could muster between them 10,500 horsemen at the turn of the C10/C11 seems reasonable, although it need not necessarily be accurate. However, when he talks of the cost of the 'Amirid campaigns (500,000 dinars per campaign[18]) or of an estate in Valencia in the early stages of the fitna (100,000 dinars), the numbers, especially the latter, seem particularly large. Either he was simply trying to say that such costs were prohibitively high, or he was reporting figures which were in circulation, which might in turn indicate that by the reign of 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir and in the period of the fitna, Muslim Spain was suffering from severe inflation. There is no other evidence to clarify the issue

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[18] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn al-Khatib, A'mal al-A'mal, pp.114-115.

and it would therefore be reasonable to assume that the large numbers used were meant to convey 'enormous' amounts.

Rum/Roma: The term Rum strictly speaking means Romans. However, in its eastern usage, it came to mean members of the Byzantine Empire. Ibn Hayyan uses the term Roma when describing the siege of Barbastro and the argument is put forward in chapter five that Ibn Hayyan clearly meant it to mean the city of Rome.

Silk al-Khidma: Literally 'the Thread of Service'. I have chosen to translate this as the civil service. There is some debate over whether one can talk of a civil service when discussing medieval kingships, or whether the concept of a ruler's agents is more appropriate. During the Umayyad period, the size and diversity of civil matters attended to by this service strongly argues for the appropriateness of using the term civil service to describe it. One has to be careful, however, in that the civil service in Muslim Spain was not concerned solely with civil administration as per the modern English usage, but was also involved in military administration.

We find that in the reign of al-Nasir (912-961) it was not unusual for the Caliph to have nine or ten wazirs,[19] or ministers. That these in turn would employ

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[19] A good example of this can be seen in Ibn Hayyan: al-Muqtabas, vol.V, pp.314, 390.

a fair number of clerks to cover most aspects of the bureaucracy is shown by the fact that the government was housed in the large complex of al-Zahra' palace. Under 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mustadhhir, there is a record of fourteen ministries.[20] These were: the ministry responsible for the Administration of the two palace complexes,[21] Khidmat al-Madinatayn al-Zahira wa al-Zahra'; the ministry for Accounts Khidmat Kitabat al-Ta'aqqub wal-Muhasaba (literally the investigation and accounts[22]); the ministry for the retinue Khidmat al-Hasham; the ministry for Food and Water (literally for apportioning water when it is scarce and of food) Khidmat al-Qut' bi al-nadd wal Ta'am [23]; the ministry dealing with the Inheritance of the Notables Khidmat Mawarith al-khassa; the ministry for the Embroidery[24] Khidmat al-Tiraz; the

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[20] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira: Part I, p.51.

[21] The palace complex in Cordova housed not only the caliph, but also the ministerial staff and some Slav guards. The excavation of the al-Zahra' palace complex a few miles outside Cordova shows it to have been the size of a village.

[22] Ibn Mandhur gives several meaning for the word 'Aqib, but this seems the most appropriate given its coupling with the word Muhasaba. Another possible meaning could be: to retain something under one's control. Ibn Mandhur gives an example of a seller I'taqaba a good until the buyer pays him for it.

[23] Another possible meaning for al-Nadd might be gold and silver, but given that the ministry was concerned with food, water seems more logical. It might be that the ministry was concerned with distributing water and food in Cordova, or for coordinating rationing at times of scarcity.

[24] This is not as absurd as it might seem. In his Kitab Surat al-Ard, Ibn Hawqal, the C10 traveller mentions that Muslim Spain was an exporter of embroidered linen to Egypt and even Khurasan p.105., as well as of wool, flax and rain proof material. It also had a silk dyeing industry p.109.

ministry for Buildings Khidmat al-MaBani; the ministry for Weaponry and Related Items Khidmat al-Asliha wa ma yajri majraha; the Treasury Khidmat al-Khizana lil qabd wal daf'; The ministry dealing with Food Supplies for the Ruler: Receipts and Payments Khidmat al-Hiraya wal qabd wal daf' [25]; the ministry responsible for Documents and the Submission of Complaints Khidmat al-Wathai'iq wa Raf' al-Madhalim; the Treasury of Medicine Khidmat Khizanat al - Tibb wal Hikma; The ministry for the Care for Guests Khidmat al-Anzal wal Naza'il; the ministry for the Regulations of Commerce Khidmat Ahkam al-Suq. Ibn Bassam adds to his quote from Ibn Hayyan saying: "And for each title of the types of this service there existed subgroups Jama'at whom Ibn Hayyan named in his book", a reference to the layer of bureaucracy which supported the ministers in their office.[26] The overall size of this apparatus can be seen in Ibn al-Khatib in A'mal al-A'lam who quotes the charter that declared 'Abd
al-Rahman, son of al-Mansur Ibn Abi 'Amir, a successor to the Caliphate in 1008. He states that it was witnessed by the Chief Judge in Cordova (Qadi al-Jama'a) Ahmad Ibn Abdullah Ibn Dhakwan, followed by 29 wazirs, then 180: men from Ashab al-Shurta and the rest of the

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[25] Ibn Mandhur lists under the verb(Hara) a noun (Huriyu) which he describes as a large house where the food of the ruler (sultan) is gathered. I have therefore taken that Hiraya is derived from that meaning.

[26] Ibn Hayyan quoted by Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira: Part I,p.51. In this instance the power of the caliph al-Mustadhhir was very weak and Ibn Hayyan recorded that non of the ministers appointed actually held office.

> people of the service from commanders Hukkam, judges Quda, jurists Fuqaha', councillors Mushawirun and others.[27]

However, the civil service in Umayyad Spain relied on the jurists to legitimise their actions. An example of this can be seen in the early part of Ibn Abi 'Amir's assumption of authority. It seems that he attempted to exert his influence over the independent jurists. When these refused to comply, he imprisoned them and sent a wazir to bully them but the jurists responded by effectively threatening to stage a strike, which would have brought the functioning of the entire State to a halt since they would not conduct any legal or religious business which included signing declarations for war and peace (to give them legal validity), helping commerce (by resolving disputes), accepting donations sadaqat to the poor or condemning any offender to imprisonment. Ibn Abi 'Amir eventually backed down. This incident is interesting because it shows a separation between Silk al-Khidma or the civil service and the Fuqaha' or jurists, although evidence shows (not least in the case of Ibn 'Amir himself) that wazirs were often trained in jurisprudence. The incidence also shows the need of the service to obtain sanction for its functions from jurists who therefore had much influence. [28]

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[27] Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam, p.108.

[28] Al-Turtushi: Siraj al-Muluk: p.56-57. See the discussion of al-Turtushi below.

The civil servants in C11 Muslim Spain seem to have been recruited from those trained in _fiqh_ or jurisprudence. The career of Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, who was originally a civil servant, was particularly well documented because of his later seizure of power. It provides a fascinating insight into the progression of the career of a well connected high ranking civil servant in C10 Spain. At times he served as a civil servant (for example, he held the ministry of the mint _al-Sikka_ in 967), and at others, as a jurist (for example, he became Chief Justice _Qadi al-Qudat_ in north Africa).[29] Not only does this underline the fact that members of the service were often trained as jurists, but it also points to an intermingling of the personnel of both these establishments.

Medieval Muslim society produced an enormous amount of written material. Many of the books produced do survive. What is intriguing is that the vast majority of what did survive is in the form of 'published' books, whereas very little of original 'letters of government', jurisprudence rulings and title deeds seem to have come down to us. However, there is strong evidence of the extensive use of written material (whether in terms of records or correspondence) by the civil service. This is seen in the large amounts of civil service letters as well

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[29] Ibn 'Idhari: _Al-Bayan_, Vol. 2, pp.268-253. Interestingly, as Chief Justice, he also held the right to be consulted over military matters.

as occasional treaties quoted in literary works such as Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira, which were no doubt intended in part to provide examples to be emulated by other civil servants. Given the literary nature of medieval Muslim society (evidenced by the large quantities of books produced and the large public libraries such as the one in Baghdad used to house them), the large complexes used to house the civil service (part of which must have been used as storage facilities for records) as well as the references to Sijjils or records in capitals such as Cordova, one could strongly argue that the Caliphal civil service in the C10/C11 was essentially one which operated on a written basis.

However, the question remains whether the term would be continue to be appropriate when discussing the Ta'ifa states, where the governmental establishment would have been much smaller. Two factors argue for continuing to use the term. First, there seems to have been a distinction in the minds of contemporary or near contemporary historians between a clerk, Katib, and a minister or wazir (although some ministers were known as al-wazir al-katib, perhaps implying a duality of function, or a record of their promotion). The Ta'ifa rulers seem to have tried to build up smaller versions of the service which had existed in Cordova, in the first instance employing members of that service who had fled the turmoil in the capital, and thereafter educated 'men of the pen' to fulfil the same role. These men and their successors

were recognised as wazirs in the accounts of Ibn Hayyan and Ibn Bassam and clearly saw themselves as such, whatever the reality of the reduced apparatus within which they worked under the Ta'ifas. Secondly, in the C12/C13 al-Mughrib fi hula al-Maghrib,[30] most provinces include a section entitled al-Silk which covers the wazirs of that province. This would suggest that within each province there was seen to be a local silk al-khidma or civil service.

Sahib: Governor of a province. In the Ta'ifa period, I have opted for the term Lord to indicate the ruler of a city-state.

Thaghr: Ibn Mandhur lists one meaning as: an area which is a clear divide between the lands of the Muslims and the lands of the non-believers (Kuffar); in other words a march.

3. The Arabic Sources

Until recently, the most important Arabic source used by historians looking at the period was al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wal Maghrib by Ibn 'Idhari al-Marrakushi. The work was particularly valuable because it quoted from earlier sources such as the history by Ibn Hayyan and that by Ibn 'Alqama. The literary al-Dhakhira

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[30] See below p.47.

fi Mahasin Ahl al-Jazira by Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini was known about but not widely used as it existed only in manuscript form and was quite long. It is an invaluable source as it contains the earliest extant extracts from the lost text by Ibn Hayyan as well as some accounts of the events of the latter part of the century composed from eyewitnesses accounts. The complete edition of the book by Ihsan 'Abbas has made the text much more accessible. In this thesis, the al-Dhakhira is the most important primary Arabic source used. I list below, by author, the major primary Arabic sources with brief commentaries on each

a) 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri, Lord of Granada: Kitab al- Tibyan: The discovery of this manuscript in a false wall in a north African mosque in 1932 has allowed modern scholars a rare glimpse into the thoughts of the ruling class of the period. Almost all the texts that survive were written by professional men of letters, while this was, unusually, written by a deposed ruler. In terms of the information it contains, it is much more related to Granada. However, it does offer a valuable insight into views of the general history of the period.

b) 'Ali Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini: Al-Dhakhira fi Mahasin Ahl al-Jazira: Part one of the book was published between 1939 to 1942. Sections of part four were then published in 1945 by a committee headed by Dr. Azzam of the University of King Fuad in Cairo. It was then neglected until 1975,

when a section of part two was published. Finally Ihsan 'Abbas edited and published the entire book between 1976 and 1979 in Beirut. In this, he used the five extant manuscripts and corrected some of the errors he saw in the earlier editions.

Ibn Bassam (d. 542/2 June 1147- 22 May 1148), from the town of Santarem in what is now Portugal started work on his major project in Cordova in 493/17 November 1099-6 November 1100[31] and was still writing in 500/2 September 1106- 22 August 1100.[32] The book is in four parts (the modern edition is in eight volumes). Ibn Bassam's original aim seems to have been to compose a literary work containing the contribution of Muslim Spain to Arabic literature. One assumes that his aim would have been to produce a book resembling al-'Iqd al-Farid. As a civil servant, Ibn Bassam's concern with literary composition (Adab) was a normal one, although the scope of his ambition set him aside from his contemporaries in the service.

One can argue that Ibn Bassam failed in producing an outstanding work of literature, despite the very substantial amount of poetry included. His book has too many quotes from Ibn Hayyan's history.[33] However, I would argue that the qualities that might be seen as making the

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[31] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira : Part III,p.654.

[32] ibid:Part II,p.452.

[33] For a more sympathetic assessment of al-Dhakhira, see Dr.H.Y. Kharyush: Ibn Bassam wa kitabahu al-Dhakhira.

work so lacking as a work of literature make it invaluable as an historical source. Ibn Bassam was clearly awed by the scholarship of Ibn Hayyan, although he also disliked the historian's harsh judgemental attitude towards people he wrote about.[34] One of the problems of the book as a source, is that Ibn Bassam in an attempt to be as inoffensive as possible deliberately deletes names of the subjects of some of the letters he quotes from (substituting the Arabic Fulan, equivalent to the English 'so and so' or 'x') so that often his book reproduces certain letters from a particular Ta'ifa to another unnamed party. It may be that his aim was to universalise the material, but in this he differs from Ibn Hayyan's practice, to the extent of doctoring the passages he copies from Ibn Hayyan, removing individual names from them.

Nevertheless, part of his stated aim was to report on the events that had taken place in the peninsula over the preceding century and for that he quotes at great length from the now lost work of Ibn Hayyan. This arguable weakness in the composition of al-Dhakhira gives one access to some of the earliest and longest extracts from Ibn Hayyan's lost 'History'. The relationship between Ibn Bassam and Ibn Hayyan is quite intriguing. One can detect a sense of admiration for the historian and at times an effort to imitate him. Ibn Bassam called Ibn Hayyan the perfect scholar al-Adib al-Kamil. The result was that

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[34] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.586.

despite Ibn Bassam's aim to write primarily a literary work, he continues to pay special attention to recording history, even for the period after Ibn Hayyan's death.

Ibn Bassam also managed to befriend Ibn Tahir, one-time ruler of Murcia, who provided him with eyewitness accounts of events in Valencia leading up to, during and following Rodrigo's occupation of the city. He in fact composed a book about Ibn Tahir's letters. He also contacted members of the civil service collecting not only examples of their literary work, their governmental work and general anecdotes, but also accounts of major political events they had experienced in the later part of the century.

The audience Ibn Bassam was addressing was varied. On one level, he clearly had ambitions for his work to be read in the east so that scholars there might learn of the literary achievements of the west. On another level, the book was addressed to contemporary Spanish Muslim men of letters, aiming to provide them with a collection of history and literature. Finally, the work was also addressing an audience of the Almoravids who had come to dominate the peninsula politically by the time Ibn Bassam was writing. It is this last category of audience that colours the politics of the book in the most obvious manner. The cautious Ibn Bassam tried very hard not to offend the Almoravids and to present the history of the C11 in a manner which would show off their positive contribution as defenders of the faith, and which was

therefore by definition unsympathetic to the Ta'ifa rulers. The work is also subject to the limitations of the author's outlook as a Spanish Muslim of the late C11/early C12. However, whatever the shortcomings of the work, it contains some of the earliest and most detailed accounts of the period, and that in itself makes the book truly a treasury or Dhakhira.

The thesis differs from other studies of the period in its heavy reliance on the work of Ibn Bassam, using it as the primary source for information. Studies of C11 Muslim Spain, even the most recent works, have tended to under-utilise the al-Dhakhira as a source. This was partly the result of the full edition not being available until 1979. Another reason might be the perception of the work as essentially a literary one, rather than an historical work, and its length (the modern edition is in eight volumes). Moreover, becuase the book was designed to be a literary work, the historical material in it is not particularly easy to use. However, despite the literary nature of the work, it provides an invaluable source for the study of the period. First, because it contains long extracts from Ibn Hayyan which is discussed in more detail below. Secondly, the book contains anthologies of civil service letters, which while not forming 'chancery' type evidence in the western sense, give, nonetheless, a feel for the general outlook of the educated classes towards the major political issues of the period. Finally, Ibn Bassam witnessed the final stages of

the Ta'ifa period and his work contains his own record of those decades.

c) Hayyan Ibn Khalaf Ibn Hayyan: Al-Matin: It is arguable that Ibn Hayyan was one of the greatest historians of Medieval Islam. Born into a civil service tradition in Cordova, he lived through the fitna and died in 469/5 August 1076 - 24 July 1077. Ibn Bassam refers to his 'long History' and it is not clear whether his other work al-Mugtabas, parts of which survive was meant to be a shorter version of his longer history. His work does not seem to have been simply a chronology, but also contained analysis of the events which he recorded.

In the introduction to his main work (part of which is quoted by Ibn Bassam), he says that God, in the Holy Qur'an taught Man about past nations and their tribulations; the implication being that to pursue this art of relating history is to follow in a theological tradition. The introduction also touches on his concern for 'scholarship' in the pursuit of this art. Interestingly, he also states that not many scholars in his time or among those who preceded him pursued this art or regarded it highly.[35]

Ibn Bassam clearly stated that he relied on Ibn Hayyan's book for much of his historical material.[36] One

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[35] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira:part I, pp. 575-578.

[36] ibid:p.18

can find sections of the al-Matin which were lifted by Ibn Bassam being quoted in the later history al-Bayan and even in Ibn al-Khatib's A'mal al-A'yan. What does survive of Ibn Hayyan's work is impressive scholarly work, although his masterpiece, the al-Matin, seems lost, other than the sections which survive in al-Dhakhira. When using Ibn Bassam's quotations from Ibn Hayyan, I have tended to attribute them to the original author.

Ibn Hayyan seems to have been among the earliest Muslim scholars to concentrate on the study of history; a tradition which was eventually established and found its most famous proponent in Ibn Khaldun. Because Ibn Hayyan saw history as a way of recording God's trials of Man, it is arguable that he tried to be fair in his reporting (although whether he succeeded is another matter). One can see this in the way he describes the courage of Crispin in the siege of Barbastro for example. In any event, he was the most important scholar engaged in the recording of the history of the peninsula until his death at the beginning of the last quarter of the eleventh century. His work is valuable on two levels. It provides a contemporary account of many of the events in the Ta'ifa century. Second, given his background, it also provides some insight into the political outlook and world view of Ta'ifa Spanish Muslims (or at least that of their educated elite), and this helps redress the bias inherent in most of the later sources tackling the period (and often probably using Ibn Hayyan as the source of their information). While modern

historians have used Ibn Hayyan, much of his work is accessable only through quotes in much later histories. Again, the recent availability of al-Dhakhira allows one access to some of the earliest quotes from Ibn Hayyan's work.

d) Ibn 'Idhari al-Marrakushi: Al-Bayan al-Mughrib: This is essentially a chronology of the western part of Islam meant to cover the period up to 667/10 September 1268 -30 August 1269. It is a much later source, written primarily for a north African audience. Parts of this work were published in the 19th century by Dozy. Three volumes of the book were then edited and published by Lévi-Provençal in 1948. Finally Huici Miranda published the last part in 1960. The edition used also contains a fragment of a history by an unknown author about the Cid in Valencia which quotes Ibn 'Alqama as well as one dealing with the Ta'ifa period generally.

For a long time this work was the main source used for the study of the period, as it relied on and quoted from earlier sources. However, its shortcomings as a source lay in the great time difference between its composition and the events in Spain in the C11, and in its essentially north African perspective. Although it has been superseded by al-Dhakhira with its quotations from Ibn Hayyan (and which was composed at the turn of the C11/C12) the al-Bayan retains its importance, partly because it set

out to be a chronicle.

e) Ibn al Kardabus: Kitab al-Iktifa' fi Akhbar al-Khulafa': Ibn al-Kardabus lived in the second part of the C12. He used earlier sources for his history of Ta'ifa Spain, but did not specify what these sources were. Menéndez Pidal believed that he used the lost work of Ibn 'Alqama, which would argue that his account of the history of the upper march and of Valencia is particularly valuable.[37]

f) Ibn Sa'id:Al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maghrib: This is perhaps one of the most unusual books ever written in Muslim Spain. In 530/11 October 1135-28 September 1136, Abu Muhammad Ibn al-Hijari, a well known literary figure visited 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Sa'id's castle near Granada. He was then commissioned to write a book about the poets of Muslim Spain. Ibn Sa'id who commissioned the work, liked it so much that he himself added to it. The book was then added to by his two sons, by his grandson and by his great grandson. From start to finish, the book took one hundred and fifty one years to complete.

The book is divided into chapters (called books) each dealing with a particular city. Each city is then dealt with under the following headings, each heading

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[37] Parts of this book has been recently edited: Historia de al-Andalus: ed. F. Maillo Salgado. Madrid, Akal, 1986. The edition used is the Arabic, published under the title Tarikh al-Andalus li Ibn al-Kardabus wa wasfihi li Ibn al-Shabbat.

corresponding to a part of a bride's dress: al-Manassa dealing with the geography; al-Taj dealing with the governors or lords; al-Silk covering the notables, wazirs judges and clerks; al-Hulla: covering those people who were neither poets nor civil servants but who were important enough to be mentioned and finally the al-Ahdab covering those engaged in the composition of the Jezel and Muwwashahat (forms of poetry) as well as men of wit. Clearly, not every city yielded enough subjects to fill all categories, so that in some cases a book looking at a city would only cover the first three topics. In terms of historical information, the book provides what seemed to be the accepted version of main events within the context of Muslim Spain.

g) Al-Turtushi: Siraj al-Muluk: Al Turtushi who died in Alexandria in 520/ 27 January 1126-16 January 1127 was a scholar born and educated in the Ta'ifa period who studied in Seville with some of the most famous scholars in Muslim Spain at the time such as Ibn Hazm and the Judge Abu-al-Walid al-Baji.[38] It would therefore be reasonable to assume that his views as well as his historical knowledge came from these sound and rather conservative scholars. His main book Siraj al-Muluk was written after he had immigrated to the east in 476/21 May 1083-9 May 1084.[39] The historical material in it concerning Muslim Spain was

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[38] Al-Turtushi: Kitab Siraj al-Muluk, p.1.

[39] ibid.

that which was accepted and known by other scholars of the Ta'ifa period. Unlike them, however, al-Turtushi was able to put down his opinions and knowledge freely without being influenced by the pressure of Muslim Spanish politics which would have influenced the works of scholars such as Ibn Bassam. The picture that al-Turtushi paints of Ibn Abi 'Amir is therefore particularly interesting. The work was completed in Fustat in Egypt on 14th Rajab 516/ 18th September 1122.

The other Arabic sources used are well known and may be used in conjunction with the above main sources. In essence the first three of those listed above are the ones that have been used most extensively. Among the other sources used are Ibn Hazm's Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab and Naqt al-'Arus, Al-Hulal al Mawshiyya by an unknown author, Ahmad al-'Udhri's Tarsi' al-Akhbar, Ibn al-Abbar's al-Hulla al-Siyara', Ibn al-Athir's al-Kamil fil Tarikh, Ibn Darraj's anthology of poems or Diwan, Ibn al-Khatib's A'mal al-A'lam, al-Marrakushi's al-Mu'jib and Ibn Hawqal's Kitab Surat al-Ard.

The main problem for this study is the lack of extant sources dedicated to the history of particular city-states (the only exception, perhaps, being 'Abdullah's memoirs and which relate specifically to Granada). The texts that do survive from the period or later ones dealing with it, tend to be general accounts of the history of

Muslim Spain as a whole, touching on the various provinces only when these provinces interacted with the general schema of the history of the peninsula. Even al-Dhakhira which tries to cover the literary contribution of the different parts of Muslim Spain and which has within it elements of an historical work, tends to fall short in this respect, although it does provide some 'local' histories, but again, the book is a general work and these local accounts are brief and told within the context of the general history of Muslim Spain.

One is therefore left with the situation where the general history of C11 Muslim Spain is fairly well documented in extant sources, but where the histories of provinces provide one with more of a problem. It is possible, however, to extract information about the history of these provinces by studying the general accounts, although this route is clearly far from satisfactory.

It is perhaps significant that it appears that no lord of a city-state commissioned a work on his Ta'ifa or its history (although it could simply be that such works did not survive). More importantly, perhaps, no attempt seems to have been made by a 'man of the pen' to write a history of a particular province. This may lead one to argue that in the minds of the educated elite, C11 Muslim Spain remained, despite its disintegration into city-

states, a single entity.

From the perspective of this study, it means that information on Zaragoza and Valencia is available only when these states interacted with the more general events in the peninsula. Very little information survives about their 'internal' affairs, the inter-province relationship or even the exact mechanics of local government (no Muslim legal documents or deeds survive). The information that is available is glimpsed through a window in more general works when these city-states are mentioned within a discussion of the general history of the period.

A brief word should be said about the tradition in Islamic culture of copying and relaying information provided by earlier scholars. The origins of this tradition are rooted in the jurists' pre-occupation with preserving the sayings of the Prophet, Hadith, which formed, after the Qur'an, the second main source of religious law and conduct, al-Sunna. The Qura'n, being the word of God, was in the eyes of these jurists, protected by God. The reports of the Hadith, however, had to be authenticated. For this reason a whole branch of investigative literature grew which dealt with the authenticity of each Hadith. The way in which a Hadith was authenticated was by tracing it back through the various people who related it to its original source, usually one of the Prophet's companions (the format would normally be:

I copied from so and so who copied from so and so who heard so and so say that he heard the Prophet say). Hadiths were then divided into a spectrum with those which could be traced back via several different sources being the most accepted to ones which could only be traced back through one source which were treated with more caution. The relevance of this to the study of non-religious works is that this methodology of tracing the source spilled over into other forms of scholarship, so that in al-Dhakhira one often comes across the phrase "Ibn Hayyan" said (Qala Ibn Hayyan). At the end of such a quote, one often finds the phrase "Here ends what Ibn Hayyan said" (Intaha Qawl Ibn Hayyan), or alternately the next phrase starts "So and So said". This format was followed in later sources, so that one can often, but not always, determine the earlier source or sources used by later authors. Interestingly, this pre-occupation with setting down the pedigree of what was being related continued to be expressed as if it were a recording of an oral tradition in the manner of the study of the Hadith, even when the medium was clearly the written word, so that, for example, the very beginning of the surviving manuscripts of al-Dhakhira start with the phrase

> Abu al-Hassan Ibn Bassam al-Shantarini al-Andalusi, May God have mercy on him, said (Qala):[40]

One can therefore argue that in Muslim scholarly tradition, the reference to oral sources should not be seen as

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[40] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, part I, p.11.

secondary to written sources. If anything, it reflects a greater concern for authenticating the related material (although that does mean that such a process necessarily resulted in an accurate account).

1 - Before the fitna

1. 1 Introduction

This thesis is mainly concerned with two Ta'ifa states, those of Valencia and Zaragoza. Although the independent rulers that emerged over the different states of Muslim Spain in the fifth century A. H. /eleventh century A.D. are collectively known as Muluk al-Tawa'if, or party Kings (ta'ifa meaning party and malik often translated as meaning king), it would be clearer for the purposes of this study to divide them into two rough categories. On the one hand, there are those rulers who reigned over cities that evolved by roughly mid-century into centres of power. As discussed in the introduction, one can call these either governors (although they held their office independently from any higher authority) or perhaps more accurately lords, and their domains city-states. Examples of such city-states include Zaragoza and Valencia in the upper march, Toledo in the central march, Badajoz in the lower march, Seville, Cordova and Granada in the south. On the other hand, there are those rulers who reigned over cities and provinces that were clearly in the sphere of influence of the greater states. Properly speaking these cities belonged to the A'mal, that is the area, including lesser towns, under the control of a major city of the greater city-states. The rulers of such

lesser cities, although belonging to Muluk al-Tawa'if were more akin in terms of real power to governors than to lords. These are referred to as lesser lords or simply as rulers of a particular city. There were also cities which did not conform to the clear cut definition above, falling somewhere in between these two broad types. Such were the city-states that were at times independent and at other times within the sphere of influence of larger city-states, even after the larger states had established themselves by the second half of the century. Among these in the upper march was Lérida, which will be examined later in the context of Zaragoza. A study of the states of Valencia and Zaragoza has to look not only at the major cities, but also the lesser cities within the A'mal, as well as the neighbouring states.

The major Tawa'if established themselves in cities and extended their control into the countryside and neighbouring lesser towns. A rather unusual characteristic of this structure, though, was that a particular party-state did not have to originate in the city in which it established itself but might move in from elsewhere. Examples of this include the Bani-Hud who were in Lérida and in 1039 took over Zaragoza,[41] and the Bani-Ziri, who were recent immigrants from North Africa, brought over by Ibn Abi 'Amir to form part of his standing army in the three decades prior to the fitna, and who established themselves first in Elbira and then in

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[41] The Hudid takeover of Lerida and their later move to Zaragoza will be looked at in Chapter 3. A description of this part of their career is in Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan: vol. 3, pp.221-222.

Granada.[42] The cities controlled the A'mal, and the centre of each state was clearly the city. A takeover of another state involved taking over the major city which brought the victor control over the A'mal. It must be kept in mind, however, that the A'mal formed the economic foundation of a state, hence the majority of inter-Ta'ifa wars involved raids on these A'mal. Examples of conquest involving the takeover of major cities in the fifth century A.H./ eleventh century A.D. include the conquest of Cordova by the Bani-'Abbad of Seville in 462/20 October 1069 - 8 October 1070.[43]

1. 2 Geographical Background

The two states with which this thesis is concerned lie in areas of differing geographical formation.[44] These differences influenced to some extent the political role of these cities immediately prior to, and during, the Ta'ifa period. In a general sense, Muslim Spain's frontier with the Christian north was along three main thughur (singular thaghr), or marches. The upper march centred around Zaragoza, the central march around Toledo and the lower march centred around Badajoz. Prior to the fitna, the evidence suggests that the thugur were centred around Zaragoza,

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[42] 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Kitab al-Tibyan, describes the Zirid immigration to Muslim Spain pp.16-17. He also describes the Zirid move from Elbira to Granada pp.21-22.

[43] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira: Part I, pp.610-611.

[44] See Maps (A) and (B) above.

Medinaceli (also in the north of Spain) and Toledo.[45] However, it seems that during the fitna Badajoz emerged as a centre of a march in its own right[46] while Medinaceli lost its importance. Ibn Hayyan, refers to Badajoz as the thaghr of the West of al-Andalus.[47]

The most obvious geographical difference between Zaragoza and Valencia is that Zaragoza is further north. Its A'mal which formed the upper march were the northernmost Muslim settlements in the peninsula. The Zaragozan march occupied the Ebro basin. This forms a more or less triangular shape (see map A) bordered by the Pyrenees in the north, the Iberian mountains in the west and south, and the Catalan hills in the east. The triangle of the basin comes to a point in the north-west where the Pyrenees approach the Iberian mountains, the widest area being in the east where the Catalan hills nearly join the Iberian mountains.

The basin is isolated from the Mediterranean coastal plain by the Catalan hills, except for a gorge where the Ebro forces its way between them and the Iberian mountains, and where Tortosa is situated. The northernmost borders of the Zaragozan province were where the Pyrenees came down in gradual steps. There Huesca and the fort of Barbastro were situated. The Ebro basin itself is not simply one lowland area, but properly speaking two. An upper portion, roughly

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[45] Prieto y Vives: Los Reyes de Taifas: p.42.

[46] ibid p.51.

[47] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.650.

a fifth of the area is on a higher level, averaging 1100 feet, and a lower portion on a lower level averaging 750 feet. The two sections meet near Tudela where the valley is greatly constricted. Despite the general lowland characteristics of the Ebro valley it does not offer good facilities for easy movement. The fertile soil in the valley is along the flood plain of the Ebro, the rest being steppe-like and with severely restricted vegetation.

The valley has two main fertile areas. The most important is in a narrow ravine belt around Zaragoza and stretching along the Ebro to the valley of Jalon in the west. This area has been irrigated since Roman times. The second most important fertile area is near the city of Lérida where the rivers Cinca, Noguera and Segre flow.[48] Away from the fertile areas or huertas (gardens) the climate is scorched in the summer and often frozen by bleak winds in the winter.

The overall geographical picture of the march, then, is that of a rough steppe hemmed in by mountains with communication within the area being difficult. This would affect the ability of the main city in its attempts at controlling the A'mal. The climate is harsher than in the south, with the fertile area concentrated mostly in two areas, near Zaragoza and near Lérida. This may help explain why these two cities developed into being the main centres of

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[48] For a good description of the geographical characteristics of the area see W.B. Fisher & H. Bowen-Jones: Spain:A Geographical Background. Also of interest is Naval Intelligence Division: Spain & Portugal. This book was prepared as part of the war effort and therefore the description of the geography of the area around Zaragoza and Valencia was made with a military use in mind.

power in the region. It is also worth noting that Zaragoza with its wider belt of fertile land was the more dominant political centre of the two. The march's lines of communication southwards towards the rest of Muslim Spain were made difficult by the Iberian mountains. An alternative route, the sea route, was made difficult by the Catalan hills, so that the only viable access to the sea was via the Ebro through Tortosa. Al-Idrisi in his 'Geography' mentions this link.[49] However, the difficult terrain within the province, combined with the mountainous terrain which surrounded it on all sides, combined to create a natural defence against any military advances from the south as well as from the north.

As a whole, the province seems to have been underpopulated, at least at the turn of the 10/11 century. Ibn 'Idhari, quoting Ibn Hayyan records how 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir (1002-1008),[50] son and successor to al-Mansur, on his first campaign north against the fort Hisn of Mommagastre de Meya, in the province of Barcelona,[51] having besieged and taken the fort offers his troops the choice of settling in that area promising each a hearth, land to plough and two dinars per month.[52] That such an offer was made to

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[49] al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p.191.

[50] Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, pp.3-7.

[51] J. Vallve identifies the fort mentioned by Ibn 'Idhari and contends that although it was loyal to the County of Barcelona, it belonged geographically to the A'mal of Lerida: La Agricultura en la España Musulmana: p.231.

[52] Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p.7.

the troops suggests very strongly that there were not enough settlers in nearby Lérida to move into the vacated area. That the offer was so generous (a monthly salary plus a house and land) suggests that the area was not very tempting. This is hardly surprising considering its difficult terrain and the close proximity to the hostile border. One would assume that some soldiers took up the offer. As for the population of the main cities of Zaragoza and Lérida we have no concrete evidence of size. Vicens Vives accepts Torres Balbas' estimate of 17, 000 for the population of Zaragoza at the turn of the century, which is based on the walled area of the medieval city.[53] This figure is, at best, an educated guess, and we can only make a reasonable assumption that the population of Lérida was probably less than that of Zaragoza.

The second point to be made about the population of the upper march concerns its ethnic make-up. Vallve believed that the march was populated mainly by Spanish Muslims,[54] that is to say indigenous Spaniards who had converted to Islam at some earlier stage. It is noteworthy that for a long time after the Muslim conquest, the upper march was ruled by the Bani Qasi (Qasi being an Arabisation of Cassius[55]) who were members of the indigenous aristocracy. The time of the

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[53] Jaime Vicens Vives: An Economic History of Spain, p.106. R. Fletcher in The Quest for El Cid, p.20 puts the population at 12,000-15,000.

[54] J. Vallve: La Agricultura en la España Musulmana, p.232.

[55] J.F. O'Callaghan believes that the banu Qasi were descendants of Fortun, the son of Count Casius, A History of Medieval Spain, p.112., while R. Collins is more cautious, Early Medieval Spain, p.180.

conversion of the majority of the population is hard to discover. The Bulliet method of tracing conversions by looking up the first generation to have used Arab names and assuming that that represented second generation Muslims founders in Muslim Spain as there is some evidence that Christians used Arabic names without converting. There were also, of course, members of the Arab aristocracy (or those claiming to belong to it) descended from those who arrived with the Muslim conquest in the first century A.H./eighth century A.D. There also seems to have been a considerable population of Jews, in parts of the province. Al-Idrisi records that Tarragona was a city of Jews along with a few Christian Rum.[56] There also seems to have been a Christian or Mozarab population which had not converted, but which preferred to remain in the province despite the close proximity of the Christian domains. This can be seen in the above mentioned example in al-Idrisi, as well as in at least one legal document involving the Christian population.[57] Among other things, the document shows a certain amount of legal independence given to the Christian population, which would suggest that the population was large enough for the Muslim authorities to court its loyalty. It also shows members of this population adopting Arabic names suggesting that these Mozarabs felt integrated into Zaragozan society.

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[56] Al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p.191.

[57] R. Collins, 'Visigothic Law and Regional Custom in Disputes in Early Medieval Spain' in Davies and Fouracre ed: Settlement of Disputes, pp.96-97.

Other examples of Christians adopting Arab names without converting include a Bishop, with the singularly Muslim name of 'Abd al-Malik, who had a translation of Canon Law into Arabic dedicated to him in 1049-1050,[58] as well as C10 Mozarab immigrants to Castile and whose Arab names are reflected in the surviving latin versions such as the monk of Berlangas called Abogaleb.[59]

Perhaps this mixture of ethnic groups, as well as the dominance of the Spanish Muslims in the province, along with the close proximity of Christian domains, helps explain the apparently more tolerant attitude in the north to Dhimmi (non-Muslim) communities. This was reflected in the ease with which military commanders in the march employed Christian troops. It was also reflected in the fact that following the upheavals of the early years of the fitna in Cordova, part of the Jewish population of that city chose to emigrate to Zaragoza,[60] and reached a rather sizeable community of 1200. [61]

In contrast to Zaragoza, Valencia was not a march (although al-Idrisi describes it as a base Qa'ida among the bases of al-Andalus[62]) and as such did not suffer from the close proximity to potentially hostile Christian domains.

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[58] R. Fletcher, The Quest For El Cid, p.52.

[59] ibid. p.60.

[60] E. Ashtor: The Jews of Muslim Spain: Vol. 2, p.238.

[61] ibid., p.254.

[62] Al-Idrisi: Sifat al-Maghrib: p.192.

The city itself was situated about three miles from the sea.[63] The A'mal of Valencia occupied a crescent shaped coastal plain facing the sea (see Map B). It is bordered from the north by the Iberian mountains, except in the north-east where the coastal plain continues past where the Ebro forces its way to the sea and then onwards east of the Catalan hills. In the west it is bordered by the edge of the central Meseta. In the south it is bordered by the Betic Cordillera, also known as the Andalusian highlands, which are an irregular series of mountain ridges. In the south-east the coastal plain continues south in a narrow wedge where Denia and Alicante are situated, then on to where it opens up into the plain around Murcia. Finally, the Valencian A'mal were bordered by the sea from the east.

This crescent-shaped plain bordered by hill country is, properly speaking, part of the levant, the extreme north-east of the Valencian plain being the edge of southern Spain. It is a lowland, with the characteristics of lowlands as regards easy communication, unlike the Ebro basin. Moreover, it is a very fertile plain being irrigated by the streams of Mijarras and the rivers of Palencia, Mogro, Turia, Jucar (with its tributary the Cabriel) and Serpis. Inland north and south of Valencia there is a zone of continuous cultivation extending some fifty miles where the soil is black and rich. The province of Valencia also has the

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[63] ibid. For a good guess at the description of the city at the end of the century see R. Fletcher: The Quest for El Cid, pp.166-171.

advantage of a favourable climate. The summers are cooler than those of the south, while the winters are almost as mild, and warmer than those of the neighbouring Ebro. The rainfall is not abundant, but is more evenly spread throughout the year, no month being entirely without rain.

These ideal conditions contributed to making Valencia a prosperous province. The fertility of the plain ensured rich harvests, while the easy communication routes north and south as well as seaward made Valencia ideally placed for trade. Moreover, although the crescent-shaped province is bordered by highlands from its western side, it is not as cut off westward as one might believe at first glance. The valleys of the Jucar and of its tributary, the Cabriel provided access from the central Maseta, while the valley of the Turia provided access down from the Iberian mountains. In general then, the Valencian A'mal were rich, bordered, but not cut off, by highlands, with the coastal plain extending north and south. In peacetime this would ensure a prosperous economy based on the export of native produce[64] and on the profits made because of the province's position as a crossroads for trade routes running from the north-east to the south-east of Muslim Spain and from the central Maseta to the sea. The terrain gave the province a degree of protection but did not detract from its accessibility, unlike the terrain of the Ebro basin. In politi-

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[64] For a brief discussion of the agricultural base of Valencia see A.Huici Miranda: Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región, Vol.1, pp.58-61.

cal terms, this along with the province's relatively close proximity to Cordova insured that its governors were not too independent from the wishes of the government there. Nor was there a need to keep Valencia well fortified; by the early part of the eleventh century A.D. , the city's fortifications needed repair.

One would assume that such ideal conditions made for a well-populated province. There is no direct evidence to support this, but then, unlike the upper march, there is no evidence to the contrary. There is, however, the point that the population of the city of Valencia was not very large. Vicens Vives quotes Torres Balbas in estimating the population of Valencia at the turn of the eleventh century A.D. at 15,500.[65] Is one to assume, then, that since the population of the city of Valencia was less than that of Zaragoza, the population of the province of Valencia as a whole was less than that of Zaragoza as a whole? Keeping in mind the difference in the geography of the provinces, an argument can be made that ta smaller population of the city of Valencia does not lead to such a conclusion. The geography of the Ebro basin would suggest a high concentration of population around Zaragoza and another less dense concentration around Lérida. The majority of the rest of the

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[65] J. Vicens Vives: An Economic History of Spain, p 106. R. Fletcher The Quest for El Cid, p.20. estimates the population of Valencia at 15,000-20,000. It has to be said that both Fletcher's numbers and those quoted in Vicens Vives are no more than educated guesses. I tend to agree with Vicens Vives' guess, if only because the general feel of the evidence seems to suggest that Zaragoza was a bigger and more important city than Valencia.

province's population would be settled along the banks of the Ebro. Given the political geography of the province, that is, its position as a frontier and its close proximity to potentially hostile Christian states, one can also reasonably assume that outside the two main cities, the majority of the population lived near fortified towns or castles.

On the other hand, the province of Valencia did not suffer from such political or geographical handicaps. The province as a whole was rich and fertile, with the most fertile area within fifty miles of the city of Valencia. However, unlike the Ebro basin, agricultural communities could settle along the banks of several rivers. Moreover, because of the province's political geography, that is, its relative protection from direct hostilities, settlers did not have to be concentrated in the shadow of major cities, fortified towns or castles. In other words, it is not unreasonable to assume that the relatively low population of the city of Valencia reflected a pattern of relatively higher population dispersion within the province, rather than a lower overall population, compared with that of the Zaragozan province.

If one accepts the probability that the population of the province of Valencia was at least as great as that of the province of Zaragoza, possibly greater, but more widely dispersed within the province, a question relevant to this study comes to mind. Which of the two provinces could produce a higher percentage of males with military experience? On one level, it would be reasonable to assume that Zaragoza

because of its role as a march under constant threat of attack from the hostile Christian states would have, not only men skilled at warfare in the employ of the commanders of the cities, fortified towns and castles recruited locally, but also that the average male member of the population would have been more skilled with weapons than one from the more protected south. In general, some of the male population of Muslim Spain tried to join as volunteers Mutawwa'a [66] at least once a lifetime to perform the duty of Jihad, but it seems likely that because of the constant raids from the north, an average male living in the march found himself involved in military situations more often than one from the south.

There is evidence to suggest that some of the settlers in the upper march in the final decades of the tenth century A.D. and first decade of the eleventh, were ex-soldiers. There is the case of the soldiers offered a hearth, land and two dinars a month referred to above. There is also the case of the army of the Slav commander Ghalib stationed at Medinaceli which was defeated by that of Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir in 370/17 July 980 - 6 July 981.[67]

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[66] Evidence for people joining as Mutawwa'a can be seen in 'Abdullah ibn Ziri, Kitab al-Tibyan, p.17 when he mentions that Ibn Abi 'Amir abolished the system, substituting a tax for the religious duty instead. Later in the century, the letter by Ibn al-Qusayra describing the battle of al-Zallaqa (Ibn Bassam al-Dhakhira, part II, pp.241-244) clearly shows that he, despite being a civil servant, had participated in the battle (suffering a small wound). One assumes that he had joined because it was a jihad rather than because it was expected of ministers to undertake fighting duties.

[67] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan: Vol. 2, pp.378-379.

It would be reasonable to assume that some of the survivors would have chosen to remain as settlers in the area in which they were stationed. Some would have remained at Medinaceli, others would have settled in Calatayud further north or possibly in Guadilajara southwards.

In general terms one would assume that the Zaragozan province had a higher percentage of men skilled in the use of arms than southern provinces. Presumably, this may help explain why Zaragoza found it easy to put effective armies in the field in the first two decades of the eleventh century A.D.

Valencia, on the other hand, probably had a lower percentage of its male population skilled in warfare. There were the volunteers referred to above, but a Muslim male who joined the professional soldiers of the Caliphate in an expedition to perform a once in a lifetime religious duty (rather like pilgrimage) would probably not have gained much military skill during his short service. Moreover, those living in the province of Valencia did not feel as threatened as those living in the province of Zaragoza; nor were they subjected to the raids constantly suffered by the Zaragozans. So that while for the average Zaragozan male volunteering for military duty would have been at times a necessity, and the acquisition of military skills important for survival, for an average Valencian male fighting was a non-urgent duty performed, perhaps, once a lifetime for religious purposes, and not linked with the pressure of living in direct confrontation with the enemy. However, even this limited

experience in military training was denied them with the introduction of the so-called military reforms by Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir. He decreed that the people of Muslim Spain would be excused from volunteering,[68] effectively abolishing any form of militia and denying the population of the non-march provinces any form of military experience.[69] This, presumably, would help explain why the people of Valencia acquired a reputation in the eleventh century A. D. for military feebleness, exhibited on such occasions as the battle of Baterna, which will be discussed later.

1. 3 The province's relations with Cordova: I: Theory

Whatever the historical reality of the nature and the reasons leading to the disintegration of Umayyad power in the peninsula, it is clear from the writings of Ibn Hayyan that for the educated Spanish Muslims, there existed in their minds a period, or even an ideal, of a legitimate governmental structure prior to the fitna, and more generally, prior to the period when Ibn Abi 'Amir was in power. They saw the changes forced on this system as leading to the calamities of the fitna and the ensuing disintegration of the state. It is also clear that in the turbulent period during and following the fitna those involved in the political arena,

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[68] 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p.17.

[69] Huici Miranda argues that the province had (Ribats), manned by volunteers, and which were abolished by the 'Amirids. Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región,vol.1,p.145.

whether on the level of governors or even civil servants, were not clear of the parameters of the new political framework which was evolving in the peninsula, responding to events in a reactive manner. However, there was a constant attempt to place their relations with one another (on an inter city-state and intra provincial basis) as well as the foundation for their authority within each city-state, within the bounds of a political framework, or system of government, which could be understood and accepted by them and which was based, in part, on their understanding of what the pre 'Amirid system of government consisted of.

This has two important implications. First, in their relations with central authority, whether in the midst of the fitna or later in response to the advent of the Almoravids, the various lords of the provinces tried to define this relationship with reference to what they believed to have been the norm prior to the collapse of the Caliphate (although this ideal of a governmental system might not have existed in reality). In the case of Zaragoza, the treaty which will be looked at below might be seen to represent only a reflection of the results of a particular confrontation with central authority. However, this treaty provides the basis of what can be seen as the ideal, or the theory, governing the relations between the provinces and Cordova in the minds of the civil servants who formulated it, and the protagonists who required it. The provinces and the Caliphate may not have adhered to such parameters, but there was a belief in the C11 that such theoretical boundaries forged under the Caliphate in

the C10 formed the basis of legitimate government. Even after the state disintegrated into a collection of city-states, the theoretical framework for the relationship between Cordova and its provinces would have provided the basis on which the newly emerging city-states would have liked to develop their relationship with their A'mal, although whether such theories were ever put into practice under the Caliphate or within city-states is a matter for debate.

Secondly, because the Spanish Muslims came to believe that such an ideal existed under the Caliphate, they tended to respond with antagonism to changes made to the Umayyad system. As will be discussed later, an argument can be made that for the first three decades of the C11, the peninsula was trying to revert to what it believed to be the legitimate Umayyad system. One could even argue that the failure to bring about this reversal resulted in a general disillusionment which added to the sense of chaos and division which characterised the period.

The main point to be made, however, is that this theoretical framework of government and the adverse changes which Spanish Muslims believed were introduced by Ibn Abi 'Amir (and which will be looked at in the following chapter) formed a very important part of the political outlook of those in power throughout the C11. It is therefore useful to examine in some detail this system of government as they believed it had existed as well as the events which they believed had led to its collapse. This dictates, however, that one looks at a period which properly speaking precedes

that of this study.

The geographical positions of both the province of Valencia and that of Zaragoza coupled with the political connotations of these positions were among the important factors that helped shape the relations of these provinces with Cordova. The relationship between the government in Cordova and the provinces influenced to some degree the way in which the various provinces evolved into independent city-states during the collapse of the government in Cordova at the end of the 'Amirid dictatorship - a period which the people of Muslim Spain called al-fitna. In particular, it is useful to look at the way in which the relationship between Zaragoza and the Cordovan government differed from that between Valencia and the Cordovan government during the reigns of the three Caliphs preceding the collapse: those of al-Nasir, al-Hakam and Hisham al-Mu'ayyed.

In general, the government in Cordova did not practise direct control over the provinces, although its civil service seems to have been developed enough to deal with a fair amount of direct rule. However, the Caliphs lacked the other essential tool that would have helped them exercise constant direct control over the provinces: the Cordovan government did not have a large standing army. Ibn Hawqal, the merchant-turned-traveller who visited Muslim Spain during the reign of al-Nasir, found the people of that country lacking in strength, courage and horsemanship as well as having weak characters and intellect. He expressed surprise

that they retained control over their land.[70] In his book, Kitab Surat al-Ard, he concludes that the Muslims in Spain conducted their war with trickery and cunning (al-Kaid wal Hila). He also expresses surprise that the Caliph kept only five thousand horsemen in his pay, thus putting himself at the mercy of the lords of the marches (Ashab al-thugur) for warding off the Christians (al-Rum).[71]

This standing army, or rather palatine guard, was mostly made up according to Ibn Hayyan from Slav Saqlab slaves.[72] Their duties included guarding the Caliph in his palace-city, although there are suggestions that the city itself was in part policed by the men of the wazir Sahib al-Medina, best translated as governor of the city, as well as those of Sahib al-Shurta (not to be confused with the modern Arabic meaning of 'shurta' which is police) whose men kept public order and meted out punishment for civilian crimes.[73] There are suggestions that these latter, among other duties, carried out the nastier punishments ordered by the Caliph such as the crucifying of the senior officers whom al-Nasir blamed for the disastrous campaign of Ramadan-Shawwal 327/July - August 939 against Galicia.[74]

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[70] Ibn Hawqal: Kitab Surat al-Ard: p.104.

[71] ibid. pp.108-109. His use of the word Rum to describe the Christians is a reflection of the fact that he was from the east where it was in common usage.

[72] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.61.

[73] For a brief study of the Shurta in al-Andalus, see Lévi-Provençal, Histoire l'Espaigne Musulmane, Vol.1, p.259.

[74] Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas: vol V: pp.445-446.

Besides their duty as a palatine guard, the Slav corps was used by the Caliph to exert pressure and bring into line rebellious governors by mounting military expeditions against them - the most famous rebel of the period being Ibn Hafsun in his fort of Bobastro. Moreover, the Slav corps were formed into the nucleus of the expeditions which the Caliph conducted against the Christian states in the north to weaken them and maintain the defence of the marches. To this nucleus was added the corps of volunteers joining to perform the duty of Jihad, and more importantly (from the Caliph's point of view) the experienced military contingents from the marches.

Clearly, the Slav corps could not deal with all these duties at once. The Caliph had to tackle each problem separately. Nor could the Caliphs, in the early part of the tenth century, spare an army to be permanently posted in the marches to protect the realm. When trying to subdue rebels within Muslim Spain, al-Nasir had to rely on the frontier lords to protect his borders. It was quite common for these lords to rebel themselves and form alliances with their Christian neighbours. When the Caliph was in the march forcing the march lords to join his expeditions against the Christian states, the rebels in the south often re-declared their rebellion. Hence Ibn Hawqal's comment that the Caliph relied on the lords of the <u>thugur</u> for the defence of Muslim Spain. The limited size of the Caliphal army may also help explain why the Caliphs preferred to reach some form of negotiated peace with the rebels even when they seemed to have

the upper hand militarily. Examples of this include the negotiated peace al-Nasir concluded with Omar Ibn Hafsun - despite the rebel's notorious record- in 303/17 July 915 - 4 July 916 [75]. They also include the peace al-Nasir forced on Muhammad Ibn Hashim al-Tujibi, lord of Zaragoza, after a long siege of the city in Muharram 326/November 937 [76]. The government in Cordova knew that it could rule its most distant provinces only with these provinces' active consent. Because al-Nasir had a standing army of only five thousand horsemen, he needed to reach a form of accommodation with the lord of Zaragoza. The Caliphate did not possess the means to garrison permanently the rebellious province. Zaragoza offered the Caliphate additional difficulties which will be examined later.

The treaty drawn up at the end of the above mentioned siege, and quoted in full by Ibn Hayyan in his book al-Muqtabas, offers a very good picture of what the political relationship between Cordova and the provinces entailed, at least in theory. Much of the document is concerned with offering safe conduct (Aman) to Muhammad Ibn Hashim and his followers and with the implementation of this specific truce (that Muhammad was to leave Zaragoza for a period, that he was to present himself in Cordova and that he was to surrender hostages for his continued loyalty). However, within the document are clauses defining the services that Muhammad owed

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[75] ibid: pp.112-116.

[76] ibid: pp.404-406.

the Caliph and what the Caliph owed in return. Some of these services are specific to Zaragoza as a centre of a march and will be looked at later in the context of the specific relationship between Zaragoza and Cordova. Other services were more general and would probably have been demanded by the Caliph from all the provinces. Starting with the second of these services, the document reads:

> And that he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] is to deliver the tax revenue (jibaya) collected from his district(baladih) at the time it is due (bimahalliha),[77] and is not to withhold it beyond its due date, nor is he to deduct from its full value [literally 'number'('ada-duha)], with the exception of the tax revenue of an [single] inviolable year which is to be withheld, because of what he and the people (basit) suffered from the anger (ma'arrat) of the army and the restriction in the payment of allowances. Then he is to deliver it after the end of the year, complete in full (kamila muwaffara), without [the need for] an embassy to remind him, nor an agent to exercise pressure on him, except for a written communication if he were the governor ('Amil) or to his son if the Prince of the Faithful sees [fit] to use him [as governor].
>
> Nor is he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] to harbour [in his province] a freeman rebelling against (nazi'),[78] nor a slave who is a fugitive from, the Prince of the Faithful or any of his subjects. And he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] is to arrest whomsoever he should capture from this category (tabaqah) and send him back to his [rightful] place.

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[77] Ibn Mandhur: From the verb Halala. Mahal al-Dain meant the time for the repayment of a debt.

[78] Ibn Mandhur records several meanings of the term. A common one was immigrant, from which the medieval Spanish word enaciado is derived. However, given the drive to populate the upper march and the tone of the text it seems unlikely that this was the intended meaning. A less common usage, but one also recorded by Ibn Mandhur, was to 'fight against', which I have opted for.

Nor is he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] to persecute any over whom [his lordship] is recorded (sujjila lahu 'alayh) or will be recorded in future, who fought against him [Muhammad] alongside the Prince of the Faithful, having abandoned him [Muhammad] for him [the Caliph], in his days of loyalty to him [the Caliph], during the days of his [Muhammad's] rebellion. [79]

And he [Muhammad Ibn Hashim] is to renew his allegiance (bai'a) to the Prince of the Faithful, and keep by its conditions and be faithful in his obedience to him [the Caliph] and give [the allegiance] its full due.

And he [Muhammad] is to undertake raids with the Prince of the Faithful, becoming an enemy of whomsoever he [the Caliph] becomes an enemy to, and make peace with whomsoever he [the Caliph] makes peace with, [whether they be] lords [literally people who reign (ahl al-mulk)] or others.[80] And he [Muhammad] will withdraw his favours [literally cut his share (yaqta' nasibahu)] from any who lifts his hand against his [the Caliph's] obedience, even if it were his [Muhammad's] son or brother, adhering to all that the Prince of the Faithful holds him to, in his manifest speech and hidden will. Nor will he [Muhammad] lessen [by] interpretation the desired [end], nor will he deviate from reform by [giving] excuses (ie Muhammad is not to escape his obligations through a reinterpretation or because of a technical defect of drafting). The Prince of the Faithful has bound [himself] in settling what Muhammad asks from that [covenant], and makes it a duty upon himself, with his [Muhammad's] attainment of this position with honest obedience, to give him in governorship (yuwaliyahu) the city of Zaragoza together with all the benefits accruing to him in his record (sijjil) [this might refer to Muhammad's rights over the A'mal], permanently, nor is

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[79] The Arabic in this paragraph is awkward but I have tried to keep to a literal translation.

[80] Ahl al-Mulk presents a problem. It could be argued that since one only made peace with acknowledged constitutional units (by necessity ruled by lords) this phrase referred to those within the Caliphal realm as opposed to Muslims living outside it, possibly in the march areas.

> he [Muhammad] to be deposed from it in his lifetime [literally length of his days]. Then he [the Caliph] will not reproach him [Muhammad] with a fault, nor is he [the Caliph] to hold against him [Muhammad] the committing of a crime, whether as a result of a mistake or intentionally, nor will he [the Caliph] lend an ear to the sayings of a secret enemy or the stabbing of an envier.
>
> And he [the Caliph] is to make that [the treaty] a will for those that come after him, forcing them to maintain it [literally to stop at it (yaqifu 'alayha)], in the manner of the Caliphs in their past eras, God willing.[81]

It is clear from this document that the foremost concern of the government in Cordova (keeping in mind that the first clause concerns Zaragoza specifically, and will be looked at below) was revenue. The Cordovan government could not control the provinces beyond sending out governors (in the case of the nearer cities) or appointing a local man (in the case of the more distant cities). However, the Caliphate needed the revenue from all its provinces. The document does not specify the percentage of the total tax collected to be sent to Cordova, suggesting that such a percentage had been agreed, which in turn might suggest that such a percentage representing the share of central government was well known and accepted. In the case of non-march provinces, sending the tax revenue to the Cordovan government must have been the most positive aspect of their loyalty. Within the city and its A'mal, the governor seem to have had complete control. He would not have had a large chancery such as the one in

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[81] ibid. pp.406-407. [] contain words added to make the text clearer.

Cordova, but a smaller one to help him run the province, possibly headed (as in the case of Zaragoza in this period) by a chief clerk Katib.[82] In the case of the march provinces the governors would have command over an armed corps (the ease with which they could raise a fighting force and the need to guard the border and fortify the various castles strongly implies the existence of such a force as well as later evidence relating to the 'Amirid period), and in that of the southern provinces, over city watchmen. The Caliphate, by and large, left the governors to their own devices in running the provinces. At times, a governor was deposed and another sent to replace him. One would assume that beyond enjoying the power inherent in the office of governor, those sent out made some money by keeping for themselves a portion of the tax-revenue collected.

Had the Cordovan government shown less diligence in procuring its revenue, the governors might have become even more independent, acquiring a larger portion of the provinces' income, and the power of the government diminished as its economic resources (the revenue from which it paid the army, the civil service and equipped its military expeditions)lessened.

The clause giving the lord of Zaragoza a year's grace for paying the revenue due from him also throws light on Cordova's dependant position in its relations with its provinces. Al-Nasir could have asked for a year's revenue

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[82] ibid. p.406. The name of the chief clerk of Zaragoza was Ibn al-'Asi.

immediately, to help pay for his two-year campaign against Zaragoza. Had he done so, Muhammad Ibn Hashim - having been defeated - would probably have had to pay. However, al-Nasir wanted to ensure that Muhammad continued to pay after the besieging army left the province. Hence the clemency shown towards the governor and people of the province (the Caliph had also to insure that the Cordovan government did not give the local population reason to hate it, nor to turn the possibly rebellious governor into a saviour figure as was the case with Ibn Hafsun).

The rest of the clause concerning the amount to be paid reflects further difficulties that the Cordovan government faced in collecting its dues. In two sections of the clause there is insistence that Muhammad Ibn Hashim pay the tax-revenue in full. This would suggest that some governors, while acknowledging the theoretical right of the Cordovan government to receive the tax revenue, might have sought to lessen the burden of the obligation on themselves and their provincial administrations by sending Cordova a lesser sum than the one they were obliged to send under the 'terms' of their office. To use a modern phrase, the concern shown by the Cordovan government suggests that one of the problems facing it in its collection of the tax revenue was that some governors "fiddled the books", cheating the government of its rightful share and, no doubt, increasing their own, and their administrations' revenue.

Having made the province acknowledge, and pay the tax-revenue due in full, the Cordovan government still faced

one last major hurdle. Twice the clause mentions that Muhammad is to pay the tax revenue due at the time it was due. This would suggest that some governors even if they did pay the tax-revenue in full, delayed their payment. For the Cordovan government, whose income depended on this revenue, such delays would have been harmful, affecting the smoothness of the flow of their balance of payments, or again to use modern terminology, such delays would have harmed the government's cash flow. The remainder of the clause reflects the administrative difficulties that such delays would create. Muhammad was to pay the tax revenue owed without an embassy prodding him or an agent pressuring him. One can imagine the difficulties faced by the Caliph's treasury if many of his provinces were reluctant to pay on time (when reminded by a letter, the clause states) and had to be almost coerced into doing so. The delay itself represented an economic loss; as were the effort, time and expense of sending out agents to prod the governors into paying.

The third clause in the treaty (second in the translation) covers two aspects of Caliphal rule over Muslim Spain. The loyal governor owed the Caliph the duty not to harbour a rebel against the Caliph, nor an escaped slave of his. This hardly needs comment as it is a case of straightforward loyalty ensuring that the enemies of the Caliph found no refuge in the whole of Muslim Spain and assisting the government in Cordova in controlling sedition and revolt. However the clause extends the ban to enemies or escaped slaves of any of the Caliph's subjects. Although the clause

is demanding a service from Muhammad, it reflects a benefit that the governors would receive for their loyalty. The Cordovan government acted as a cohesive force for all the provinces ensuring that despite relative freedoms for each governor, they still remained within the context of a single entity.

Once Muhammad Ibn Hashim became a loyal subject of the Caliph, he strengthened his own position against any possible rebel. Such a rebel would not have been able to escape Muhammad by fleeing into another province, for the governor of such a province would have been duty-bound by his loyalty to the Caliph to assist and hand back any such rebel or enemy to Muhammad. The same applied to escaped slaves. The clause therefore strengthened the positions of both the Caliph and the governors -the Caliph within Muslim Spain as a whole, the governors within their province - by protecting the status quo.

The next clause was inserted to protect those over whom Muhammad Ibn Hashim had lordship and who had chosen to abandon him during his rebellion against Cordova and side with the Cordovan government. On one level, this particular clause was the product of the Zaragozan rebellion and the two year campaign that had ensued. On another level, it offers insight into the formation of political hierarchy within Muslim Spain in the tenth century A. D. The clause suggests that Muhammad, as governor of Zaragoza, would have had the right to punish any over whom his lordship was recorded (that is, registered at Cordova) had they rebelled or sided against

him in an inter-provincial feud. However, Muhammad's rights of lordship ceased when he rebelled against the Caliph. In other words, a lesser lord owed allegiance and loyalty to his overlord except in circumstances when such allegiance was in conflict with the lesser lord's allegiance to the Caliph. At all times, allegiance and loyalty to the Caliph superseded all others. This position of the Caliph as the supreme overlord, either indirectly if all stages in the hierarchy were loyal, or directly if a part of the hierarchy rebelled, contributed to the function of the Caliphate as a cohesive force in Muslim Spain.

The fifth clause of the treaty (fourth in the translation) involved the public renewal of allegiance by Muhammad to the Caliph. Public declaration of allegiance was important in that it made visible the bonds between the province and the government in Cordova. A normal way for a province to show its contrived allegiance to the Caliphate was to include the Caliph's name in the Friday prayers.

The final clause of the treaty, has two aspects. First, Muhammad's obligation to join the Caliph in his campaign against the enemies of the Caliphate reflects Zaragoza's position as a march and its governor's command over experienced soldiers. The Caliphate needed such men with military experience to supplement the palatine guard who formed the core of its armies and the relatively inexperienced (and probably unreliable) corps of volunteers joining to perform the religious duty of Jihad. Such an involvement formed the second positive manifestation of loyalty by a lord

to the Caliphate.

Secondly, the governor of a city had to be an enemy of the Caliph's enemies and a friend to his friends. This was probably a more general obligation, demanded from all governors, not just those of the march provinces. Again, it re-emphasises the position of the Caliph as the supreme overlord, loyalty to whom supersedes even family ties, traditionally strong in medieval Muslim societies. It also reinforces the position of the Caliphate as a cohesive force channelling the political direction of all Muslim Spain in any particular direction it chooses, whether against rebels within its boundaries or against neighbouring states. The list of services demanded ends with yet another indication of the Caliphate's concern that the subdued rebel's loyalty may not have been completely reliable. This is reflected in the efforts made to ward off any future attempt on Muhammad's part to lessen his full obligations by finding loopholes within the agreement or offering individual excuses for particular actions, or failures to act, that might have gone against the treaty.

There then follows a set of duties that the Caliph owes in return, with a final reminder that these are tied up with true loyalty on the part of Muhammad. First and foremost, the Caliph gave Muhammad the governorship of the city of Zaragoza along with the area or A'mal surrounding it as recorded in the archive in Cordova. In some ways, the Caliph was simply reinstating the status quo. At the beginning of the document the Caliph promises to let Muhammad's brother

keep Lérida[83] as part of the treaty with him. The Caliph went on to reinstate Muhammad over domains he already ruled. However, this gift of the Caliph's was very important in that the Caliph, as the overlord of Muslim Spain was the source of all legitimacy. One could rule a province as a rebel successfully, but in the end one would be outside the bounds of legality. This would mean that the rebel's own position was constantly under threat from those over whom he had lordship in that he had no legal right over them: the only right he did have was that of military might.

Although the importance of legality in the medieval Muslim mind is outside the bounds of this thesis, the importance of legitimacy needs to be emphasised. Going back to the concept of the Caliphate as a cohesive force mentioned earlier, we can see that in the final analysis this force was derived from the position of the Caliphate as the source of all legitimate government. It may have been that Muhammad held Zaragoza while his brother Yahya held Lérida. However, once Muhammad rebelled against Cordova, he lost the right to hold the march <u>de jure</u>, even though his military might gave him lordship <u>de facto</u>. That the ruling hierarchy of Muslim Spain in the tenth century A.D. held such legality of possession to be of importance is testified to by the fact that despite many rebellions, the fabric of Muslim Spain as a cohesive whole was not torn apart, with the governors choosing for the most part to acknowledge the Caliphate and derive

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[83] ibid. p.405.

their own legitimacy from that relationship. Had all the governors chosen to ignore such legitimacy collectively, Muslim Spain would have disintegrated into many small entities with the Caliphate probably powerless to stop the disintegration. Such a disintegration did occur when the Caliphate's own legitimacy was called into question in the second and third decades of the eleventh century, and which will be examined in the next chapter.

However, to return to the document, the Caliph by his gift, imbued the governorship of Muhammad with legitimacy by including it in the record in Cordova thus protecting (at least in law) Muhammad from the insurgency of those below him and from the attacks of greedy neighbouring governors. The clause went on to say that this appointment of Muhammad as governor was for life. This might indicate that the appointment of a governor for life was something of an exception. To a large extent this was due to the special position of Zaragoza as a centre of a thaghr, as well as its distance and the established power of the Tujibids there. There is evidence to suggest that in less sensitively placed provinces, nearer to Cordova the governors could and would have been changed periodically by orders from Cordova (for example, once al-Nasir established his authority over Valencia, he changed the governor there four times in as many years- see below pp. 95-96). That Zaragoza was a special case is further shown in the indications in the document that Muhammad's son might have been accepted by the Caliphate as a successor to his father. Making Zaragoza into an almost

inherited province reflected more the special difficulties Cordova faced in dealing with Zaragoza than a general practice of the Cordovan government in dealing with its provinces.

Interestingly, the next duty the Caliph owed a loyal subject was that of not reproaching the subject, nor accepting the stabs of enviers or secret enemies of the distant governors in the court of Cordova. The same problem, it seems, was faced by loyal vassals of the Castilian monarchy: King Alfonso VI in the eleventh century allowed his opinion of his vassal Rodrigo Diaz to be influenced by enviers and court gossips.[84]

Finally, the Caliph gave a guarantee that this agreement between Muhammad Ibn Hashim and himself would be honoured by al-Nasir's successors. This ability of the Caliphate to offer continuity in its relations with its provinces added to its ability to act as a cohesive force in Muslim Spain. Provided the governors in Zaragoza kept their loyalty, their agreement with Cordova would not be subject to change even if the ruler in Cordova were to change. The agreement was between the governors and the Caliph as a head of the government in Cordova and not as an individual, so that it was binding on the government, no matter which Caliph might be the head of government. The reference to past practice suggests strongly that this understanding of continuity and consistency in Cordovan-provincial relations was to some degree an accepted practice in Muslim Spain.

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[84] El Poema de mio Cid, end of 1st section, first cantar p.23 and end of 17th section, first cantar p.37.

1.4 Relations with Cordova II: Practice

Having looked at the theoretical framework for the relationship between the government in Cordova and the provincial administrations we now come to look at the way this was translated in reality in the relations between Cordova and Zaragoza, and Cordova and Valencia. We must keep in mind the discussion in the introductory chapter about the kind of evidence available for Muslim Spain in the tenth and eleventh centuries A. D. : that is, that in general we have no extant local histories, but rather histories of Muslim Spain as a whole. Even in literary works, historical events related to a particular province which are mentioned tend to be ones relating to the history of Muslim Spain as a whole. For instance, Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira concerns itself with the localities of Zaragoza or Valencia only when the events there affect, or are linked with, the schema of Muslim Spanish politics as a whole. Keeping all this in mind, two interesting differences appear between the treatment of Zaragoza and Valencia in the extant sources. First, there appears to have been a difference in kind in the sort of problems which Zaragoza presented to the Cordovan government from those which were presented by Valencia. Secondly, there appears to have been a difference in the frequency with which Zaragoza presented such problems from that with which Valencia did. In the decades preceding the fitna, Zaragoza was mentioned relatively often in the general histories of Muslim Spain, while Valencia was rarely mentioned. Moreover, Zaragoza, when refered to, was often named as part of a

major political difficulty faced by the government in Cordova, while Valencia tended to be mentioned, for the most part, in connection with the routine changes of governors appointed by the Cordovan government.

In part, these differences derive from the different geographic positions of Zaragoza and Valencia, discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Zaragoza was further away from Cordova and in close proximity to Christian states. Its relations with these states would have been on two levels. On the one level, there was the position of Muslim Spain as a whole, as dictated by the Caliphate, towards these states and which Zaragoza, when loyal to Cordova would adopt. Part of the obligation of being an enemy to the Caliph's enemies and a friend of his friends involved following Cordova's lead in matters of foreign policy. However, Zaragoza was also in the front line of Muslim Spain's defence and often suffered from marauding raids from the north. Valencia could easily accept the 'foreign policy' of Cordova, since it had almost no direct contact with foreign powers. The province of Zaragoza, on the other hand, was almost surrounded on three sides by hostile Christian territory. In such circumstances, it would have been perfectly understandable for the governors of the province to reach some form of accommodation with their (hostile) neighbours.

Such deviation from official 'foreign policy' was clearly resented by Cordova. In the treaty of which parts are translated above, the first clause demanded quite clearly that Muhammad Ibn Hashim should cease from conducting any such

'private' foreign policy. This first clause reads as follows:

> And Muhammad Ibn Hashim is to sever his contacts [literally rope], whether open or secret, with the Christians from the country of Barcelona to Gardania to Panpelona to Alba to Castile (al-Qila') to Galicia. He is not to correspond with them nor have dealings with them (yudakhilahum), and let him [Muhammad] oppose them in the manner of the Prince of the Faithful, and dispatch [military] divisions to their country, nor is he to make peace with them over any part of the march except after [obtaining] the permission of the Prince of the Faithful and referring to his [the Caliph's] advice.[85]

The implication in this stipulation suggests that the governors of Zaragoza did enter into negotiations with the various Christian states and did conclude some sort of truce with them. The ending of the clause is quite telling. On the one hand, it seems to forbid the governor from entering into any such individual treaties with the Christians, but on the other hand, it almost lamely stipulates that the governor should at least consult the government in Cordova before doing so. The geo-political situation of Zaragoza as the centre of the northernmost Muslim march continued to be the cause of its reaching occasional accommodation with its Christian neighbours. This ability to make peace, at times ally, with the supposed enemy of Muslim Spain as a whole, and of the government in Cordova in particular, characterised the policy of Zaragoza towards its neighbours, Muslims and Christians, in the years preceding, during and succeeding

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[85] Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, pp.406-407.

the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate. Such an ability to work with its Christian neighbours, and the experience of such co-operation even before the Ta'ifas became independent in the eleventh century A.D. differentiated the attitude of Zaragoza towards the Christians from that of the more southerly provinces such as Valencia, in that because it was a march, the administration and population of Zaragoza tended to behave in many instances in a more pragmatic way towards the Christian states.

In the early part of the reign of the Caliph 'Abd al-Rahman III, titled al-Nasir li-din Allah (912 - 961),[86] there seems to have been little difference between the relations of Cordova and Valencia on the one hand, and between Cordova and Zaragoza on the other. Al-Nasir had succeeded to a Caliphate weakened by open rebellion, even in the provinces close to Cordova. His main aim seems to have been to establish his authority first over those provinces that were supposedly loyal, that is, not in open rebellion, before turning his attentions to those provinces that were in open rebellion. Within a year of al-Nasir's accession in 301/7 August 913 - 27 July 914, there appears to have been a siege of Zaragoza,[87] although it is not clear who ordered it to be undertaken. However, the fact that it was mentioned in a general history of al-Nasir's reign suggests strongly that it must have been part of his efforts to secure the

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[86] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan: Vol. 2, p.156.

[87] ibid. p.164, also Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.99.

allegiance of the northern province. It also fits within the pattern of his campaigns (such as the one against Seville)[88] in the early years of his reign to establish his authority.

The campaign al-Nasir ordered against Valencia in 304/5 July 916 - 24 June 917 [89] was clearly an attempt to ensure the province's loyalty when the main body of his army was involved in a campaign against the north. This preemptive strike appears to have ensured the province's loyalty until Valencia rebelled again in 316/25 February 928 - 13 February 929.[90] Another campaign in the province seems to have re-established al-Nasir's authority. This last campaign was conducted and won at a time when al-Nasir seems to have regained for the Caliphate more control over the provinces nearer Cordova, especially since he had managed to capture Bobastro , the 'capital' of the Bani-Hafsun,[91] the main rebels against the Caliphate in this period.

The upper march, however, seems to have been a source of some difficulty for the new Caliph on two levels. On one level, it seems to have been the target of attacks by the Christian north, who were taking advantage, no doubt, of the Caliph's occupation with internal affairs. These included the attack of King Sancho of Navarre on Tudela in

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[88] Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.69.

[89] ibid. p.127.

[90] ibid. p.228.

[91] ibid. p.222.

303/17 July 915 - 4 July 916,[92] the combined attack of Navarre and Galicia against the upper march in 305/24 June - 13 June 918,[93] and the attack of Navarre against the march in 311/21 April 923 - 8 April 924.[94] On another level, the authority of the Caliph does not seem to have been completely accepted in the upper march. Feuding among the lesser lords of the march did occur. In 306/14 June 918 - 2 June 919 a local lord named 'Amroos Ibn Muhammad attacked and took over the governorship of Huesca from his brother,[95] ignoring, it seems, the peace expected within the Caliphal domains and the right of the Caliph to designate governorships.

Both these types of difficulties were a threat to the Cordovan government. The attacks of the Christian states had to be halted if the borders of Muslim Spain were to be protected. The feuding in the upper march also had to be halted and for three main reasons. First, the anarchy that would ensue from such feuding would only weaken the upper march, making it vulnerable to attacks when the Caliphate's army was absent. Secondly, such feuding challenged the legal right of the Caliph to appoint the governors he chose, as well as the peace his overlordship over Muslim Spain ought to have imposed over his domain. Finally, such strife disrupted the collection of taxes and their transmission to

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[92] ibid. p.124.

[93] ibid. p.143.

[94] ibid. p.143.

[95] ibid. p.147.

the government in Cordova.

The response of the Caliphate to both types of threat came in a single action; raids against the Christian states through the upper march. Such campaigns would weaken the Christian states restricting their ability to attack the Muslim borders, as well as reinforcing the authority of the Caliph in the march with the presence of a large Caliphal army there for part of the year, bringing the important local families into line. This method of dealing with the dual sided problem which the upper march presented was employed by the Cordovan government until its collapse in the eleventh century. Examples of this include the Caliphal armies' campaigns against Navarre and Galicia in 308/23 May 920 - 11 May 921,[96] and against Navarre in 312/9 April 924 - 28 March 925.[97]

Al-Nasir used this latter campaign not only to weaken Navarre, but also to ensure the loyalty of important local families in the upper march, notably the Tujibids,[98] established there from the time of the Muslim Conquest.[99] On the march from Cordova, al-Nasir raided the province of Valencia, which was not totally loyal after the campaign of 304/5 July 916- 23 June 917, to prod its governor into

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[96] ibid. p.159.

[97] ibid. p.189.

[98] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.186, also Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.191.

[99] Ibn Hazm: Jamharat, p.430.

strengthened loyalty.[100] In fact, although al-Nasir managed to subdue Valencia, more or less by 316 A. H., he still had to forcibly subdue Jativa, the main town in its A'mal in 317/14 February 929 - 2 February 930.[101]

The Tujibids benefited from their support of the Caliphate. Hashim Ibn Muhammad al-Tujibi was succeeded by his son Muhammad in 318/3 February 930 - 23 January 931.[102] Muhammad's younger brother received the governorship of Lérida in the following year 319/24 January 931 - 12 January 932.[103] Even their rebellion (described by Ibn Hayyan as the last of the violent rebellions in Muslim Spain) in 322/22 December 933 - 10 December 934,[104] which lasted until Zaragoza was besieged and defeated in 325/19 November 936 - 7 November 937[105] did not do them any lasting harm. The treaty discussed in the previous section allowed the Tujibids to keep their governorship so long as they renewed their loyalty to the Caliphate. In fact having proven their loyalty, the Tujibids received governorship over the whole of the upper march in 330/26 September 941 - 15 September 942.[106] The geo-political position of Zaragoza as a frontier province

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100 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.190.

101 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.201.

102 Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.285.

103 ibid. p.315.

104 ibid. p.333.

105 ibid. pp.393-410.

106 ibid. p.474.

along with its distance from Cordova forced the Caliphate into allowing it to become almost an hereditary governorship, as long as the family governing it followed the direction the Cordovan government advocated in 'foreign policy'. Beyond that, the Caliph attempted to curb the power and relative independence of Zaragoza by sending a corps of Slav soldiers, loyal to him, under the command of a young officer called Ghalib, to rebuild and occupy the city of Medinaceli in 335/2 August 946 - 22 July 947.[107] Ghalib's presence had a dual function. One was to help buffer the march against the northern Christian states thus reducing the reliance of the Caliphate on the local governors for defence. The other was to be close enough to strike if the Tujibids were tempted into rebellion again.

By contrast, Cordova's control over Valencia was more established and more direct once the initial difficulties faced by al-Nasir in the early years of his reign were overcome. The strength of the authority that Cordova had over Valencia is attested to by the ability of Cordova to change the governors of Valencia when it pleased, not allowing any one governor, or any one local family to become too powerful in the province, as in the case of Zaragoza. Cordova appointed new governors in Valencia in 321/1 January 933 - 21 December 933,[108], in 322/22 December 933 - 10

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[107] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.314.

[108] Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.331.

December 934,[109] in 323/11 December 934 - 29 November 935[110] and in 324/30 November 935 - 18 November 936.[111]

Although we have less detail about Cordova's relation with the provinces during the reign of al-Hakam Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman, titled al-Mustansir billah (October 961 - April 977),[112] the information we do have points to al-Hakam pursuing the policies of his father. In Ibn 'Idhari's general history al-Bayan, Valencia was seldom mentioned during the reign of al-Hakam. This perhaps suggests that the control of Cordova over Valencia had become so well established that the province did not warrant a mention in a general brief history of the reign. As for the upper march, al-Hakam continued his father's policy of relying on the Tujibids, but trying to limit the damage such reliance inflicted on the Cordovan government by utilising the Slav corps under the command of Ghalib to act as the main defender of the march. Ghalib's campaigns against the Christian north are recorded in 356/17 December 966 - 6 December 967,[113] 357/7 December 967 - 24 November 968 [114] and a campaign against rebels in North Africa is recorded in 363/2 October 973 - 20 September

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109 ibid. p.355.

110 ibid. p.377.

111 ibid. p.391.

112 ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.253.

113 ibid. p.240.

114 ibid. p.241.

974.[115] On the other hand, Yahya Ibn Muhammad al-Tujibi whose succession to his father as governor of the upper march was decreed in 330/26 September 941 - 14 September 942,[116] had his governorship over the march reconfirmed by al-Hakam in 365/10 September 975 - 29 August 976.[117]

1.6 Conclusions

The cities in Muslim Spain in the century leading up to the collapse of the Cordovan government were the centres of provincial administration. The government in Cordova controlled the provinces by appointing and controlling governors in these cities. Muslim Spain in the century preceding the fitna thus appears to have had two sets of chains of command. There was, on the one hand, the chain of command from Cordova to the governors of the various cities, controlled by a sizeable civil service housed in the palace complex of the Caliph. On the other hand, there was the chain of command from the cities to the surrounding countryside or province, including, at times, lesser towns. This chain of command was headed by the appointed governors who formed the link between these two chains. However, this provincial chain of command existed independently from the governors, operating from the cities to the surrounding provinces. Hence governors could be changed at will without disrupting this system

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[115] ibid. p.247.

[116] Ibn Hayyan: Al-Muqtabas, Vol. V, p.490.

[117] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.249.

(as for example in the changes of the governors of Valencia referred to above). The very existence of these two chains of command and the lack of direct control over the provinces from Cordova helps explain why when central government collapsed in the early part of the eleventh century, local government went on functioning, almost independently of what was happening in Cordova. It also helps explain why the new Ta'ifas were based on the various cities and why a Ta'ifa moving into a new city found it relatively easy to gain control over the whole province. The chain of command being already in existence, the new Ta'ifa simply had to preside over its source in the city.

Within this system of provincial government, there were differences between, broadly speaking, the frontier provinces and the ones nearer Cordova. While Valencia had the ability to rebel when the Caliphate was weak, it was easily brought under control once the Caliphate became stronger. Its governor, the link between the local administration and the Cordovan government was a Cordovan appointee. The administration in Valencia in the century preceding the collapse of the Cordovan government had very little experience in military confrontation and no experience in relations with foreign powers. In other words, the experience of the Valencian administration restricted its outlook to an almost introverted direction, with very little experience of independent action. Zaragoza presented a different picture. The governors there were local men belonging to the local nobility. Although the province could not sustain rebellion

against a strong Cordovan government for long, it tended to be more independent than provinces like Valencia. The local administration in the march had much experience, in the century preceding the collapse of the Cordovan government, both in military confrontation and in conducting a foreign policy towards the Christian north. This latter involved a pragmatic accommodation with Christian states, attacking or allying with them when it suited the interests of Zaragoza. However, Zaragoza remained reliant on the ability of Cordova to put a strong army in the field and come to its aid if the Christians mounted a concentrated attack.

These differing characteristics in the administration of Zaragoza and Valencia as well as the relationship they had with Cordova help explain the way these two provinces behaved under the 'Amirid dictatorship and during the collapse of the Cordovan government that followed. Some of the traits visible in the policy of the Zaragozan administration, notably its ability to pursue its own interests even by allying with the Christian enemies of Muslim Spain, will be traced when looking at the Zaragozan Ta'ifa in the eleventh century. Valencia's inexperience in matters of war and foreign relations dictated, to some degree, the direction that the independent Valencian Ta'ifa took in the eleventh century.

Finally, a considerable part of this chapter has been concerned with the theoretical basis of the relationship between the Cordovan government and the provinces. The

importance of this lies in that even after the collapse of the Cordovan government, this framework remained the point of reference to which the A'mal referred when defining their relationship with the city and indeed, to which lesser cities or even provinces referred when defining their relationship with a stronger city-state. There is some evidence in Christian texts that in the latter part of the eleventh century some Muslim provinces, notably Zaragoza, entered into a relationship of vassalage with Castile. When looking at these allegations later, one has to refer to the Muslim understanding of a bond with an overlord, and base the assessment of whether or not Zaragoza did become a vassal of Castile (in the Castilian sense of the word) on this Muslim definition of a relation with an overlord. This framework will also help explain how Zaragoza understood its relationship with the province of Valencia in the eleventh century as it sought to gain control over it and bring it within its own sphere of influence.

2 - Dictatorship and Rebellion

2. 1 Introduction:

Most of the information we have about the Ta'ifa era is derived from sources written either towards the end of the period, when the Ta'ifas were losing their states to the Almoravids or to the Christian kingdoms, or after the end of the era. We, therefore, seldom have the Ta'ifa point of view about that period or about the period preceding it (the exception being what survives from Ibn Hayyan's works). The majority of the sources tend to portray the Ta'ifa period as one of weakness arising from disunity. This perspective affects the way in which these sources view the role that the provinces played in the period of turbulence that heralded the end of the Caliphate and the rise of the city-states: the fitna. It also affects the way in which these sources view and portray the period immediately prior to the fitna when the real power in the realm rested not with the Caliph, but with his chief wazir or Hajib Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir and later with his son 'Abd al-Malik.

Because the Ta'ifa period was seen as one of weakness, disunity and retreat before the Christian enemies of Islam, the period prior to the fitna, that of the 'Amirid dictatorship was seen as a period of glorious Islamic rule with its strong united government and successful aggressive

policy against the Christian north. Such a perception was formed in a period of renewed unity and effective hostility against the Christian enemy which had grown in power and gained seemingly irreversible advantage during the Ta'ifa period. However, such post-Ta'ifa views do not necessarily correspond to those of the Muslim Spaniards living in the early part of the eleventh century A.D. They do not help explain why the collapse of the government in Cordova occurred, nor why, when it did, the provinces cut themselves off to form independent units. To understand better the period of the fitna one has to try to see the pre-fitna period from the point of view of the Muslim Spaniards who might not have seen it in the same glorified heroic light that later generations did. By doing this one might also see why the collapse did occur and what the different lords in the cities were trying to achieve in the muddled and turbulent two decades that led to the official termination of the Umayyad Caliphate. The post-Ta'ifa viewpoint tends to paint the fitna as a period when governors wrongfully sought independence and brought upon Muslim Spain much harm. Although the lords in the cities did eventually assume independence and establish separate states, that was not what they aimed for from the start. To understand their action during those years, one has to try to see their perception of the situation and the aims they were trying to pursue.

To their eyes, the 'Amirid dictatorship fundamentally changed the system of government in Muslim Spain, so that to a degree the actions of some of the city-states during

the period of the fitna were seen as an attempt to ensure that such a wrongful system should not repeated. There were early attempts also at restoring what was perceived to be the pre-'Amirid Umayyad system of government. As will be shown below, these attempts failed. However, the 'Amirid period is important to the history of the Ta'ifa period for another related reason. The 'Amirids did introduce changes to the political system in the peninsula. Some of these changes (among others, the strengthening of central government, and the way this was achieved; the introduction of military reforms; the invitation of large numbers of Berber troops; the changes made to the civil service; the discrediting of the Caliphal system; the constant northward campaigning and the effects of these campaigns, both in terms of economic cost and increased Christian resentment) played an important role in the shaping and the development of political events in the peninsula, not just in the period immediately following the fall of the 'Amirid government, but arguably throughout the C11.

2. 2 The 'Amirids

As with the case of the Almoravids, who came to play such a prominent role in the history of Muslim Spain in the C11, the historical assessment of the 'Amirids, and in particular that of their founder, Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, has tended to rely on sources which were sympathetic to his dictatorship partly because they were written (as in the case of Ibn 'Idhari) long after his reign, when it appeared as if a period of strong Muslim rule under him was followed by a

period of weakness, division and retreat. This sympathetic assessment has found its way (as in the case of the assessment of the Almoravids) into common modern Arab consciousness. Yet, as the discussion below will attempt to show, those Spanish Muslims who were contemporary, or who lived just after his reign had a much more cynical assessment of his career and motives. Their reaction to his rule and to that of his successors, their reactions to the collapse of his government and their understanding of the changes which he had instigated were dependant on their view of the man and the motivation driving him. Part of what this section, therefore, tries to examine is not so much an historical assessment of the 'Amirid period (which has been covered before) but rather a discussion of how contemporary Spanish Muslims and those who lived in the period following his reign interpreted the events and changes that occurred during his dictatorship, since these perceptions, as well as the actual events involved, played such an important role in the forming of the Ta'ifa period.

The traditional post-Ta'ifa sources of information portray Muhammad as a just, strong ruler, working for the good of the Caliphate and the glory of Islam. However, even these later sources contain information that might suggest that although Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir was certainly respected, he was not quite as revered by his contemporaries as by later generations. This is also born out by the way in which the (near contemporary) historian Ibn Hayyan deals with him. Ibn Hayyan seems to have respected Muhammad's authority and

aggressive policy towards the Christian north, but he does not seem to have quite seen him as the perfect Muslim, or rather Jihad oriented ruler.[118] This aspect is important for two reasons. First, the fitna was to a large extent seen by the educated among Ibn Hayyan's generation as the result of, and reaction to, the 'Amirid dictatorship. Secondly, depending on one's view of Ibn Abi 'Amir's motivation, accepted actions of his might be interpreted in a different manner. To balance the later image of a strong Muslim ruler whose reign was directed towards the glory of Islam, two incidents in his career might be worth looking at.

There is at least one reference in al-Turtushi [119] to a clash between Ibn Abi 'Amir and the Cordovan jurists who attacked his government as nepotistic and corrupt. There were also accusations that Ibn Abi 'Amir's advancement owed much to his friendship with the Sayyida Subh, mother of the Caliph-to-be, Hisham.[120] There were further allegations that he had been suspected of pilfering from public funds when he was the wazir in charge of the mint- a post he was relieved of.[121] These two incidents would suggest that the contemporaries of Ibn Abi 'Amir did not view him necessarily as the honest

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[118] See Ibn Hayyan's description of Ibn Abi 'Amir's rise to power: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp.56-73.

[119] See the brief biography and discussion in the introduction, pp. 47-48.

[120] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.251.

[121] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.252.

unambitious civil servant turned model Muslim ruler that he was later made to seem. With this in mind one can survey his career and, in particular, the effects that his reign had on the relationship between Cordova and the provinces, between Cordova and the Christian north and more generally on the credibility and strength of the Caliphate as an institution.

At al-Hakam's death in Safar 366/October 976, the Caliphate was transferred to his eleven year old son Hisham. The faction supporting Hisham included al-Mushafi, al-Hakam's Hajib and Ibn Abi 'Amir's sponsor, and Subh. One of Ibn Abi 'Amir's first acts upon Hisham's succession was to ingratiate himself with the commoners in Cordova by having Hisham abolish the hated olive oil tax.[122] Ibn Abi 'Amir then turned his attention to weakening the main rivals to the faction he belonged to, the palatine guards. He turned the child-Caliph against them forcing one of their commanders Jawdhar to resign, and having another, Durray, killed. He further weakened them by extracting fines from them.[123] This left Ibn Abi 'Amir with two obstacles to absolute power, his mentor the leader of his faction, al-Mushafi, and the Slav corps under the command of Ghalib in the upper march.

His opportunity to establish himself as a more decisive leader than al-Mushafi came when Galicia hearing of al-Hakam's death began raiding the marches. Al-Mushafi was slow to respond, but Ibn Abi 'Amir led a successful expedi-

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[122] ibid. p.259.

[123] ibid. pp.262-263.

tion through the lower (al-jawfi) march to Galicia[124] in Rajab 366/February 977. As a result Ibn Abi 'Amir was made commander of the army in Cordova,[125] while Ghalib - head of the Slav contingent [126] and main rival to al-Mushafi's faction - was confirmed as commander of the army in the march area. Ibn Abi 'Amir then arranged an alliance with Ghalib in a meeting in Madrid during his second campaign in Shawwal 366/May 977, which was soon cemented with Ibn Abi 'Amir's marriage to Ghalib's daughter Asma', thus forestalling a marriage alliance being arranged by al-Mushafi.[127]

The power of al-Mushafi was thus broken. He was dismissed from office in Sha'ban 367/March 978 and arrested soon after.[128] Ibn Abi 'Amir then proceeded to show his strength with firm government extracting heavy taxes. In 368/9 August 978 - 28 July 979 he began building al-Zahira as a rival palace - complex and centre of government to the Caliph's al-Zahra'. He moved into this new complex in 370/17 July 980 - 6 July 981,[129] thus showing his hand and declaring openly that he was the de facto ruler of Muslim Spain. He kept the child-Caliph as a virtual prisoner in his palace declaring that the Caliph preferred isolation to concentrate

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124 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.62.

125 ibid. p.64.

126 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.265.

127 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, pp.265-267.

128 ibid. p.267.

129 ibid. p.273.

on religious contemplation.[130] The final obstacle to Ibn Abi 'Amir's path to total power was his father-in-law Ghalib. Both protagonists put armies in the field in which members of the important upper march families (notably the Tujibids)[131] served. The battle was very close, suggesting perhaps that Ibn Abi 'Amir's military power was not as strong as it would later develop to be. Ghalib was killed and his army defeated.[132]

Ibn Abi 'Amir's rise to power is important in three ways. First, political changes occurred as a result of his struggle to gain power. Secondly, his assumption of power brought fundamental changes in the political schema of Muslim Spain. Thirdly, political changes occurred as a result of Ibn Abi 'Amir's efforts to maintain his power.

By the time Ibn Abi 'Amir had assumed complete control of authority in Muslim Spain, symbolised by his setting up his government in a palace-complex of his own, he had destroyed several important facets of the Umayyad government. He had changed the role and position of the civil service from one loyal to, and serving the Caliphate, to one loyal to, and serving the ruler. In this way he laid the

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[130] ibid. p.278.

[131] Ibn Hazm: Jamharat, p.431.

[132] Ibn Hazm: Naqt al-'Arus, Appendix I, pp.34-36. An interesting point in this account of the battle is that it clearly referred to Ghalib wearing a distinctive signet ring, and said that Ibn Abi 'Amir accepted reports of his death only after he saw the ring. There are other references to the use of signet rings in this period in Muslim Spain, although it is not clear how distinctive the mottoes on the rings were and whether they acted as a source of identity for a family or clan or of a particular individual.

foundation for this important tool of the Umayyad government becoming accustomed to serving whoever was in power, irrespective of a legitimacy derived from the Caliphate. In some ways, Ibn Abi 'Amir's actions set the precedent for the civil servants abandoning the Cordovan government during the fitna and serving lords whose claim to legitimacy as masters of their city-states was, to say the least, suspect. Ibn Abi 'Amir also destroyed the military arm of the Caliphate. In Cordova the Slav corps were discredited, in the march defeated and in both cases deeply demoralised. The standing army of the Caliph was, as mentioned in Chapter I, not large. However, it was large enough to form the core of a military corps with which the Caliphate could keep the loyalty of its provinces in times of trouble. By destroying this corps, Ibn Abi 'Amir deprived any future Caliphs of the tool which could have helped re-establish his authority. Finally, by destroying the army of Ghalib, Ibn Abi 'Amir undid the scheme set up by al-Hakam to control the distant (and therefore more rebellious) provinces not so much by constant punitive campaigns, but with the presence of a military contingent loyal to the Caliph and serving two purposes, first, to reduce the Caliphate's reliance on the march lords for the protection of their realm; secondly, to keep a watchful eye over, and be a constant threat to these same lords, at a lower cost than that entailed in punitive campaigns. In other words, Ibn Abi 'Amir dismantled the fabric of government which preceded his reign, the ideal of which is seen in the treaty discussed in chapter one, and

substituted in its place a more centralised military based government. The Slav corps was rather small and loyal to the Caliph; the Berber troops which Ibn Abi 'Amir imported formed a larger corps, loyal to himself and which needed greater resources to keep. This new system is bound to have been unpopular and one can make the argument that in the early part of the C11, the lords of the various provinces tried to return to that pre-'Amirid system.

If in his rise to power, Ibn Abi 'Amir weakened the tools (the bureaucracy and the standing army) which the Caliphate used to rule Spain, his final position as supreme ruler of Muslim Spain was in itself damaging to the Caliphate. Ibn 'Idhari likens his takeover of authority to that of the Dylamite commanders in the east.[133] By making it obvious that he was the real ruler of Muslim Spain, Ibn Abi 'Amir weakened the legitimacy of the Cordovan government by demonstrating that it could become a mere puppet of a strong ruler.

However, Ibn Abi 'Amir never quite crossed the line dividing what was legitimate (even if just barely so) to what was not, and perhaps that had something to do with his training as a jurist. Unlike his son, he never tried to claim the Caliphate for himself or for his sons after Hisham, acknowledging the fact that the general consensus among jurists was that the Caliphate could only be held by members of certain families (Umayyads, 'Abbasids or descendants of the

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[133] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.272. This clearly copied from Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.61.

Prophet's line from the surviving female side[134]). Nonetheless, he came very close to crossing the thin line dividing legitimate from illegitimate behaviour by adopting the title al-Mansur in 371/7 July 981 - 25 June 982.[135] Adopting a title was a prerogative of a Caliph, and by calling himself al-Mansur, Ibn Abi 'Amir was giving himself a rank approaching that of a Caliph. It also set the precedent for a mere Hajib having the right to adopt Caliphal titles; a precedent taken up by his sons and later in the eleventh century by the lords of the city-states. It is important to remember that one of the most distasteful aspects of the Ta'ifa period to later historians was the adoption of Caliphal titles by Ta'ifa rulers. Yet this debasement of Caliphal prerogative was started by Ibn Abi 'Amir.

Finally, the steps taken by Ibn Abi 'Amir to maintain his position contributed to further weaken the power of the Caliphate as well as laying the foundations for the instability in the structure of government which contributed to the collapse of the Cordovan government during the fitna. The most fundamental change that Ibn Abi 'Amir introduced into Muslim Spain was to the military structure of the Cordovan government. He had weakened the Slav palatine guard so that when in power he had to either rebuild or find a substitute for it. Possibly because of his involvement in north Africa under al-Hakam, he turned to the Berber tribes

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134 Ibn Hazm: Al-Muhalla, Vol.1, pp.44-45, Vol.9, pp.359-362.

135 ibid. p.273.

there as a source for his new standing army. At the beginning he had a modest regiment of around 600 warriors,[136] which later grew considerably in size. One of the main reasons behind this importation of troops was that his position as ruler was tenuous. It depended simply on his ability to maintain power. To do this he needed a standing army, yet, unlike the Caliph whose legal position as head of state was secure, Ibn Abi 'Amir had to trust his troops not to turn against him. At first, he used the small Berber contingent to counterbalance the Slav corps. However, he soon had to import more Berber troops to counterbalance the original ones and so on. Prince 'Abdullah understood this attitude of Ibn Abi 'Amir. In his 'memoirs', he describes it:

> And his [Ibn Abi 'Amir's] opinion persuaded him that his soldiers should be different tribes and separate groups: if one of the groups (tawa'if) intended to disobey, he defeated them with the other groups.[137]

Clearly this led to a vicious circle, the more troops he imported, the more he had to import to control them.

The Berber troops crossed over to Muslim Spain taking with them their families. By 377/3 May 987 - 20 April 988 Ibn Abi 'Amir had to expand the main mosque in Cordova to accommodate the extra men, while the suburbs overflowed with the increased population.[138]. By the time he died the stand-

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136 ibid. p.279.

137 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p.16.

138 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2,, p.287.

ing army in Cordova numbered around 10,500,[139] yet his son and successor faced with the same position and adopting the same method had to import even more Berber troops into Muslim Spain.[140]

The second military change that Ibn Abi 'Amir introduced was his attempt to abolish the local militia. Instead of the provinces contributing fighting men to supplement the Cordovan army as in the time of the Caliphate, they would pay a tax instead.[141] The advantage to Ibn Abi 'Amir with such an arrangement was quite obvious. By abolishing the local militias he insured that no governor would have the military ability to oppose him, or to defend his province. The provinces would thus be both at the mercy of Ibn Abi 'Amir's troops and in need of their protection against invaders from the north as well as from inter-provincial feuding. All in all, this scheme must have increased the ability of Ibn Abi 'Amir to control the provinces, this control increasing as a new generation grew up with almost no experience in warfare. The damage done to Muslim Spain's ability to put trained soldiers in the field even as a back up to professional soldiers was great, showing in the weakness of the military ability of most of Muslim Spain in the eleventh century.

However, this attempt by Ibn Abi 'Amir to deprive the provinces of their militias was not entirely successful. The

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139 ibid. p.301.

140 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.81.

141 Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p.17.

march lords could not afford to give up their military men, for that would have weakened their defences against border raids by the northern Christians. By the end of Ibn Abi 'Amir's reign the three frontier provinces had between them nearly the same number of soldiers as in the standing army in Cordova.[142]

The third military change that Ibn Abi 'Amir introduced into Muslim Spain was the concept of intensive campaigning. During the Caliphal period campaigns were conducted at a maximum of perhaps one a year, normally during the summer. Ibn Abi 'Amir, however, conducted campaigns both in summer and in winter.[143] In his twenty five year reign he conducted between fifty two to fifty six campaigns,[144] some like that of Jamada al-Akhira 387/July 997 against Santiago de Compostela were spectacular, others less so. The reason behind this intensive campaigning were varied. In part, they were directed against the march lords to keep them in check. Ibn Abi 'Amir had destroyed and disbanded Ghalib's army whose duty was to keep the marches under control. Having disposed of this possible threat, Ibn Abi 'Amir could not afford to install a commander with another large military contingent to replace that of Ghalib, for such a commander could have turned against him. In part the campaigns were aimed at keeping the Christian states weak and unable to

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[142] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.301.

[143] ibid. p.273.

[144] L. Molina: 'Las Campañas de Almanzor a la luz de un nuevo texto', Al-Qantara, 1981, pp.216-217.

attack Muslim Spain, while keeping a firm grip over the march provinces. Zaragoza, however, because of its geopolitical situation, remained a source of trouble. In Safar 379/May 989 Ibn Abi 'Amir occupied the march and dismissed its Tujibid governor. Interestingly, he needed the co-operation of the Tujibids enough to appoint another, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Yahya, to replace the deposed one.[145] His son and successor 'Abd al-Malik also felt the need to occupy Zaragoza in his first campaign as ruler in Sha'ban 393/June 1003.[146] This would suggest that this alternative method of controlling the march province was probably less successful than the one devised by al-Hakam, and certainly much more expensive.

Another reason for conducting so many campaigns was the profit they could bring in. Ibn Abi 'Amir (and his son and successor 'Abd al-Malik) imported Berber troops to help prop up his authority. He lured them into Muslim Spain partly by offering them the opportunity to serve in a Jihad against the Christian north and the chance to earn a place in heaven.[147] Part of the lure, however, was the offer of financial gain. The Berber tribesmen who crossed over to Muslim Spain hoped to benefit from the legendary wealth of that realm. Ibn Abi 'Amir offered them a better lifestyle, one, we are told by Ibn 'Idhari, they never imagined, even

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145 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.283.

146 ibid. Vol. 3, p.5.

147 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p.16.

in their dreams.[148] The campaigns served to satisfy both of these demands of the Berbers, spiritual and financial. As the cycle of Ibn Abi 'Amir's import of troops speeded up, so his need to conduct even more campaigns increased. However, campaigns were expensive to mount. In his first campaign of 393/1003 'Abd al-Malik's expenditure, according to Ibn Hayyan, included 15, 000 dinars (one assumes gold) distributed to the Berbers plus other large unspecified amounts spent on preparation, plus 5000 shields, 5000 helmets and 5000 pieces of head-mail distributed from the government armoury.[149] Ibn Hayyan is reported elsewhere as recording that a summer expedition under Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir cost the treasury 500, 000 dinars, while the standing army cost between 150, 000 - 200, 000 dinars per month.[150] One would assume that as the 'Amirids mounted an increased number of campaigns against the economically poorer north, these campaigns must have suffered from decreasing returns, so that the more the 'Amirids needed to raid north to pay for their imported soldiers, the less they received from these campaigns, forcing them to spend from the other resources of the government, perhaps in the long run harming the Caliphal treasury.

Finally, a third reason why Ibn Abi 'Amir may have felt the need to conduct intensive campaigning against the

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148 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.279.

149 ibid. Vol.3, p.4.

150 Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam, pp.114-120.

north may have been connected to the maintenance of power. His prestige originally grew because of the firm stand he took against Christian raids following al-Hakam's death. His adoption of the title al-Mansur followed a victory over the Christian states in the north, so that in part, Ibn Abi 'Amir derived some justification of his usurpation of authority from his position as an active defender of Muslim Spain and attacker of the Christians in the north in Jihads, although he was not noted particularly as an outstanding horseman (faris).[151] This continuous cycle of Jihad helped lend legitimacy to his position. That it was to some degree successful, is testified to by the fact that later sources continued to point him on the good Muslim Jihad-oriented ruler, glossing over the problematic legal basis of his authority and title. However, this constant Jihad while helping to lend legitimacy to Ibn Abi 'Amir's reign may have had a counter-effect on Muslim Spain in the long run. While in the later Umayyad era the Christian states in the north occasionally raided the Muslim marches, there was an acceptance (at least a de facto one) of the military superiority of Muslim Spain and the futility of fighting it. This superiority was made bearable because Muslim Spain while keeping these states in check never pushed them too far. Ibn Abi 'Amir's constant campaigning made the situation politically unbearable for the Christian states, the attack on Santiago de Compostela being almost the proverbial final straw. Economically

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[151] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p.278.

and ideologically, the Christian states were being put in a position where they had to start to at least seriously consider a counter attack on the Muslim south. What was now keeping them in check was not a well maintained march and a few campaigns maintaining a sort of status quo, but rather the almost constant presence of attacking Muslim troops. Once this pressure was lifted, the Christian north did not fall back into the pre-'Amirid state of affairs, but instead moved slowly and steadily into a counter offensive (partly to do with changes within these Christian states, which will be discussed briefly below), which was to a large extent successful. Traditional Christian sources (and many recent studies) tend to gloss over this fact maintaining a myth of a continuous reconquest. However, a very strong argument can be put forward that the ideal began to develop in earnest in the period following (and partly as a result of) Ibn Abi 'Amir's rule.

2. 3 The Fitna

Strictly speaking, the term fitna ought to be applied to the turbulent years following the death of 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir in Safar 399/October 1008[152] to the time when the Almoravids brought Muslim Spain under their control (and because of their titular allegiance to the 'Abbasid Caliphate, into the sphere of that Caliphate) in the last

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[152] ibid. Vol. 3, pp.3-4.

quarter of the eleventh century. However, in the eyes of the contemporary Muslims, the fitna seems to have stretched from the end of the brief reign of 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir to the abolition of the Caliphate, a period stretching roughly from 1009 - 1030. There seems to have been an awareness that the period under the Ta'ifas was unique and relatively stable, with a semblance of legality that made it something more than a period of fitna. Interestingly, the Muslim Spaniards of the time clearly laid the blame for the sedition on the shoulders of the Berbers. Ibn Hayyan calls it al-fitna al-Barbariyya [153] - the Berber sedition - nor does it seem that he was alone in holding this view.[154] This posed problems for later historians writing for a north African audience, for they could not ascribe such a hideous crime to north African Berbers. Ibn Bassam sidesteps this problem neatly. Writing in c. 1105, he simply does not discuss the very beginning of the sedition (Muhammad Ibn Hisham's rebellion against 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir) and starts his book al-Dhakhira by discussing the reign of the next pretender (Sulayman al-Musta'in) when the fitna was under way.[155] Later sources such as Ibn 'Idhari, having the advantage of time distance between the writing of their book and the events themselves, try to lay the blame on the Muslim

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153 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira. Part I, p.576.

154 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p. 76.

155 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.35.

Spaniards, exonerating the Berbers.[156]

It is far too easy to lay the blame for the breakup of the 'Amirid state and the civil wars that followed on 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir. He was not entirely an ideal successor to his brother 'Abd al-Malik. For one, he was rumoured to be a transvestite homosexual. He also lacked political sensitivity to an astonishing degree: he appointed a child to a ministry and crossed the fine line that kept the 'Amirids on the legitimate side of the political scene by forcing the Caliph Hisham to appoint him as a successor to the Caliphate.[157] However, his incompetence as a ruler and the uncertain nature of his morals are not in themselves enough to explain why in a few months Cordova faced a popular uprising followed by a very bloody civil war which led to the collapse of the government. The reasons for that upheaval were partly to do with the changes that the 'Amirids had made to the Umayyad government.

When 'Abd al-Rahman succeeded his brother, he had taken over a state almost on the verge of collapse. 'Abd al-Malik had had to continue in his father's policy of importing Berber troops, so that he presided over a large standing army (mostly Berber, but also partly Slav) which needed to be paid. The raids northwards were not very successful financially or strategically. When he succeeded his father in Ramadan 392/August 1002 he faced hostility from the Christian

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156 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.76.

157 ibid. pp.40; 43-47.

states in the north kept in check only by constant campaigning. Six years and seven campaigns later,[158], he left his brother facing a situation where he felt it necessary to immediately threaten hostilities to keep the Christian states within their boundaries.[159] The campaigns were expensive in themselves, as were the salaries payable to the troops. Much of the cost was raised from taxes which made the Berbers understandably unpopular, an unpopularity compounded by their overcrowding of Cordova.

So when Muhammad Ibn Hisham, titled al-Mahdi (the guided one - a suggestive title) rose against his cousin the Caliph Hisham and 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Abi 'Amir during the latter's absence on his first campaign in Jamada al-Aula 399/January 1009[160] he found widespread support among the commoners of Cordova. He exploited this popularity by freeing prisoners condemned by the 'Amirids and offering them the chance to join his cause. Much of the anger of the commoners was directed against the symbol of 'Amirid power; their palace-complex of al-Zahira. However, this anger was also directed against the Berber presence, looting some of their houses. Al-Mahdi shared the Cordovans' dislike of the Berbers, probably partly because he saw them as the source of 'Amirid power who had usurped Umayyad authority and partly because he resented their being a drain on the wealth of

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158 ibid. p.3.

159 ibid. p.39.

160 ibid. p. 50.

Cordova. It is interesting that as soon as al-Mahdi thought himself secure in power he released from service no less than seven thousand Berber troops. He was trying to deal with a situation that had got out of hand - namely that the state paid for an exceedingly large standing army which was a strain on its resources. Nor was this act of 'de-mobbing' confined to the Berbers (although as the largest component of the army, they suffered most); al-Mahdi also Banished some of the Slav corps which had become loyal to the 'Amirids and who moved to the eastern side of the peninsula. Al-Mahdi had the support of the commoners as well as the civil servants, such as Ibn Hazm and Ibn Dhakwar, who supported him despite his appointment of "servants and members of the lowest elements of the army" as (Hajibs) (here used in the sense of those that controlled admittance to his presence). It was also attested to by the fact that despite the unorthodox method with which he acquired power, and despite his suspect morality, his succession was accepted by scholars such as Ibn Hayyan, while they called the movement against him the fitna, while for Ibn 'Idhari who was writing later and whose sympathy lay with the Berbers it was al-Mahdi and not the Berbers who should have been accused of starting the fitna

> and this was the doing of the foolish Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar [i.e. al-Mahdi] who was the reason for the corruption and the great long-lasting fitna, which the people of the al-Andalus call the Berber fitna and it would have been more truthful if they had called it the fitna of Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar.[161]

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[161] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.76.

The people of Cordova, whether commoners, or members of the educated elite, had clearly had enough of the 'Amirid dictatorship and the heavy burden of its imported troops, wishing to return to the Umayyad system of government.

The Slavs, being relatively few in number and used to the system in Muslim Spain, when Banished from Cordova tended to try to establish themselves in provinces outside the immediate control of Cordova, hoping perhaps to find a profitable accommodation within the "traditional" Umayyad system. The Berbers, however, did not know quite what to do with themselves. They dared not remain in a Cordova where the Caliph's protection was far from enthusiastic. They did not immediately think of taking over distant provinces as their experience of Muslim Spain was centred mostly on Cordova. Furthermore, they and their families relied on the salaries the Cordovan government paid out. The option they chose to follow was to back another claimant to the Caliphate, Sulayman titled al-Musta'in, whom they hoped would keep them in employment. The resulting civil war was particularly bloody in which several massacres of Cordovans and of Berber were committed.[162] Nor was the conflict restricted to the two claimants to the Caliphate. At one stage there were no less than four claimants in Muslim Spain.[163]

This was highly damaging to the Caliphate in Muslim Spain, but would hardly have happened had the Caliphate not

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[162] ibid. pp. 56-97.

[163] Ibn Hazm: Ibn Al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam, p.166-167.

been weakened under the 'Amirids. The conflict continued for nearly twenty-two years until the elders of Cordova took the unprecedented step of suspending the Caliphate[164] in dhi al-Hijja 422/December 1031.[165] It was not simply a case of switching allegiance to the 'Abbasid or even the Fatimid Caliphate, but simply deciding that Umayyad succession could not be maintained and therefore no new Umayyad Caliph could be nominated. By not writing to Baghdad to offer even nominal allegiance, the elders were deciding to live outside the bounds of a 'Caliphate'. Such a move was momentous; the Caliphate was the source of all legitimacy, the corner-stone of Islamic medieval order.[166] Ibn Hayyan's account reflects the unease at such a move. It seems the elders confined themselves to a discussion of how to govern Cordova itself without underlining the "abolition" of the Umayyad line. The account also makes clear the political cunning of Ibn Jahwar who as a result assumed power in Cordova:

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[164] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp.150-152.

[165] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.602. The quote below is from this reference.

[166] Ibn Hazm in his Al-Muhalla, declares that a Muslim who dies without declaring for a Caliph dies as a non-believer. Vol.9, pp.359-362 & Vol. 1, pp.45-47.

> And in the Middle of dhi al-Hijja of the year 422, after the deposing of Hisham [titled] al-Mu'tadid and the murder of his wazir Hakam al-Ha'ik, the people of Cordova agreed to give the shaikh Abi al-Hazm Ibn Jahwar authority over them, recounting his attributes which no one disputed. He refused; but they insisted until he agreed provided his two cousins the shaikhs Muhammad Ibn 'Abbas and 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Hassan would share his authority. The people agreed to give them the right to counsel him without authority. . . . And when asked he [Ibn Jahwar] would say "I have no authority to give or to withhold; it [the wealth of the state] belongs to the people Jama'a and I am their trustee". If he was unsure about a course of action or if he decided to act, he would summon them [i.e. the senior wazirs] and ask for their counsel and they would agree with him, giving him authority to act once they realised his purpose. When addressed by a formal letter, he would only act in response to such a letter in the name of the wazirs. [167]

It is noteworthy that Ibn Jahwar was careful in involving the other wazirs in his decision. Also that he was careful in describing his authority over the treasury as that of a "trustee". He was clearly wary of being accused of having usurped the power which rightly belonged to the Caliph. Ibn 'Idhari writing much later provides a less circumspect picture of this event:

> And the people and wazirs gathered in the mosque and plotted to remove Hisham who was sent to fort(?) without taking a legal decision Khitta to depose him or bearing witness against him of failing in his duties

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[167] Ibn Hayyan's description is quoted by Ibn Bassam. However, it is likely that Ibn Bassam was careful in his choice of quotations, so as not to offend his Almoravid audience. This account of the suspension of the authority of the Umayyads is important because ibn Hayyan was a Cordovan civil servant himself, with access to the civil servants originally involved in this act. It is reasonable to assume that had his book survived it would have contained more detail about this important decision.

> as a Caliph, thus removing the obligation of the people Ummah to bear him allegiance, as was customary. This they either forgot or neglected to do . . . And it was declared in the market place and suburbs that no Umayyad might remain in Cordova. [168]

2. 4 The Provinces and the fitna

The evidence we have about the way in which the provinces reacted to the fall of the 'Amirids in 399/1009 is rather scarce. In part, this was due to the fact that many provinces did not react immediately. The governors were not sure of the situation in Cordova, especially since the changes in Cordova resulted in actual changes in some provinces. This was especially the case in the eastern part of the peninsula where the Slavs exiled from Cordova established themselves, as well as in the areas into which the Berbers attempted to move. Keeping in mind the discussion in chapter one about the historical background of Zaragoza and Valencia, especially the way in which the former seems to have had experience of some independence from Cordova, in part because of its position on a march, it is interesting to note that Zaragoza appears as one of the first provinces to react to the coup against the 'Amirids, and thereafter attempts to play some role in the efforts to rebuild the Cordovan government without them.

As with the efforts of the Umayyads in the C10 discussed in chapter one, Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir had not been able to completely overthrow the power of the important

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[168] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3 pp.151-152.

families in the upper march. He, like the Umayyad Caliph before him, had to use them so that when al-Mahdi conducted his rebellion, the upper march was under the command of a local man, promoted from the ranks while serving the 'Amirids, but belonging to the Tujibid family.[169] This Mundhir Ibn Yahya Ibn Tujib had under his command part of the march's military force, which Ibn Abi 'Amir had not been able to abolish. The military forces in the thugur were said to number around 10, 000 horsemen, [170] which seems a reasonable number as these horsemen would have been spread over three frontier provinces. To the southwest of Zaragoza lay the march centred on Medinaceli which had been established by al-Nasir. Although Ibn Abi 'Amir had defeated and disbanded the Umayyad army under the command of Ghalib, the 'Amirids still needed to have some military presence there. As he did not trust the local nobility, Ibn Abi 'Amir installed another Slav commander, Wadih, with a probably smaller army loyal to the 'Amirids. Between them Wadih and Mundhir controlled the largest contingent of military personnel outside Cordova. Moreover, they were used to exercising their authority in their provinces.

Both realised that as defenders of the buffer state which protected Muslim Spain's borders, their value to whatever government ruled in Cordova was high enough for such a government to seek their loyalty. This would especially be

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169 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.180.

170 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 2, p. 301.

the case if the government reverted to the Umayyad style.

Added to this was the fact that neither of those two commanders felt any particular loyalty to the 'Amirids. The Slav contingent had suffered under them, losing much of its prestige and power which was taken up by the imported Berber troops whom they resented. Some, like Wadih, served under the 'Amirids, but an end to 'Amirid power might have meant an end to Berber ascendancy and a reversal to the dominance of the Slav corps. The Tujibids, likewise, had little cause to be loyal to the 'Amirids. Some of them had served Muhammad and his son 'Abd al-Malik, but that was because their power was manifest. The strong 'Amirid dictatorship had not ended Tujibid power, but by constant campaigns to the north had restricted it considerably. An end to 'Amirid rule could have been seen by the Tujibids as leading to more independence in the province. Both commanders, then, had an interest in supporting the coup. The first reference we have is to Wadih acknowledging the new Caliph al-Mahdi and supporting the execution of 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abi 'Amir in 400/1009.[171] We also have a reference to Mundhir Ibn Yahya actively supporting al-Mahdi at the end of Shawwal (May) of the same year/1010,[172] which would suggest tacit support for the coup in Cordova earlier in the year. Both these men probably saw in the coup a chance of ending 'Amirid dominance, while remaining within the bounds of legality. Muslim Spain, it

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171 ibid. Vol.3, p. 76.

172 ibid. p. 96.

seemed, had apparently reverted to an active Umayyad Caliph. The Caliph al-Mahdi appeared to have been acting in a manner which might re-establish Umayyad power and re-organising the government on the pre-'Amirid Umayyad style. Both Wadih and Mundhir, it seems, supported the claim of al-Mahdi, partly to ingratiate themselves with his party (which seemed to be in the ascendant) and also because by supporting him they were supporting a return to the pre-'Amirid set-up which was beneficial to the marches.

By contrast, Valencia seems to have experienced a disintegration in the power of the Cordovan appointed governor, not so much in favour of local families, but in that of undisciplined possibly Cordovan appointed officials. 'Abd al-Rahman ben Yasar, either a convert from Judaism, or a Jewish civil servant who had adopted a Muslim name (a not unheard of practice), who was governing Valencia at the time does not seem to have reacted immediately to the coup, or if he did, his reaction was not deemed worth recording by Ibn Hayyan. He governed a city close to Cordova whose defences seem to have been weak.[173] He probably had a small contingent of night watchmen to keep the peace but no sizeable military force. Mujahid, a Slav commander had tried to gain control of Valencia following al-Mahdi's accession. The unknown author of the manuscript published as fragment B at the end of Ibn 'Idhari's al-Bayan implies that Mujahid controlled the city until Mubarak and Mudhaffar (two Slav

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[173] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 16.

commanders) rebelled against him,[174] but that does not seem likely. Possibly Mujahid appointed Mubarak and Mudhaffar to serve under Ben Yasar in a bid to share control of the city. Ben Yasar seems to have tried to dismiss these two and regain complete control. Ibn Hayyan recorded how in 401/15 August 1010 - 3 August 1011 he dismissed the two officials from their office of the water tolls (al-siqaya), probably accusing them of embezzlement.[175] However, he could not enforce this dismissal. This reflects to some extent how Ben Yasar was losing his authority. Soon after, the two Slavs took over the governorship of Valencia (possibly with the approval of the new government in Cordova) and forced Ben Yasar into exile.

The new governors of Valencia realised that unlike the upper march the government in Cordova would woo its loyalty only in times of turmoil. Once the situation was settled, the government in Cordova would revert to its policy of control over Valencia. Mubarak and Mudhaffar probably had no idea how long the fitna would last, but planned to benefit from it. In some ways, because of this realisation that they could exercise some independence only during the period of unrest in Cordova, the two Slav usurpers were more prepared in the short-run to cope with the situation than the upper march. They showed little interest in what was going on in Cordova. That was because while the length of the

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[174] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p. 302.

[175] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p. 14. For a description of the takeover of the city by Mubarak and Mudhaffar, see A. Huici Miranda, Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Region, Vol.1, pp.148-151.

period of unrest was of interest to them, they had no interest in contributing to the establishment of an accepted government there. Once such a government was established, provinces like Valencia would come under its direction and the two rulers would go. Obviously, the longer the state of unrest lasted, the better for them, but in addition, they lacked, or rather Valencia lacked, the military ability to contribute to the civil strife. To gain some form of legal authority for their rule, Mubarak and Mudhaffar declared for Hisham , but that was as far as their support went. They took no steps to reinstate 'Amirid power, nor did they help the Berber contingent, hardly surprising considering that they belonged to the Slav corps.

The most pressing problem which Valencia faced at the time of their takeover was its lack of military power. Unlike the upper march, Valencia did not have a standing army. This in a time of civil strife, with groups of disbanded soldiers, Berbers and others, as well as supporters of different claimants to the Caliphate roaming the southern part of Muslim Spain was dangerous, putting the "governorship" of the two rulers at grave risk. The steps which they took sought to remedy the situation. The longest lasting military contribution they made to the city of Valencia, the influence of which affected the city until the end of the century, was its fortification. As soon as they took command of the province, they built up the city's defences and fortifications. They also built a wall that surrounded the whole city (although the sources are not clear on this point,

for there is a suggestion that the walls might have protected only the harbour - with fortified gates [176]). To build up their army they invited soldiers of Slav as well as Basque and Frankish origin (mawali) to join them. They seemed to discourage free Muslims from joining them and there is no mention of Berbers doing so. Ibn Hayyan noted that they attracted rebellious and escaped slaves. This newly gathered army was trained in horsemanship and equipped with the best weapons available.[177]

The instability in Cordova could not have been easily settled, for although the Umayyads seem to have been successful in their coup against the 'Amirids, they did not find a solution to the problem of the Berber legacy. The Berbers themselves reacted to the coup by first approaching the new Caliph, al-Mahdi, then as it became obvious to them that he was hostile they supported another pretender, Hisham Ibn Sulayman in 399 (5 September 1008-25 August 1009). Their move against al-Mahdi failed resulting in a Berber massacre. This did not eliminate them as a problem for Cordova. A sizeable number of them survived and they turned to yet another Umayyad pretender Sulayman Ibn al-Hakam, titled al-Musta'in.[178] This led to a series of claimants and counter claimants to the Caliphate, which by 404/13 July 1013 - 2 July 1014 started including not only Umayyads, but also

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[176] Dr 'Abbas favours the theory that the walls surrounded the whole city, which he records in his main reading of Ibn Bassam.

[177] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp.14-16.

[178] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp. 83-84.

Hammudids.[179] The Berbers remained a factor contributing to the general instability in Cordova until many of them established themselves on the mountain where they built Granada.[180]

Wadih, having decided to support the re-establishment of the Umayyads, refused to act as an intermediary for peace between the Berbers and al-Mahdi. Possibly he was influenced by their sacking of Guadalajara, or possibly he simply wanted to take a stand against Berber power. In Muharram 400/August 1009 the Berbers defeated a combined force of the marches under Wadih.[181] In Shawwal 400/May 1010 al-Mahdi defeated the Berbers and reentered Cordova with a force which included Mundhir Ibn Yahya as well as Wadih. Both were acting in an effort to restore stability. Possibly they saw al-Mahdi's claim as stronger than that of Sulayman because of its precedence (that is, because he was declared Caliph first). Possibly they feared the dominance of the Berbers. They may have also feared the consequences of more than one claimant to the Caliphate. Up to this stage, the marches were merely loyal and supportive to what they believed to be the legal authority in Cordova. However, the continued ineffectiveness of the Caliph slowly allowed them to be more assertive in their relationship.

In Dhi al-Hijja 401/July 1011, the Caliphate

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179 Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam: pp.149-154.

180 'Abdullah ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan, p. 22.

181 ibid. p. 87.

reverted to Hisham with the death of al-Mahdi. This, however, did not end the fitna, for the Berbers refused to declare for a weakling now controlled by their enemy Wadih. Wadih fearing the ineffectiveness of the Caliph tried himself to negotiate with the Berbers, was discovered and executed. This left the upper march, including the area centred on Medinaceli under the control of Mundhir. Meanwhile, those with influence, the Ahl in the thugur, were beginning to tire of Cordova's quarrels with the Berbers and wrote to the government in which they demanded either a peaceful settlement or a decisive military victory. In Shawwal 403/May 1013 the Berbers regained Cordova reinstating Sulayman al-Musta'in as Caliph. Mundhir shifted his allegiance to al-Musta'in and received legal title to Zaragoza.[182]

2.5 The Provinces and the Weak Cordova

Although Mundhir had declared for al-Musta'in, receiving the title Hajib [183] as well as confirmation of title to lands he already held, he must have realised that, at least for the time, the Caliphate had lost its power. It seems that Mundhir started to act in complete independence from Sulayman. It was not a case of reverting to the pre-'Amirid type of relationship between Cordova and Zaragoza: beyond acknowledging al-Musta'in, Mundhir ignored him. This can be seen in a letter from al-Musta'in to Mundhir in which he

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[182] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp.85-109.

[183] Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 408.

almost begs to be kept informed of events in the march, while at the same time stating his complete confidence in Mundhir's actions without knowing them:

> And We miss hearing your news which is slow [in arriving]. The fact that we do not doubt that you, in all your actions, are doing as we would wish for and desire, reflects the esteem [lit. your share] which we hold you in and the position you hold in our trust.[184]

The tone of the letter contrasts with the treaty discussed in chapter one. The relationship was no longer one of interdependence with Cordova having the upper hand, but rather one of the Caliphate needing Zaragoza's loyalty even if only in a titular manner.

Mundhir Ibn Yahya does not even seem to have attempted to help al-Musta'in against the joint Slav-Berber force under 'Ali Ibn Hammud which captured Cordova, declaring 'Ali Caliph in Muharram 407/July 1017. At the beginning of the fitna, the upper march believing in the power of the Caliphate did attempt to back up its allegiance with some form of action. The death of Wadih ended the role of Medinaceli as a centre of a march. This was because Zaragoza under the command of Mundhir filled the vacuum left by Wadih's death. This left Mundhir controlling a city whose influence stretched south-west covering almost two thugur. By 1017 this major political figure in Muslim Spain decided to take a less active part in the struggle in Cordova; perhaps because he lacked Wadih's motivation and dislike of the Berbers. Probably,

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[184] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 116. The letter was composed by the wazir Abi Hafs Ibn Burd, the Elder.

Mundhir believed that the succession would sort itself out and concentrated on solidifying his position in the upper march. He was not hasty in acknowledging 'Ali as a new Caliph,[185] again an indication of the weakness of the office, but also possibly revealing his own views on the legitimacy of 'Ali's claim. Once he did declare for 'Ali, he not only dictated his own terms concerning his governorship, which 'Ali accepted, but also gave 'Ali advice on how to treat the Cordovans which was also accepted. Mundhir, it seems, could treat the Caliph in a high-handed manner and get away with it. The weak position of 'Ali in his relations with Zaragoza is made clearer by the third of the letters quoted by Ibn Bassam.[186] 'Ali talked of co-operation and his right to Caliphship, but the letter's tone aimed to convince, not order. Zaragoza under Mundhir was distancing itself from the political turmoil in Cordova. Yet, this is not to suggest that it sought to break off relations. Like all provinces, Mundhir kept up at least a facade of political cohesiveness, in always declaring for a Caliph, trying to work within a system that had clearly begun to fall apart. All the same, Zaragoza was beginning to form, through necessity, a political identity beyond the one of an important march in an Umayyad system.

Ironically, this evolving political personality was best illustrated in Zaragoza's last serious attempt at ridding

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[185] ibid. pp. 117-118.

[186] ibid. pp. 119-120.

Muslim Spain of the Berber problem and restoring the Umayyad Caliphate. In 409/20 May 1018 - 8 May 1019 a force made up of Slav and march soldiers sought to attack the Berber presence in Cordova, then under the rule of al-Qasim, brother to 'Ali Ibn Hammud. On the way to Cordova, they diverted to Granada to fight with the Berbers settled there. The Slav-Zaragozan force was defeated in the ensuing battle and in their retreat Khairan, commander of the Slav forces, and Mundhir, commander of the Zaragozan forces, ordered the Umayyad pretender, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad, titled al-Murtada, whom they had sought to establish in Cordova, to be killed.[187] In some ways this act symbolised the abandonment of the Umayyad system. Viguera sees this year of 1018 as marking the beginning of Mundhir's reign in Zaragoza as head of a Ta'ifa,[188] and in a way it was. On the other hand Mundhir's reign could be seen to have started much earlier, during the reign of Sulayman al-Musta'in. One could also argue that Mundhir and his successors never became independent Ta'ifa rulers in the way in which their successors the Hudids became.

However, in this campaign of 409/1018, there is evidence of Zaragoza starting to operate as an independent political unit. Mundhir came into the field not only with his own troops, but it seems with others who were semi-independent, but operating within Zaragoza's sphere of influence

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[187] ibid. pp. 453-455.

[188] M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p. 136.

and whose relationship to Zaragoza seemed to be not dissimilar to Zaragoza's relationship with Cordova under the Umayyad system. Among them were the forces of Sulayman Ibn Hud, lord of Tudela which he held from Mundhir,[189] but as I hope to show below, that did not mean that Mundhir's control was total. Sulayman had not only his own men but some Christian troops as well identified by Ibn Hayyan as Franks (ifrani).[190] These do not seem to have been a section of the troops under the control of Khairan, but men controlled by Sulayman directly. Mundhir's relationship with Sulayman and the Christian troops reflects the establishment of a system of political dependence centred on Zaragoza.

The question that comes to mind is: given the situation in Cordova and Zaragoza's geo-political position, why did Zaragoza continue to adhere, at lest de jure, to the Caliphate? Why did it try as late as 409/1018 to re-establish the Umayyad system? One would have expected Mundhir to have been more forceful in seeking independence, like Valencia which will be examined below. There was of course the importance of legality. Mundhir's power could not have emanated from a vacuum, it had to be derived from a legal source, and the only legal source of authority was the Caliphate. Mundhir, therefore, had always to acknowledge a Caliph if only in a titular way. Mundhir and his successors faced a situation when the very geo-political position of

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189 Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 183.

190 ibid. pp. 454-455.

Zaragoza which allowed it to be independent from Cordova could become counter-productive if Cordova were too weak. Although the upper march could stand up to occasional raids from the north, it needed in the final analysis the back-up of the full might of Muslim Spain represented in the armies raised by Cordova. These expeditions north served to keep the Christian states subdued while the march kept them at bay. As mentioned above, the 'Amirids took the principle of northward raiding to an extreme, which was resented by the local powers in the march, but the principle itself was sound and accepted. To some extent a less domineering Cordova would have led to a stronger Zaragoza, but a powerless Cordova and a fragmented Muslim Spain would leave Zaragoza without the prospect of reinforcements.

The situation was particularly dangerous because some Christian forces were involved in the fitna and experienced Muslim civil strife at first hand. In Shawwal 399/ August 1009, a Christian force under the command of Sancho (III) son of García, King of Navarre, helped the Berber force of al-Musta'in to attack and occupy Cordova,[191] an engagement during which many Cordovans were killed. The psychological effect of this episode cannot be stressed enough. For many years the Christians had been dominated militarily by the Muslim Spaniards. Cordova was the symbol of the military, cultural and economic superiority of Muslim Spain. It was a city that contained twenty one quarters, the

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[191] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan , Vol.3, p. 51.

ditch surrounding it on three sides stretching for 47,500 dhira', the river running on the fourth.[192] Yet this vast metropolis, with its palaces and gardens, its markets and wealth, fell before the might of a partially Christian army. It was not quite a revenge for Santiago, but it would not be too unreasonable to assume that those Christians involved in the attack felt some satisfaction. The story of the fall of Cordova probably spread back into Navarre and possibly to neighbouring Spanish Christian domains, as well as stories of Muslim in-fighting. The idea of Muslim military superiority probably began to crumble and the morale of the Christian soldiers must have received a boost.

The image of Muslim military dominance received another blow when Wadih recruited some Christian soldiers to fight against Sulayman al-Musta'in in the following year, allowing them into Medinaceli where, some sources claim,

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[192] Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam: pp.120-121.
Ibn Mandhur in Lisan al-Arab defines a dhira' as the length from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger, or roughly equal to 0.5 of a yard. This suggests that the overall size of the city was somewhere in the region of 36 square miles. Two arguments can be put forward to support the view that such an overall size is not improbable. First, Cordova had a large population. The suggestion is that the population of the city could have been between 100,000 (Fletcher, The Quest for El Cid,p.20) and 250,000 (Vicens Vives, Economic History of Spain, p.106). Secondly, if for the sake of mathematical convenience we assume that Cordova was built in the shape of a circle (which it was not), the above mentioned circumference would suggest a radius of about 3.4 miles. It is interesting to note that the distance from al-Rasafa, a suburb at the edge of the city limits, to the river is about 3.5 miles. The distance between the Caliphal palace complex, al-Zahra', which was built outside the city, and the main mosque is about 6 miles.

they turned the mosque into a church.[193] Medinaceli did not have the same symbolic value as Cordova, but it had been for a time the centre of the middle march. Again, the psychological and moral value to those from the northern Spanish kingdoms who were involved, if only for a while, in controlling one of the centres of Muslim Spain's buffer zones, must have been immense. The image of the buffer zones, the marches, as impregnable, was severely dented. One would expect this to have been a factor influencing the north Christian states to be bolder in their attacks on Muslim Spain, especially if unchecked by some form of punitive expedition from Cordova. The Christian north, first under Sancho García III of Navarre and later under Fernando I of Léon-Castile, then under Alfonso VI of Castile did become bolder; the eleventh century saw a gradual southward advance of Christian Spain, an advance influenced, it would be reasonable to assume, to some degree, by this denting of the Muslim military image.

Mundhir Ibn Yahya of Zaragoza faced three Christian states on his borders: Castile, Navarre, and the County of Barcelona. Of these three, Navarre under King Sancho García III, known as el-Mayor (1008-1035), presented Zaragoza with the strongest threat. Sancho who had been kept in check by the 'Amirids, took the opportunity of the <u>fitna</u> to retrieve lands lost to Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir including Buil

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[193] Ibn 'Idhari: <u>Al-Bayan</u>, Vol.3, p. 94. The reference might be read to imply that the mosque was, in turn, originally a church, which when converted to a mosque had kept its belfry, so that when the Christian troops took it over they rang its bells.

and lands from the Cinca to Penarrvia. He also re-occupied lands lost to 'Abd al-Malik, Muhammad's son, including Ribagorza and Roda de Isabena.[194] Under him Navarre grew to be the most influential of the Spanish Christian states.[195] Mundhir tried to check the growing power of Navarre with punitive expeditions. There is reference to at least one campaign in which Mundhir occupied Pamplona, Navarre's capital, sometime between 1018-1022, as well as another campaign in which Sancho García III was defeated. [196]

However, without the support of reinforcements from Cordova, Mundhir did not have the ability to mount major expeditions northwards regularly enough to keep the Christian states weakened. He had to find an alternative method for protecting his borders from Christian excursions. This he did, the alternative method being a combination of limited military operations and diplomacy. This policy of diplomacy as well as its positive results was recorded by Ibn Hayyan, who notes that Mundhir treated with the leaders of the Christians (_'Udhama' al-Ifranj_), while perhaps raiding the lesser counts (_Asaghir al-Qawamis_). He goes on to note that the march was "blocked up with no gap in it, nor did it become weakened in its state".[197]

Mundhir's policy against Navarre was twofold.

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[194] M.J. Viguera: _Aragón Musulmán_, pp. 136-137.

[195] J.F. O'Callaghan: _History of Muslim Spain_, pp. 134-135.

[196] Ibn Darraj: _Al-Diwan_, p.119, 126.

[197] Ibn Bassam: _Al-Dhakhira_, Part I, pp. 181-182.

First, he exploited the resentment caused by the vigorous rule of Sancho García III whose expanding power weakened, and at times dislodged, local counts.[198] There are at least two references to local counts who came to Mundhir for support. The first was a count identified only as Ferdinand, whose power was restored to him.[199] The second was al-amir Ibn Miro who is identified by Makki [200] and Viguera [201] as the count of Pallars and who also received aid from Mundhir.

Secondly, Mundhir tried to exploit the resentment caused by Navarrese strength to its Christian neighbours of Castile and Barcelona. There is a reference to the count of Castile coming to Mundhir for aid, [202] one assumes against Navarre.

Even if the aid was not specifically against Navarre, the fact that the count came to Mundhir demonstrated how the latter was working on dividing the ranks of his Christian neighbours. He went as far as to organise a marriage alliance between the Count of Castile and the Count of Barcelona.[203] Viguera [204] sees this arrangement as having as its main purpose the checking of Navarre's power. Ibn

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198 M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p. 138.

199 Ibn Darraj:Al-Diwan, p.123.

200 ibid. poem 50: p. 168.

201 M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p. 138.

202 Ibn Darraj: al-Diwan, p. 128.

203 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, pp 182-183.
Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p. 177.
Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, poem 44, p. 130.

204 M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p. 138.

Hayyan writing in Cordova, and basing his narrative, in part, on information he received from a Katib named Abu Umayya Ibn Hashim al-Qurtubi, who had left the Cordovan civil service at the time of the fitna, settling in Tudela, gives this reason for Mundhir's dealing with the Christian states:

> And it was said that Mundhir's opinion in this matter was wiser than the opinion of those who spoke against him, for he considered the matters of his time and the weakness of the Muslims [lit. the cracking of the staff of the people of his word], and so chose friendship [with the Christians] to protect his realm. [In this way] he tricked Raymond and Shanjah, the two Galician leaders ('Udhama'), who were talking in those days of attacking the people of al-Andalus, and distracted them from war. . . And in this manner Mundhir gave the people of the march peace and stability, which enabled them to build and prosper, until he died, by which time all had acknowledged [the [wisdom of his] policy. [205]

Mundhir's son and successor Yahya (414/1023 - 420/1029) [206] continued his father's policy towards the north. There is a reference, for example, to him aiding an Ibn Ferdinand, identified by Makki as the Count of Castile.[207] Unlike his father, however, Yahya lacked the ability to mount any major expeditions northwards, partly because Navarre was becoming stronger and partly because he faced trouble within his province.

Both Mundhir and Yahya realised that to be able to check the northern Christian states, particularly the Navarre

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[205] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.182.

[206] A. Turk: 'El Reino de Zaragoza', RIEEI, Vol. 17 & 18, p.49. D. Wasserstein: Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 91.

[207] Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, p. 128.

of Sancho Garcia III, the march needed the help of a Cordovan army. To some extent this may help explain why Mundhir continued to attempt to re-establish the Umayyad system up to 409/1018. Even after his participation in the murder of the pretender, al-Murtada, Mundhir does not seem to have totally cut his ties from the Caliphal system. He assumed the titles al-Hajib and Dhu al-Ri'asatyn [208]: neither denotes a wish to imitate Kingship by assuming Caliphal titles. His son Yahya, it appears from numismatic evidence also called himself Hajib,[209] as well as adding the title al-Mudhaffar.[210] It could be argued that this assumption of a Caliphal title by Yahya was in itself a declaration of independence. For by this act, Yahya could be seen as clearly showing that he had broken off from the Caliphal system, setting himself up as an independent lord. However, two objections can be put against such an argument. First, that the title was al-Hajib al-Mudhaffar. Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir titled himself al-Hajib al-Mansur while in the service of the Caliphate, thus setting up a precedent for a non-Caliph to assume a title; one that was taken up by his son 'Abd al-Malik, so that this assumption of a title by Yahya, while obviously meant to pronounce his authority did not necessarily mean an assumption of a status of a completely independent ruler. Secondly, Yahya, like his father before him, continued to show at

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208 M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán, p. 136.

209 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reyes de Ta'ifa, p. 197.

210 M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p. 142.

least titular allegiance to a Caliph. Numismatic evidence shows allegiance to the Caliph al-Qasim, then later to 'Abd Allah al-Mu'ayyad (their names are found on coins minted in Zaragoza during Yahya's reign).[211]

Internally, Mundhir and Yahya needed to strengthen their hold over the province. In a sense, the absence of a strong Caliphate made their task harder. One of the advantages of holding a province from a Caliph was that one possessed the legal right to exercise one's authority over all of it. If local lords rebelled, they outlawed themselves. At times, Cordova gave a province's governor military as well as moral aid to help uphold his authority. The absence of a Caliphal system robbed the governor of the upper march of both these aids, although the continued declaration for a Caliph must have been, in part, an attempt at maintaining some sort of legal basis for their authority. Be that as it may, Mundhir and Yahya do not seem to have had complete control over their province. They controlled Calatayud,[212] but there is no evidence to suggest that they controlled the other main centre in the Ebro basin, Lérida,[213] in this period. Zaragoza also controlled Tudela through Sulayman Ibn Hud, but his loyalty was not absolute. He disagreed with Mundhir's plan to create a marriage alliance between Castile and Barcelona (possibly fearing the consequences of any

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211 A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reyes de Ta'ifa, p. 197.

212 D. Wasserstein: Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 82.

213 ibid. p. 85.

alliance between the northern Christian states), and it appears as if he cut himself off from Zaragoza at this stage (c. 1017). [214] One of Yahya's main successes was to bring Sulayman back into the Zaragozan fold. [215] Zaragoza also had no control over Tortosa (its main outlet to the sea) which up to 452/1060 was under the rule of Slav commanders. [216] Huesca, Zaragoza's advance post against the north, was under a relative of Mundhir, Muhammad Ibn Ma'an al-Tujibi. His loyalty to Mundhir was also not total. After the death of Sulayman al-Musta'in in 407/May 1016, Muhammad tried to achieve independence from Zaragoza. Mundhir responded with a campaign in which Huesca was captured from Muhammad, who fled. [217]

Valencia, on the other hand, did not face the pressure of being a neighbour to hostile Christian states. It lacked the position that made Zaragoza more prone to be independent, but then it also lacked the problems that such a position would bring. Mudhaffar and Mubarak, having taken over the military steps discussed above to defend the city against military attacks, seem to have concentrated to amassing as much wealth as possible during their period of office. Perhaps this would suggest that they believed that their position was tenuous, and that as soon as a strong

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[214] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 183.

[215] Ibn Darraj: Al-Diwan, poem 60: p. 203.

[216] D. Wasserstein: Civil Wars in Muslim Spain, p. 93.

[217] Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol.3, p. 173.

government was established in Cordova, their authority would go. They had no reason to suppose that the difficulties in Cordova would continue for a long time or that the government there might disintegrate, and probably saw their reign as being of short duration and hoped to make the best of it. Their actions in Valencia do not seem to have been aimed at building up a strong position in preparation for bargaining for power with a reinstated Umayyad system, but rather at securing their position during the fitna, while reaping as much profit as possible during their reign. As will be discussed below, they took little interest in the changes in Cordova and the taxes which they collected seem to have been punitively high. However, they like the Tujibids in Zaragoza took steps to strengthen their authority within the province.

The province of Valencia offered less of a problem for this end than that of Zaragoza. In the triangular plain, there was only one other centre, Jativa. Jativa was under the control of another Slav called Khaira. Following a visit to Mubarak and Mudhaffar he died (there was suspicion of poisoning). Khaira was succeeded by his second in command 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Aflah al-Sultani, who seems to have accepted being in Valencia's sphere of influence. At the same time, Mujahid, lord of Denia seemed to have been pursuing a policy more akin to that of Zaragoza and was intent on expanding his domain. He therefore attempted to take over Jativa. This, in fact was to set a precedent for the rest of the century, when Denia's northward ambitions continued to represent a threat for the province of Valencia. Mubarak defeated him,

then beat off another attempt at the city, this time from Mundhir Ibn Yahya of Zaragoza, who had attempted to take advantage of this turbulence.[218] Again, this can be seen as a precedent, as the attempt to bring Valencia within Zaragoza's sphere of influence, whether directly or through forging alliances with its rulers, was to develop into on of the major thrusts of Zaragozan policy in the C11. It is not clear exactly when these events took place, but by 409/1018 there is evidence that Jativa was not under the control of Valencia.

Once established in Valencia, Mubarak and Mudhaffar seem to have taken little interest in the upheavals in Cordova. There is numismatic evidence that they declared for 'Ali Ibn Hammud in 407/10 June 1016 - 29 May 1017,[219] in that coins minted in the province bearing their names also acknowledge the Caliph. So it appears they thought it necessary to acknowledge the Caliphate. However, there does not appear to be any evidence of them taking part in the strife in Cordova by supporting any particular faction. In 409/20 May 1018 - 8 May 1019, the forces trying to install the pretender al-Murtada found the gates of Valencia shut against them. [220] This seems to be the only participation of Valencia in the political struggle in Cordova recorded in this period.

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[218] Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al-A'lam, pp.259-260.

[219] A. Prieto y Vives: Los Reyes de Ta'ifa, p. 182.

[220] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p. 456.

Mubarak and Mudhaffar concentrated on increasing their wealth during their reign. Ibn Hayyan recorded that the monthly income from the tax which they managed to collect from the province came to 120,000 dinars at the beginning of their reign; 70,000 from Valencia and 50,000 from Jativa. These sums appear to be substantial but Ibn Hayyan seems to have accepted them, perhaps because he believed that the two rulers were bleeding the province dry. Ibn Hayyan, quoting an unnamed eyewitness, goes on to describe how Mubarak and Mudhaffar extracted these taxes mercilessly, the situation becoming so bad for the population that many dressed in rags and ate grass (although the extent of the suffering of the population of Valencia might simply reflect Ibn Hayyan's hostility towards what he would have seen as adventurers). Many could not sustain this pressure and left their villages. Their property was simply confiscated by Mubarak and Mudhaffar.

On the other hand, Valencia was seen as settled and stable enough to attract the wealthy citizens of Cordova who were dislodged from the troubled capital. They settled in Valencia investing huge sums (up to 100,000 dinars) in building residences there. Again, the quoted cost for a villa (presumably with land) seems inordinately high and might reflect either an attempt by Ibn Hayyan to convey a feel of excessive spending by the well-off Cordovan immigrants in Valencia. Alternatively, the figures might well reflect a period of high real estate inflation. If one accepts that Valencia was seen as a safe and settled city, where many of

the wealthy of Cordova moved to, it is not unreasonable to assume that this increase in demand for large villas over a short period might have resulted in real estate bubble.

Such a form of government could not be tolerated for long. Following Mubarak's death in a riding accident, the people of Valencia rebelled. They invited Labib, the ruler of Tortosa to rule them. Labib found this offer attractive, but could not hold the province. Sulayman Ibn Hud of Tudela then tried to extend his control in the province. However, he was stopped by the forces of Mujahid of Denia also trying to extend his authority there.[221] Finally, the people of Valencia sent to the grandson of Muhammad Ibn Abi 'Amir, 'Abd al-'Aziz, then living in Zaragoza, asking him to come and rule them. 'Abd al-'Aziz left Zaragoza secretly and arrived in Valencia 412/17 April 1021 - 5 April 1022. Little is known about his previous career, but he seems to have arrived with the notion of a longer reign - perhaps influenced by what he saw in Zaragoza. One of his first acts was to acknowledge the Caliph al-Qasim. He then tried to strengthen his position by building up a small civil service capable of running the province. It is noteworthy that this chancery was made up of four men holding the lesser rank of Katib, rather than Wazir- although some were to earn the rank of wazir later. The four were: Ibn Talut, Ibn 'Abbas, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (who was later to establish his own rule over Valencia) and Ibn al-

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[221] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp. 14-20 for the earliest extant description of the reign of Mubarak and Mudhaffar.

Takirni. This perhaps reflects the fact that at that early stage 'Abd al-'Aziz was unable to attract more established civil servants to his service. [222]

The position in Muslim Spain was changing: while Mubarak and Mudhaffar do not seem to have behaved as if they believed that the fitna would last (they did not try to build support within the province, but rather to extract as much wealth as possible as quickly as possible), there are indications that other provinces were beginning to expand and consolidate, in preparation for an indefinite period of unrest in Cordova. The attempts by Denia to extend its control over Valencia in 409 and 412 were not the acts of a governor building up his position in preparation for a return to the Umayyad system, but rather of one preparing to build up a state that would be large enough and strong enough to survive. Nor was Denia alone in its attempts to expand. Tortosa tried to expand southwards as did Tudela. In other parts of the peninsula the same was happening with the provinces trying slowly to expand beyond the limits of a traditional city-province. This seems to have been the emerging current in Muslim Spain (although it does not necessarily imply a conscious abandonment of the Caliphal system), a current which Mubarak and Mudhaffar did not go along with, but to which the new governor of Valencia, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Abi 'Amir seems to have belonged.

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[222] ibid. pp. 249-251.

2. 6 Conclusion

The 'Amirid dictatorship was a period when fundamental changes were integrated into the governmental structure of Muslim Spain. These were tolerated because of the military might of the dictator, and possibly because of his active policy against the northern Christian states. There is some evidence to suggest that contemporary Spanish Muslims did not view it as the period of ideal Muslim Jihad-oriented rule that it was later made out to be. Many of the changes the 'Amirids brought about were resented by various sections of Spanish Muslim society. The increased power of the Cordovan government in relation to the provinces although by no means complete, especially with regards to the march provinces, was resented. The heavy-handedness of the many north-bound campaigns, designed in part to keep the marches in check, was resented. The weakening of the status of the Caliph, by turning Hisham into an invisible puppet, was resented. So was the act of turning the civil service into an apparatus separate from the Caliphate.

Once the 'Amirid system started collapsing, it found no natural supporters among the Spanish Muslims (although the Berber contingent, whose economic well-being was linked to the government were natural supporters of the system). At the same time, the changes forced onto the Umayyad system of government were such that they made a reversal to a pre-'Amirid form of government very difficult to achieve. They had not only ripped the fabric of that

government (destroying the Slav standing army and discrediting the civil service) but had also introduced elements which added to the instability of the region during the period of turmoil following the collapse of the 'Amirid government, which included the introduction of the Berbers, the economic drain on Muslim Spain and the increased resentment of the northern Christian states, brought about by the intensification of hostilities under their reign. The changes in these northern states will be looked at in more detail in chapter five, but one can see in the eleventh century a change which resulted in a more expansionary Navarre. As Léon-Castile became more prominent from the mid 1030's, it was Castile which followed this gradual expansion southwards.

Amidst this confusion, the lords of the provinces tried to adapt to what they perceived to be the changes affecting the peninsula. In this, many of them started with their resentment of the 'Amirid system and a wish to revert to the Umayyad system (or at least what they believed a Caliphal system entailed) as a first point of reference. However, in the fluid conditions of the first two decades of the century, these lords found it impossible to revert to a system that combined elements of autonomy for the distant provinces with a strong central government that brought all the provinces together in a political unity. They also became aware that the Umayyad system had become discredited with a number of pretenders representing various factions vying for power. The resulting change to the world view of the Spanish Muslims was underlined by the extraordinary decision to abolish the

Cordovan Caliphate altogether. This effectively rocked the foundations of legitimacy on which the government of the various provinces was based. It also took away the only viable central government that could have coordinated Muslim Spain into something approaching a single political entity, especially when it came to facing threats on its border provinces from external powers.

What was perhaps the most unusual aspect of what followed was that no representative of the 'Abbasid Caliphate was invited to hold, if only titular, authority in Cordova and bestow a sense of legitimacy on the governments in the peninsula (although some independent lords did acknowledge the 'Abbasid Caliph, while others, notably the lords of Seville, continued to acknowledge the Umayyads). The lords of the provinces had no experience of a situation so separate from the mantle of Caliphal legitimacy and their efforts to come to terms with the situation, made worse by the increased pressure from Navarre and later from Léon-Castile, did have the feel of a reactive set of actions. An important factor which must have influenced the behaviour of these emerging rulers was the distance of Muslim Spain from the rest of the Muslim world. The two centres of alternative Caliphal authority in Cairo and Baghdad were too distant (and in the case of Baghdad too weak) to be able to fill the vacuum left with the abolition of the Umayyad Caliphate. One can also conjecture that this perception of distance and perhaps even isolation from the rest of the Muslim world (reflected to some degree in the attempts by Ibn Bassam in al-Dhakhira to prove

that Muslim Spain was not a provincial backwater and could produce men of literary and ministerial ability equal to any who lived in the east) was further stressed by the fact that Muslim Spain was seen as an island (jazira). Both the lack of any decisive interference from an alternative legitimate government in the politics of Muslim Spain and its distance from the rest of the Muslim world might be seen as having prodded further the various lords of the provinces into patterns of behaviour where they became independent to a degree where they crossed the line from being simply governors of city-provinces within the Caliphal state to being independent lords of city-states, although as discussed in the introduction, whatever their actions, it does not appear as if they formally adopted the title (malik) or king, preferring to continue to use the less problematic title (sahib) or lord.

3. Ta'ifas Emerging

3. 1 Introduction

In the last two chapters, I have attempted to highlight some themes in the period preceding the age of the Ta'ifas and which influenced the political development in Spain in the C11. The peace treaty, discussed in chapter one, marking the end of the Zaragozan rebellion suggests that the framework of government in Umayyad Spain was one in which legitimacy, rooted in and emanating from the Caliphate, played a very important part. A lord of a province derived his legal title to his province and hence his authority over the lesser lords in the province from Cordova. This foundation of legality supported a structure where at least the march lords enjoyed a great amount of independence, but where Cordova continued to play a vital practical role: first; in providing sanction against any lesser lord who might rebel; secondly, in coordinating the resources of the whole of Spain to support the marches militarily when the marches failed to contain the attacks from the northern Christian kingdoms through a combination of diplomacy and military action. This framework was, as discussed above, dismantled by the 'Amirid dictators who with the symbolic assumption of Caliphal titles and creation of a new government centre in al-Zahira diluted the legality of the government in Cordova. The 'Amirids also

changed the relationship between Cordova and the marches in a military sense with their constant, and arguably unnecessary, campaigning as well as destabilising the military establishment in Cordova with the introduction of new Berber troops and the weakening of the Caliphal palatine corps. The new Berber emigres proved a strain both on the economy of Muslim Spain and on the social set up in Cordova.

Chapter two attempted to discuss the way in which the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship was seen by Spanish Muslims as an attempt at a return to pre-'Amirid normality. The blame for the ensuing civil war in Cordova was laid firmly by contemporary Spanish Muslim scholars on the Berbers imported by the 'Amirids. There seemed to be, however, a belief that the state of chaos was to be short-lived. The behaviour of Mubarak and Mudhaffar, who took over Valencia, suggested an attempt to amass as much wealth as possible in a short period, as opposed to an attempt at consolidating a kingdom. The 'Amirids, however, had fundamentally changed the fabric of government in Muslim Spain so that a return to the Umayyad system was impossible. The attempt to reestablish a "legitimate" framework for the political system continued to be an important theme throughout the C11. This can be seen in the continued importance of declaring for a Caliph, even when the Caliphal institution in Spain had so obviously disintegrated. In fact, the legal justification for the Almoravid's occupation of Spain towards the end of the century was that they declared for, and therefore represented, the

'Abbasid Caliph. [223] Given that the political system in Muslim Spain, both in the sense of internal provincial relationships between lord and overlord and inter-provincial relationships, was reliant on the existence of, at least de jure, Caliphal authority, the situation in the first half of the C11 where Spain had four Caliphs [224] in addition to the existence of an orthodox Caliph in Baghdad and a shi'ite one in Cairo must have added to instability within provinces and between provinces.

It is this instability which allowed lords to jockey for positions within provinces and to expand into neighbouring ones. The assumption, fairly early on, by Ta'ifa rulers of Caliphal titles provoked attacks on them by later authors. Yet, as discussed above, this was a concept first introduced by the 'Amirids. Moreover, a distinction must be drawn between the titles assumed in the early part of the C11 where there was an attempt to present them as ministerial titles in the 'Amirid sense(for example dhu al-Ri'asatayn or al-Hajib al-Musta'in) and titles were all attempts at a pretence of adhering to ministerial rank were given up as in the latter part of the C11 (for example, al-Mu'tamin); a distinction which is made by Ibn 'Idhari.[225] There was, however, a gradual shift towards real independence and what perhaps can be termed 'kingship' (although the evidence suggests that the

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[223] Ibn 'Idhari:al-Bayan, Vol.4, p.23

[224] Ibn Hazm: Ibn 'Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.244

[225] Ibn 'Idhari:al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.168

Ta'ifa lords while using words like Sahib (Lord) as well as Caliphal titles, never actually used the title king; they did however use so called 'Kingly paraphernalia' (Alat Mulukiyya).[226]

This chapter will try to look at the development of Hudid power and in particular the evolution of Sulayman Ibn Hud into the lord of Zaragoza. It will also look at the evolution of an independent power in Valencia under the grandson of the 'Amirid dictator al-Mansur, 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn abi 'Amir. The fortunes of Zaragoza in the C11 became closely tied with those of Valencia to the south and to a lesser extent to those of Toledo, the middle march, to the south west. The politics of these three states concerned both their relationships with each others and with the Christian powers to the north. By the fourth decade of the C11, the Ta'ifa states had reached a position where their power was, mostly, equal so that an equilibrium was reached. The only way for the major Ta'ifas to impose their will on their neighbours was either to ally with other Ta'ifas or with a Christian kingdom. An extension of this state was the attempted expansion by the major Ta'ifa states of their spheres of influence over lesser ones. However, this equilibrium led to a situation, particularly with the increased unity in the north, where no single Ta'ifa could match the growing power of the northern Christian kingdoms, and especially Castile in the second half of the century.

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[226] For a discussion of the term "Malik" in the Ta'ifa period, see I.de las Cagicas: Los Mozárabes, pp.419-423.

3. 2 Sulayman Ibn Hud - Lord of Tudela and Lérida.

The Bani Hud were an established family in the upper march who claimed descent from an aristocratic Arab lineage. [227] One assumes that the relationship between Sulayman Ibn Hud and the Tujibids in Zaragoza followed the pattern suggested in the peace treaty discussed in chapter one. That is to say, he passed on part of the tax collected in Tudela to Zaragoza and, in theory, followed Mundhir I's policies. In return, Mundhir offered Sulayman support to maintain his lordship over the city against internal and external dangers. Sulayman had been the lord of Tudela from the time of the 'Amirids which is the main reason for believing that his relationship with Mundhir I followed the pre-fitna pattern between lord and overlord. That Sulayman was a local man suggests that he had a local power base and family influence. Ibn Hazm mentions in his Jamharat that the Bani Hud were an old Arab family long settled in the area. In the sense that Sulayman held Tudela as part of Zaragoza's A'mal, he was in the pre-'Amirid set-up Mundhir's man. Tudela, on the Ebro, to the northwest of Zaragoza, commanded the approach from the Rioja. It was not as rich as Lérida and its surrounding A'mal nor was it as advanced a post as Huesca. Both these important cities were in the hands of relatives of Mundhir I. A symbolic indication of Tudela being in Zaragoz-a's sphere, and therefore part of Zaragoza's greater A'mal

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[227] Ibn Hazm:Jamharat Ansab al-'Arab,p.431.

concerned the chancery which was established in Zaragoza (and which, like the chancery of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia, seemed to have employed only Katibs at this stage, among whom were Abi al-'Abbas Ibn Marrus, Abi 'Amir Ibn Arzak and Ibn Wajib).[228] It clearly would not have been as sophisticated as the Caliphal chancery, but its presence in Zaragoza marked the city as the administrative centre of the whole march. Indeed, the creation and development of chanceries was one of the main ways in which rulers established their power centres in cities, as for example, in the case of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia, which will be looked at below).

There is also clear evidence that Zaragoza started striking its own coins from the very early stages of the fitna, thus transferring fiscal power in the province to itself. In time, all city-states came to mint their own coin. However, the Tujibid ruler of Zaragoza must have had the Caliphal coinage replaced or demonetized to make the Zaragozan coin effective. Control over coinage (including occasional replacement of the currency in circulation) was an effective method for central authority to exercise control, and to be seen to do so, in the C10/C11 and has its parallels elsewhere in Europe.[229] Whatever the outward manifestation of the independence of the emerging city-states, this development of the power of the local chanceries which eventually

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[228] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p.183.

[229] See J. Campbell Essays in Anglo-Saxon History, chapter 10, p.155.

metamorphosed into small scale civil service apparatuses, and the control of the currency in circulation in each city-state, indicate that from an early part of the C11, some of these states were exercising effective independence and operating as integral political units.

Another indication of Sulayman being in the sphere of Mundhir's influence was his participation in the latter's failed bid to reinstate the pre-'Amirid system in Cordova and establish al-Murtada as Caliph in place of the Hammudid al-Qasim in 409/20 May 1018-8 May 1019. During that campaign, Sulayman commanded a Christian corps among his troops. The command of Christian forces in the field, as opposed to simply allying with them was to become a feature of Hudid rule in the C11. While the forces of Mundhir and his ally Khairan the Slav fled before the forces of Habus Ibn Ziri of Granada, Sulayman held fast until told to retreat by Mundhir I. This he thought shameful and it might have been the beginning of his losing his respect for his overlord. Ibn Hayyan recorded how the forces of Mundhir and Khairan were the first to break. As Mundhir passed by Sulayman with his Christian troops holding fast, he shouted:

> Seek safety, you son of a harlot, for I shall not stand by you. Sulayman then retorted: you have committed a calamitous deed and shamed the people of al-Andalus. He then withdrew. [230]

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[230] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.455. I have used "You have committed a calamitous deed" to convey the sense of Sulayman's reply. In fact his reply was an old saying "Ji'ta biha sal'a'".

That Sulayman was willing to stand against what was after all an inferior force suggests that he was not privy to the developments in the planning of the campaign by Mundhir and Khairan. The two allies had turned against al-Murtada when the latter refused to pressure Mubarak of Valencia to join their campaign. They decided to divert their combined forces to Granada where they planned to betray the pretender. Further, Sulayman does not seem to have been involved with the murder of al-Murtada after the battle had been lost(due to the allies' forces retreating). [231] The importance of this incident to the relationship between Tudela and Zaragoza concerns again the concept of legitimacy discussed earlier. What bound Sulayman to Zaragoza was not only the practical necessity resulting from Tudela being part of the greater A'mal of Zaragoza, but also the legal framework of both lords acknowledging, and therefore deriving their authority from, the Caliphate. Sulayman was willing to help his overlord try to install an Umayyad Caliph. As a member of an established Spanish Muslim family, Sulayman's allegiance would have naturally veered towards the Umayyads and the pre-'Amirid system. His loyalty to Mundhir stemmed partly from a political perspective where he saw himself as owing allegiance to, and deriving legitimacy from, Mundhir who in turn owed loyalty to, and derived legitimacy from, the Caliph. It would be reasonable to assume that the existence of several pretenders would have strained this political perspective.

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[231] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I,pp.453-455.

This political perspective would have been strained further by Mundhir having the Caliph he declared for, killed. After all, in the overall power structure of Umayyad Spain, the Caliph was to Mundhir what Mundhir himself was to Sulayman. In other words the civil war that followed the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship produced a situation where relations between a major lord and the lords of the lesser cities within his A'mal became a purely practical one and not bound by a recognised legal framework. This would strongly suggest that the loyalty of the A'mal to the main city must have been weakened. Because of the future importance of Sulayman and the important role Mundhir played in the civil war, their relationship is better documented than that between other lords and the lesser lords in the A'mal. However, this blurring of what is legally correct and what is not was probably echoed in other A'mal and might help explain the ensuing weakness and political volatility in the various provinces even after the establishment of relatively strong Ta'ifas. A dependency built solely on practical considerations and unsupported by any moral (or at times practical) authority from the Caliphate could have been and frequently was severed when the weakness of the main city offered an opportunity to the lords of the lesser A'mal to exercise their independence. An example of this can be seen in the relationship between Valencia and Almeria which will also be looked at below. In the case of Zaragoza and Tudela, this legal framework and Sulayman's loyalty were further strained by the habit Mundhir was developing of killing Caliphs he did not particu-

larly like. Besides al-Murtada, Mundhir was responsible for the death of Hisham in Cordova and Muhammad Ibn Sulayman, the latter while he was staying as a guest in Zaragoza.[232]

The failed campaign to install al-Murtada can be seen as marking the beginning of the development of the Hudids as a separate Ta'ifa. It certainly marked the beginning of a period when Sulayman as lord of Tudela did not follow the policies of Zaragoza. The first major departure from Zaragozan policy was in 1017, when Sulayman refused to cooperate with the plan to arrange a marriage alliance between Castile and Barcelona. Sulayman went to the extent of closing the gates of Tudela to the marriage party. Viguera sees this alliance as directed primarily against Navarre.[233] The incident is interesting from Tudela's point of view for several reasons. First, there is an indication in Ibn Hayyan that the "people" Ahl of Tudela opposed allowing the party into the city. Ibn Hayyan recorded the following quote from the Katib Abu Umayya Ibn Hashim, who had settled in Tudela:

> The Count Shanjah Ibn García,[234] lord (sahib) of Castile passed by Tudela at the beginning of the rule of al-Hajib Mundhir, and at the time we were ruled by Sulayman Ibn Hud, his friend and whom he had set to govern us. [The count] was passing to the upper reaches of the march to meet Count Raymond, the ruler of Barcelona, to arrange a marriage between them, with the female from Shanjah. He was passing our territory with the knowl-

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[232] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.181.

[233] M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán,p.138.

[234] García Sánchez (1017-1029). Ibn Hashim seems to have used García's second name without the deminutive to identify him.

> edge of, and a safe passage from, Mundhir, our governor (Walina). The people of Tudela, then strong and powerful, denied him passage thus disobeying their prince (Amirahum) Mundhir. Shanjah, on hearing this, sent for some of [Tudela's] elders, and I was among those who went. . . . And when we reached where he was sitting, we found him dressed like a Muslim, bare headed, old and balding, his hair not yet completely grey, dark skinned and handsome. He spoke gently to us and we told him of the objection of the city to his passing through. . . He reminded us of war and its effect and so we left him and reported what he said, but the commoners ('Awwam al-Nas) did not accept this. . . and wanted to rob his baggage train, disobeying in this the elders (Mashyakha).[235]

Whether this was at the instigation of Sulayman or whether Sulayman followed the wishes of the Tudelans is unclear. It does suggest that a lord of a city had to rely on the support of its populace or perhaps the lack of support from Zaragoza forced Sulayman to rely on popular support. The power of the citizens of a city played an important role in the eventual coming to power of Sulayman in Zaragoza and in the coming to power of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia. Secondly, it marked a new era in Muslim policy towards the Christians. Prior to the fitna, a lord would only oppose the foreign

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[235] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part I,pp.183-184. It is interesting to note that Ibn Hashim describes Sulayman as well as the Counts of Castile and Barcelona as Lord, (Sahib), but tries to differentiate Mundhir by describing him as governor (Wali), which is a title used under the Cordovan government, and prince (Amir). There is also a clear division between the commoners and the elders of Tudela. Finally, García Sánchez was dressed like a Muslim, and the text implies that he spoke directly to the delegation. Either, they all conversed in Romance, or García spoke in Arabic. Such a proposition is not entirely improbable. Fletcher in The Quest for El Cid (between pp. 77 and 79) shows a charter issued by Pedro I of Aragon in 1100 with the king's signature in Arabic.

policy of his overlord if he believed that that policy was opposed to the policy of Cordova. This insured a more or less uniform approach to the northern Christian kingdoms, coordinated by Cordova. A local deviation from such a policy could occur, but was generally limited. The significance of the closure of Tudela's gates lay in the fact that it simply represented the policy of Tudela. This incident symbolised the end of a coordinated policy towards the north, as each lord devised his own. Indeed, Ibn Hashim mentions that the calamity faced by the Muslims was that they experienced the fitna and disunity in the presence of the leaders of the Christians, especially that of the "enemy of God" Sancho III el Mayor.[236] This disunity towards the north characterised the Ta'ifa century until the Almoravids brought back a semblance of a unified policy in the last two decades of the century, although Zaragoza remained outside its bounds.

There is evidence to suggest a rift between Tudela and Zaragoza in the years following 1018. The main evidence for the A'mal politics of the Tujibid period comes from the poems of their court poet Ibn al-Darraj. It seems that following the death of Mundhir and the succession of his son Yahya I in 1021/22, there was an attempt at a reconciliation, with Sulayman visiting Zaragoza.[237] However, this reconciliation was relatively short lived. Sulayman's attempts to

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[236] ibid. p.185. Ibn Hashim calls him (Shanjah ibn Ferdhaland), presumably because Sancho III was succeeded by Fernando I and Arabs tend to call their first born by their father's name.

[237] Ibn al-Darraj:al-Diwan,poem 60,p.203.

expand his influence in Valencia following the death of Mubarak in 1019/20 could not have been welcomed by the government in Zaragoza. It was in effect a declaration by Sulayman of his independence and an attempt to establish his own Ta'ifa. In 1028, Yahya I's campaign against Navarre was in part directed against the A'mal of Tudela.[238] Two incidents in particular reflect the growing independence of Tudela.

The first was the capture of Lérida, the second city in the upper march. This city was governed by a cousin of the Tujibids in Zaragoza, Abi al-Mutarrif al-Tujibi. Sulayman attacked Lérida and captured it killing abu al-Mutarrif. This gave him command of the second wealthiest centre in the march. Furthermore, with the A'mal of Lérida, including Monzon, just south of Barbastro and halfway between Huesca and Lérida, Sulayman now controlled two of the main approaches to Zaragoza from the north. This served to increase his importance to Zaragoza and hence his power base. That the Tujibids allowed this expansion and the killing of their relative points to their decreased power within the provence. It also helped boost Sulayman's prestige within the march since it was a clear signal that his power was beginning to equal if not exceed that of the Tujibids.

The date of Sulayman's takeover of Lérida is unclear. Ibn al-Khatib records that this event took place at the relatively late date of Muharram 431/23 September-

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238 M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán,p.142.

22 October 1039.[239] This seems to agree with the earlier al-Bayan by Ibn 'Idhari,[240] who simply gives the year 431/23 September 1039-10 September 1040. However, this date seems unlikely. Al-Marrakushi in his al-Mu'jib states that the Caliph Hisham III fled from Cordova soon after 8 dhi al-Hijja 420/18 December 1029 to Lérida in the upper march where he stayed with Sulayman Ibn Hud.[241] Ibn 'Idhari himself records that Hisham III died and was buried in Lérida in Safar 428/24 November-22 December 1036, having fled from Cordova 12 dhi al-Hijja 422/30 November 1031,[242] although he makes no mention of who ruled Lérida at the time. However, the earliest extant source, Ibn Hayyan, records that Sulayman Ibn Hud the lord of Lérida sent a letter to Hisham declaring allegiance at the latter's assumption of the Caliphal title in Cordova in 420 (1029).[243] It is reasonable to assume that Hisham chose not to go to a city controlled by Yahya I, otherwise he would have gone straight to Zaragoza. This would suggest that Lérida was under the control of Sulayman Ibn Hud by 1029.

The second incident which reflects the growing independence of Sulayman was his harbouring of and declared allegiance to Hisham al-Mu'tadid in Lérida. The boost to his prestige from having a Caliph (albeit one of several

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239 Ibn al-Khatib:A'mal al-A'lam,pp.197.

240 vol.3,p.222.

241 Al-Marrakushi:al-Mu'jib, p.58.

242 Ibn 'Idhari:al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.145.

243 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam, Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.517.

pretenders) in his own city must have been tremendous. Muhammad Ibn 'Abbad, lord of Seville produced a man claiming to be Hisham al-Mu'ayyed in an attempt to increase his prestige and power among the other Ta'ifa rulers in Muharram 427/ November 1035.[244] Needless to say, Sulayman was not one of those offering allegiance to the pretender in Seville.

The divergence in policy between Sulayman and Yahya occurred over Hisham III. Coins struck in Zaragoza in 1029 show that Yahya was acknowledging the authority of the 'Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad.[245] This might have been the result of Yahya finally giving up all hope of the possibility of reestablishing the Umayyad system in Spain. It allowed him to keep his

independence while remaining within the framework of legitimacy by acknowledging a Caliph de jure who could never have any authority over him de facto. In some ways this was a somewhat introverted move. It allowed the Tujibids to concentrate on the affairs of Zaragoza while removing themselves from the arena of pan-Spanish politics.

However, it must have been very awkward for Yahya to have one of the main lords of the A'mal of Zaragoza not only declaring for a different Caliph, but actually harbouring him in the A'mal. It is at this stage that one can see the Tujibid power retreating to Zaragoza and Huesca. By 1031, Sulayman Ibn Hud was, in all probability, an independent lord in his own

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[244] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.18. Also Ibn 'Idhari:al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.190.

[245] M.J. Viguera: Aragón Musulmán, p.142.

right and not simply the lord of a city within the greater A'mal of Zaragoza. The Hudids had therefore become established as a separate Ta'ifa, sharing the power within the upper march with the Tujibids and acknowledging a more "Andalusian" Caliph. This was important as the jurists of Muslim Spain and in particular the highly respected Ibn Hazm believed that the Umayyads were the only house entitled to hold the Caliphate.[246] Within the upper march the Hudids' prestige was firmly established through the twin facets of actual visible power (their control of Lérida and Tudela and the extra economic resources which ensued from that control) and moral or legal authority derived from having Hisham III in Lérida. These two factors laid the foundation for Sulayman's eventual take-over of Zaragoza and control of the whole of the upper march at the end of the third decade of the C11.

3. 3 The 'Amirids in Valencia

The struggle for the control of Valencia following the death of Mubarak provides an interesting insight into the politics of the early part of the C11;in particular the way in

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[246]Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.169. "And what added to his [ibn Hazm's] anger was his support for the cause of the Umayyads, past and present, in the East and the Andalus" 'Abbas in a footnote points out that Ibn Hazm in several texts attacked Marwan Ibn al-Hakam (684-685)- who had established the Marwanid line within the house of Umayya- and supported the claim of the pretender Ibn al-Zubayr. From a theological viewpoint, Ibn Hazm believed that certain descendants of Quraysh, including non-Umayyads could become Caliphs (Al-Muhalla, Vol.9, pp.359-362.), but I believe that Ibn Hayyan was referring to Ibn Hazm's political stance.

which the various lords were trying to expand and consolidate their domains as the dust settled on the ruins of both the Umayyad and the 'Amirid systems in Cordova. Valencia was a particularly rich city which had attracted both a large contingent of 'Amirid Slav soldiers fityan and the rich emigrés from Cordova. Its political distance from the civil strife allowed at least the rich to prosper, their palaces driving the prices of land higher, although the poor suffered under a government dedicated solely to the material advancement of its two leaders. The contribution of Mubarak and Mudhaffar, however, was not wholly negative. They had preserved the wealth of the province. Furthermore, they had rebuilt the walls of the city making it a more viable military base supported by a strong economy and containing among its citizens a trained corps of horsemen who could be very useful to an ambitious ruler.

Interest in Valencia came from three quarters. Mujahid, lord of Denia, was the obvious predator. Denia, to the south of Valencia was close enough to make unification a viable proposition. With Jativa, the second city of the Valencian A'mal, a province could be created which controlled the whole of the coastal plain as well as the stretch of coastline between Valencia and Denia. Denia, moreover, like Valencia was a maritime power with an interest in, among other places, Sardinia. Finally, Mujahid himself was a Slav fata of the 'Amirid forces and therefore had something in common with the other professional soldiers who gathered in Valencia under Mudhaffar and Mubarak.

A less obvious predator was Labib, lord of Tortosa to the north of Valencia. Tortosa was much more distant from Valencia than Denia and belonged more properly to the A'mal of Zaragoza. However, a link along the coastline was a possibility and would have given Labib control over the whole of the costa del Azahar. Labib, like Mujahid was also a Slav commander and would also have had connections with the soldier contingent within Valencia.

Finally, Sulayman Ibn Hud was the last and least likely contender. It is unlikely that he controlled Lérida at that time. His power base of Tudela was too far inland to make a joining with the A'mal of Valencia a sensible proposition. He could, of course, have been acting on behalf of the Tujibids, but that period in 1018-1020 was one in which he seemed to have been estranged from them and in any case the extant sources mention him specifically as opposed to the Tujibids. His involvement seems to have been the result of the Valencians inviting him following an earlier invitation to Labib of Tortosa, who had formed a close alliance with a Christian state, probably Barcelona.[247]

> And that is because when Mubarak died, the people (Ahl) of Valencia agreed to advance Labib the Slav, who treated them harshly and asked the tyrant ruler of the Franks (al-Taghia Amir al-Ifranj) for aid until he became like one of his men (ka-ba'di 'ummalih). They attacked him [Labib] and called on Ibn Hud for aid (Istasrakhu Ibn Hud). [Ibn Hud] came and the horizon darkened between him and Mujahid for what occurred with Tortosa. Wars ensued between them, and people were worried about the effect of this

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247 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.164.

> conflict on the thugur. This carried on until that area decided to give authority (Ta'mir) to 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Abi 'Amir.

The most interesting aspect of this episode, as far as the upper march is concerned, is not so much that Sulayman failed to make any impact beyond neutralising the effects of Mujahid's campaigns or eventually being responsible for Labib's withdrawal from the A'mal of Valencia. Rather, it is the fact that the Ahl of Valencia chose to call upon Sulayman for help when they discovered that Labib was acting like a governor ('Amil) appointed by the Count of Barcelona. This suggests that even as early as 1020, Sulayman's reputation was well established outside the upper march as a powerful lord and one who is seen as a defender of the Muslims against the Christians. From Sulayman's point of view, his involvement may have been in part an attempt to establish himself as a Ta'ifa lord in a new domain. Had this been partly his objective, he clearly failed, possibly because Valencia was too distant from his own power base. His reputation as a possible ruler was, however, fairly established and he built on this base over the following two decades which eventually enabled him to take over Zaragoza.

The main weakness in the legacy of Mubarak and Mudhaffar was that they left no clear successor. This lack of succession was made more difficult by the fact that the power in Valencia seemed to rest largely with the professional 'Amirid soldiers. One of the more striking aspects of the strife which followed Mubarak's death in dhi al-Hijja 408/

20 April-18 May 1018 or 409/10 April 1019-8 May 1019,[248] was that there seemed to have been no local lord capable of taking over the government of the city. The details of that strife are unclear. One source suggests that Labib was the first to take over the city. He then seems to have shared his authority with Mujahid, eventually leaving Valencia entirely in the hands of the latter.[249] This seems to agree with Ibn Hayyan's version which simply records Mujahid as the last ruler of Valencia before the take over by 'Abd al-'Aziz.[250] Ibn 'Idhari recorded that the people of Valencia first called upon Labib, who then became unpopular. Labib asked for the help of the "Prince of the Franks", which led the Valencians to call upon Sulayman Ibn Hud to aid them. Labib then left Valencia and Sulayman and Mujahid entered into a war over it which drove the people of Valencia to invite 'Abd al-'Aziz. [251]

The choice of 'Abd al-'Aziz as the best candidate for the governorship of Valencia fulfilled several criteria. As the grandson of the dictator al-Mansur, 'Abd al-Aziz would

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[248] Anon:Fragment B published at end of Ibn 'Idhari's Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p.302. When the third section of Al-Bayan was published by Lévi-Provençal, he came across an incomplete manuscript of a history of the Ta'ifa kings in Spain and north Africa, by an unknown author. He published this at the end of the Al-Bayan as fragments A & B. In print they constitute 28 pages. The length of the original text and the identity of the author is unknown.

[249] ibid.

[250] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.249.

[251] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp.163-164.

have been a legitimate leader to the 'Amirid contingent in Valencia. Moreover, his authority would have extended, at least in theory, over Mujahid and even Labib. However, a major reason for choosing him as opposed to his cousin, an equally legitimate choice,[252] was probably his youth. He was only fifteen when he was given allegiance in Valencia in dhi al-Hijja 411/28 March-15 April 1021.[253] The 'Amirid party in Valencia must have believed that he would prove to be a manageable ruler. The extent of their power was reflected in the fact that they invited Labib, then tried to replace him when his policies became unpopular. 'Abd al-'Aziz was informed of their choice while residing in Zaragoza under the hospitality of the Tujibids. He was informed of his being chosen in secret and left Zaragoza in secret.[254] The 'Amirid party in Valencia was obviously wary of the possible interest of the Tujibids and any possible influence they might have over 'Abd al-'Aziz. This shading of openion is only now available through al-Dhakhira. In fact, he turned out to be a particularly good choice. Although represented by Ibn Hayyan as a bland character, he consolidated the power of Valencia and became one of the longest ruling Ta'ifa lords.

His actions following his ascension to power were, however, fairly uncontroversial. He acknowledged the Caliph

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[252] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.249.

[253] Anon:Fragment B. Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p.301.

[254] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.249.

al-Qasim in Cordova,[255] receiving the title al-Mu'tamin dha al-Sabiqatayn [256]in return. He also managed to extend his authority over Denia, where Mujahid recognised him.[257] Internally, he concentrated on extending the fortification programme started by Mubarak and Mudhaffar,[258]including the building of the East gate (Bab al-Qantara)[259] which played an important part in the defence of Valencia. The main plank of his internal policy was the establishment of an efficient chancery made up of four famed Katibs.[260] An efficient chancery would have allowed 'Abd al-'Aziz to control his domain politically and economically, ensuring that the state received its due share of taxes collected, as well as controlling the parties within the city. The chancery also meant that 'Abd al-Aziz received advice independent from any faction. It also provided him with the tools to conduct diplomacy with other powers, whether Muslim or Christian. The link made between 'Abd al-'Aziz's rule and this chancery by the sources attests to the importance of chanceries in the mechanics of governing provinces in the C11.

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255 ibid.

256 Huici Miranda claims that unlike his grandfather, 'Abd al-'Aziz did not earn the title! Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región, Vol.1, p.168, which perhaps reflects his unsympathetic attitude to the Ta'ifas.

257 Anon:Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol. 3, p.302.

258 Al-'Udhri:Tarsi' al-Akhbar, p.17.

259 ibid., p.18.

260 Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.250. Cf p. 151-152 above.

Much of Ibn Bassam's al-Dhakhira is a record of various sorts of correspondence between the wazirs of the chanceries of the different Ta'ifas. The collapse of the Caliphate led to the disbanding of the Cordovan civil service, but they generally found work with the Ta'ifa rulers creating miniature versions of the highly developed Caliphal civil service. The demands made on these chanceries as a result of the development of the provincial centres into city-states in their own right must have led to the development of the provincial chanceries of the pre-fitna period(mostly concerned with tax collection and correspondence with Cordova) into more sophisticated apparatus. These had to cope with the government of the province, coordinating action with lords of the A'mal as well as conducting foreign policy with the neighbouring Ta'ifas. Bad ministerial advice could have disastrous consequences as can be shown by the case of Zuhair of Almeria which will be looked at below. That 'Abd al-'Aziz's chancery was a particularly successful one is reflected not only in his long and successful reign but also in the fact that the wazirs were recognised as being especially good by the rest of the intellectuals of Muslim Spain.[261]

However, 'Abd al-'Aziz's honeymoon period was to be short-lived. Mujahid of Denia rebelled against the authority of Valencia. It could be that as it became apparent that 'Abd al-'Aziz was consolidating his authority within the province, Mujahid decided that it was had been a mistake to

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[261] ibid. See also Huici Miranda: Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región,vol.1, p.168.

accept his authority. The efficient chancery might have also been a source of alienation for Mujahid, in that the four wazirs would have shielded the young ruler from Mujahid's influence. An efficient chancery probably also meant more persistent demands for a higher percentage of the income of Denia. Moreover, as 'Abd al-'Aziz consolidated his authority, Mujahid must have felt in danger. The young ruler would remember that Mujahid himself had been a contender for the Valencian throne. Mujahid probably thought that as soon as 'Abd al-'Aziz felt able, he might decide to replace him as lord of Denia. The weak governmental legacy left by Mubarak and Mudhaffar meant that the bond linking Valencia with its wider A'mal was quite weak. This allowed Mujahid the opportunity to rebel.

Interestingly, Mujahid seems to have lacked the military muscle to launch a full attack on Valencia. There is no surviving evidence of any such direct confrontations with the forces of 'Abd al-'Aziz. However, in a letter from Habus, lord of Granada, (composed by the wazir Abi 'Abd Allah al-Bazalyani) to Yahya, lord of Zaragoza, and quoted by Ibn Bassam,[262] there is reference to the on-going confrontation between Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz (involving also, it seems, Yahya). One therefore assumes that such confrontations took the form of border raids, rather than all-out assaults. In his efforts to tilt the balance of power in his favour, Mujahid used Christian soldiers. Equally, 'Abd al-

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[262] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.627.

'Aziz himself was not strong enough to meet Mujahid on his own. This is surprising and suggests that his hold over Valencia and its A'mal was not complete. He too had to resort to the use of Christian troops to aid him. Although Christians were used in the civil war that followed the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship, this must have been one of the earliest instances when Christians were involved on both sides in a Muslim conflict in the C11. The letter suggests that the use of Christian allies in inter-Muslim fights was still viewed as unacceptable, although the whole of Muslim Spain had already gone down the path of disunity and separate Ta'ifa states. For 'Abd al-'Aziz, the rebellion served to weaken him further, as he lost his briefly-held control over the gulf of Valencia. This must have also weakened him economically, in terms both of lost revenue and of increased military expenditure, not least to pay for the Christian troops.

3. 4. The Campaign for Almeria.

Almeria, to the south of Valencia and Denia was not part of the Valencian A'mal, but belonged rather in the sphere of Granada. It was a particularly prosperous town famed for its production of marble and luxury goods such as embroidered linen [263] as well as for ship construction.[264] Yet this

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[263] E.M.Lopez:'Algunes Concideraciónes Sobre la Vida Socio-Económica de Almeria en el Siglo IX y primera Mitad del XII', Actas del IV Coloquio Hispano-Tunecino, ed. M. Marin, pp.183-4.

distant port was the scene of the only attempt by 'Abd al-'Aziz at military expansion.

The policy of 'Abd al-'Aziz seems to have been based on an attempt to maintain his authority over the traditional A'mal of Valencia. The main threat to his domain came from Toledo to the north*p1056Xwest the vigorous rule of Isma'il Ibn dhu al-Nun. Toledo was land bound and shared a long border with Valencia. The danger was that Toledo might have been tempted to expand eastward into Valencia to gain access to the sea. To the south, Mujahid held Denia as a hostile A'mal, while to the north, Labib in Tortosa formed a buffer on the narrow coastal strip between Valencia and Barcelona. Unlike the marches, Valencia had no reason at that stage to feel pressured by the Christian states, nor the need to try to expand its territory. Valencia was not unique in this approach to politics in C11 Muslim Spain. The Bani Razin held al-Sahla, an area between the upper march and the south. Like Valencia, it was a wealthy province, whose prosperity was based on particularly rich agricultural lands.[265] They chose to keep out of Ta'ifa feuding,[266] while maintaining their independence(they refused to fall under the influence of the Tujibids [267]). As a result of this, they managed to remain outside the strife that characterised much of the politics of the C11

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[264] ibid. p.187.

[265] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III,p.111.

[266] ibid.

[267] ibid.p.110.

and held on to their power until the advent of Almoravids. In this, they were aided, like Valencia, by not being in direct confrontation with the Christian states as they were protected by the middle and upper marches.

Valencia's one major departure from this policy of maintaining laissez-faire was the Almerian adventure. It was, in part, a response to the rebellion of Denia. Control over Almeria would have extended the authority of Valencia and added to its treasury, enabling it to launch a more concerted response against Mujahid. It was, however, a fundamentally opportunistic act.

Almeria had been under the control of Zuhair, a Slav commander.[268] His influence extended as far as Jativa, the second city in the A'mal of Valencia [269]

> As for Zuhair, the fata mentioned earlier, his kingdom (mamlakatuh) extended from Almeria to Jativa and beyond. . to the edge of the Toledan state.

This is, in fact, a very wide area. The reason why Zuhair would have held control over Jativa, which quite distant from Almeria, might have been because the main power there was made up of professional 'Amirid soldiers. Meanwhile, the proximity of Almeria to Granada had led to an alliance between Zuhair and the Berbers who had established their Ta'ifa there.

At the death of Habus the lord of Granada, Zuhair

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[268] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-bayan, Vol.3, pp.166-167.

[269] ibid.,pp.168-169.

went to offer his condolences to Badis, Habus' son and successor, accompanied by his main wazir, Ahmad Ibn 'Abbas in 429/14 October 1037-20 October 1038.[270] This trip turned into a disaster. Prior to the trip the Zirids of Granada were fighting another Berber group, the Zanata, who were led by Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah, and who had established themselves in Carmona. It seems that despite his alliance with Granada, Zuhair was supporting Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah and sending him supplies. Badis Ibn Habus had asked for the meeting to try to convince Zuhair to cease his support of Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah.[271] Ibn Hayyan related that despite Badis' attempts at treating gently with Zuhair, the latter had responded as if he were visiting one his appointed governors (<u>'Amil</u>), rather than an ally.[272] Ibn 'Abbas, Zuhair's wazir, chose to highlight the disagreement between the two lords, rather than put a diplomatic gloss over them, at least until they departed from Granada's <u>A'mal</u>.[273] Ibn 'Abbas is represented as both arrogant and devoid of military experience. [274] He had advised his lord badly. First, he misjudged totally the reaction of Badis to a high-handed approach. Secondly, he had misjudged the strength of Badis, possibly because of the latter's youth. Finally, he chose to

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270 ibid.pp.166-167.

271 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: <u>Al-Dhakhira</u>, Part I, p.656.

272 ibid.

273 ibid.,p.657.

274 ibid.p.662.

force a disagreement while in Granadan lands with mountainous terrain between the force of Zuhair and Almeria. Even when some of Zuhair's commanders sensed danger and advised their lord to flee in the night on his own, Ibn 'Abbas advised against them despite having no experience of a single military confrontation. The force of Zuhair were cut off in the rough terrain and literally annihilated.[275] In an age when Ta'ifa lords were adapting to a new situation where each was sovereign in his domain, and where relationships with neighbouring provinces entered new and untried realms, sound ministerial advice was essential to the survival of Ta'ifa lords.

The citizens of Almeria on hearing of their lord's death invited 'Abd al-'Aziz to govern the city at the end of dhi al-Hijja 429/September-2 October 1037.[276] This suggests that by that date, seventeen years after coming to power, 'Abd al-'Aziz had firmly established his credentials as an acceptable lord within the south-eastern part of Muslim Spain. Clearly, his credentials among the 'Amirid party in Almeria were greatly bolstered by the fact that he himself was an 'Amirid. For the second time in his life, 'Abd al-'Aziz was being offered a province on a plate. For the second time, he accepted. This time, however, he arrived with an army.[277] His troops included among them his son, 'Abd al-Malik and his son in law Ma'an Ibn abi Samadih. Ma'an was the son of the

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275 ibid.p.659.

276 ibid. p.663.

277 ibid.

Tujibid Muhammad, former lord of Huesca.[278] Muhammad had moved to Valencia after his defeat by Mundhir I, and his son had joined the service of 'Abd al-'Aziz.

The events that followed 'Abd al-'Aziz's arrival at Almeria are not very clear. It seems that Mujahid, on hearing of this development responded by attacking the A'mal of Valencia. [279] This might have been the result of his fearing the political consequences of Valencia's expansion or perhaps a purely opportunistic attack on the lands of his enemy. Interestingly, he chose not to attack 'Abd al-'Aziz directly, but rather to attack his lands. This method of warfare involving mostly indirect confrontation characterised most of the military conflict within Muslim Spain in this century. The use of raids, sieges and skirmishes were preferred to the use of direct confrontational battles. In fact, one could argue that the age of the Ta'ifas saw only one major battle, that of al-Zallaqa between the allied forces of the Ta'ifas and Almoravids and the Castilian forces in 1086.[280] 'Abd al-'Aziz left Almeria taking the treasury of Zuhair with him to try and meet this new threat.[281]

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[278] ibid.p.730.

[279] ibid.p.731.

[280] For a study of the place of battles in the strategy of medieval warfare, see J.Gillingham, 'Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages', War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J.Gillingham and J.C.Holt, pp.78-91. Also J.Gillingham, 'William the Bastard at War', Studies in Medieval History Presented to R.A. Brown, ed. C.Harper-Bill, C. Holdsworth and J.L. Nelson, pp.141-158.

[281] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.663.

At least one source indicates that 'Abd al-'Aziz left his son 'Abd al-Malik as commander in Almeria in 430/ 3 October 1038-22 September 1039.[282] However, Mujahid's rebellion had stirred up the whole of the A'mal of Valencia. 'Abd al-'Aziz faced a general rebellion in the outposts (husun) [283] as well as in Jativa and Lorca. In his attempt to put down the rebellion at Jativa, 'Abd al-'Aziz was defeated and wounded. The 'Amirid forces of the city believed that they had killed him.[284] It was probably at this stage when the power of 'Abd al-'Aziz seemed to have been ended that Ma'an Ibn Samadih, who had been left in Almeria with 'Abd al-Malik (probably Ma'an had exercised real authority in the city) decided to rebel against his father-in-law. This seems to have been in Rajab 433/24 February-25 March 1042.[285]

The Almerian adventure was therefore a disaster for 'Abd al-'Aziz. He failed to expand his domain, faced a rebellion whose ramifications carried on for at least two years and very nearly lost his life. In one respect it had been successful and that was in acquiring Zuhair's treasury. Eventually 'Abd al-'Aziz managed to recapture Jativa, killing

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[282] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.192

[283] As indicated in the introduction, a strict translation of the term should read forts or fortified towns, but it seems that in the context of this passage 'outposts' is an appropriate translation.

[284] Anon:Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.302.

[285] ibid. 'Abd al-Malik survived this coup and returned to Valencia.

the forces that had opposed him there.[286] At the end of this affair, 'Abd al-'Aziz probably had tighter control over the immediate A'mal of Valencia, but while his power was thus firmly established on the Valencia coastal plain, he had failed to expand it southwards. Denia remained independent and hostile under Mujahid and Almeria became an independent state under 'Abd al-'Aziz's now estranged son-in-law Ma'an. Thereafter, 'Abd al-'Aziz concerned himself mostly with Valencian affairs. With the establishment of real control over Jativa and its A'mal, Valencia reached a form of equilibrium with its neighbours. It made no further attempts at conquest.

3.5 Sulayman Ibn Hud - Lord of the upper march.

The exact mechanics of the takeover of Zaragoza by Sulayman Ibn Hud, and therefore his acquisition of control over the whole of the A'mal of the upper march are also unclear. It had occurred, however, after a period of preparation in which Sulayman had gradually asserted his independence from the Tujibids and established his credentials as an "Andalusian" ruler. He was helped in this by the power base that his family had in the upper march and by an element of luck in having Hisham III choose to seek refuge in his domain. Ibn Hayyan presents a picture of Sulayman as an able statesman and soldier. Certainly the state he established was

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286 ibid.

one of the most powerful and successful in C11 Spain. The establishment of the Hudids in Zaragoza can be seen as marking the turning point, where the Ta'ifas evolved from "provinces" to what could be termed city-states; certainly, the 1040's seems to have marked the time when Ta'ifa rulers started adopting Caliphal, as opposed to "semi-Caliphal" 'Amirid-ministerial titles. This issue of evolutions into city-states will be looked at in the following chapter.

The growth in Sulayman's power with control over Tudela, Lérida and Monzon reflected a weakening in Tujibid power. Yahya I had managed to establish friendly relations at times with Sulayman, but their relationship no longer corresponded to that of a lord and his overlord. Interestingly, Sulayman never attempted to extend his power to Zaragoza while the Tujibids were there. This might have been because he lacked the strength to do so (after all, the Tujibids were fairly strong in their own domain) or perhaps he retained a remnant of pre-Ta'ifa world view, in which the Tujibids were seen by Sulayman as the legitimate rulers of Zaragoza. The Tujibids, on the other hand, continued to signify their separateness from the mainstream of Muslim Spain by declaring for the 'Abbasid Caliph. They had, however, established a matrimonial alliance with their most powerful neighbours the dhu al-Nun of Toledo. Yahya I married the sister of Isma'il, lord of Toledo.[287] In the increasingly unstable and untried political arena which characterised the

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[287] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.2, p.178.

C11, Ta'ifa lords sought to establish a degree of predictability and stability in their relationships with one another by the use of matrimonial alliances. Such alliances were in use prior to the Ta'ifa period (for example the marriage of al-Mansur to Ghalib's daughter), but one assumes that with the proliferation of Ta'ifa states and the increased tension in the relationship between provinces, the use of such marriage alliances, for political purposes, increased. Needless to say, these alliances were not particularly efficient; for example, Ma'an turned against his father-in-law in Almeria. They did, however, represent a basis on which inter-Ta'ifa relationships could be constructed at a time when the previous basis of a framework of legal title emanating from Cordova had collapsed.

On the first of dhi al-Hijja 430/24 August 1039, 'Abd Allah Ibn Hakim, cousin to Mundhir II and a commander in Zaragoza's army entered the palace of Mundhir and murdered him.[288] There does not appear to be a clear reason for this murder. It was not really part of a concerted effort to take over Zaragoza, as 'Abd Allah does not seem to have had any accomplices. The reason he himself gave for the murder was that Mundhir II had not declared for the pretender Hisham in Seville, but rather for the 'Abbasids.[289] It seems that on a popular level, the Umayyads still held the primary position as acceptable Caliphs. There is clear evidence that 'Abd

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[288] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.185.

[289] ibid. p.186.

Allah managed to win over the commoners on the back of that cause.[290] In the first instance, 'Abd Allah called the Qadi and the elders of Zaragoza, claimed that he had performed his deed for the good of the province and declared that he would accept Sulayman Ibn Hud as the new lord of Zaragoza.[291] Clearly, Sulayman's prestige and his renowned allegiance to the Umayyads was well established in the upper march.

What happened next is not clear. Ibn Hayyan recorded that the Qadi and elders turned against 'Abd Allah forcing him to flee the palace and the city taking Mundhir's brothers and ministers as hostages to the fort of Rueda de Jalon. The commoners then looted the palace until Sulayman arrived in Muharram 431/23 September-22 October 1039. However, in an earlier section of Ibn Bassam, Ibn Hayyan is quoted as recording that Sulayman rushed to the gates of Zaragoza where he was met by a force led by Isma'il lord of Toledo who had come to avenge his son-in-law (and probably to take up the opportunity presented by this assassination to extend his authority into the upper march). 'Abd Allah managed to hold them outside the gates then retreated to the citadel.[292] Probably, 'Abd Allah, having seen the ease with which he managed to kill Mundhir and the response of the commoners, decided to take power himself. Isma'il lord of Toledo arrived as did Sulayman. In a sense, with the

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290 ibid.

291 ibid.pp.187-188.

292 ibid. p.186.

exception of the Tujibids, he had already established his claim to be the most legitimate ruler of the Zaragozan march. The combined forces of Sulayman and Isma'il forced 'Abd Allah out of the city after an initial resistance. No mention is made of the fate of Mundhir's brothers or indeed of 'Abd Allah. The assumption must be that they were all killed when Sulayman eventually conquered the fort of Rueda.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that Sulayman's rush to Zaragoza foiled the middle march's attempt at northern expansion. One could argue that this episode marked the beginning of a long period of tension between the two ruling houses which was to characterise the relations between the two city-states, although both still needed to rely on each other if the march structure were to function efficiently in keeping the Christian states in check. Some of the support which Sulayman found in Zaragoza may have been rooted in the fear, among the city's elite, that if Isma'il were to take over, either directly or through the appointment of an agent, they might lose some of their influence, while supporting the 'local' Sulayman might help preserve it, although there is no direct evidence to support this conjecture.

By Muharram 431/ September 1039, Sulayman had established his control over the whole of the upper march with his capture of Zaragoza. An indication of his military power was his ability to neutralise the military presence of Isma'il, then the lord of arguably the most powerful Ta'ifa in the peninsula. Unlike 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia, Sulayman did not have to go through a long phase of consolidating his

power in the city then in the A'mal. He had already established his authority over the A'mal, so that the conquest of Zaragoza marked almost the immediate birth of the Hudid state as an established power in the upper march.

3.6 Conclusion.

The period following the civil war in Cordova was a period of flux in the politics of Muslim Spain. For a considerable period of time the main lords of the border provinces as well as some of those with political influence within Cordova tried to reinstate the pre-'Amirid system of government. That was because the lords of the marches, in particular, but also some of the Cordovan political elite, viewed the 'Amirid system as too centralised, having weakened the powers of the provinces, and looked to the Umayyad model of government as the only workable and legitimate one. The 'Amirids had, however, so changed the structure of government and society in Muslim Spain during their relatively short period in power that a return to the Umayyad system was not possible. The Umayyad system itself was a somewhat delicate one based on a mixture of legality and militarily imposed authority so that it was not surprising that the Spanish Muslims found it hard to reinstate it. It had, after all, shown signs of weakness even in the heyday of Umayyad rule.

The Umayyad system had, however, helped define the relationship between the lords of the provinces and the minor lords in their A'mal by providing a theoretical pyramid of

power with the Caliph passing on his authority to the lords of the provinces who then passed it on in turn to the lesser lords in the A'mal. It also provided the lords of the provinces with a framework for the relationship between the provinces. Each was clearly defined not only by the geographical reality of the area but also by a legal reality emanating from Cordova. Weaker provinces were protected from the more powerful ones by the overall control of the Caliphate.

The 'Amirid system destroyed both these frameworks without really providing an alternative that would work outside the bounds of a vigorous dictatorship. This led to a form of breakdown in both types of relationships in the early part of the C11. Sulayman's path to independence within the A'mal of Zaragoza is a good example of this. After the civil war, the only bond between him and Zaragoza was simply one of convenience. It could be argued that in the final analysis, convenience defined the boundaries of the bond between a lesser and a greater lord even before the fitna. The Umayyad system, however, provided for the imposition of overall order in the peninsula, so that Sulayman would have been unlikely to have developed such independence as he would have faced sanctions not only from Zaragoza but also from Cordova. Mujahid provides another example of the breakdown of this relationship. In practical terms this tended to encourage the breakup of provinces. Any lord could rebel provided he could hold off the lord of the province. Even if the lord of the province established his authority, the fact that he had no additional source of support in the event of a rebellion must

have led to a political atmosphere of volatility, where each lord of a province spent much time and energy in ensuring that his province remained loyal.

The breakdown of the framework governing the relationship between provinces was equally damaging. In the first instance, it led to a period when each province felt it could expand into and occupy the land of neighbouring ones for political and economic gain. Prior to the fitna, the fact that all provinces belonged within a single system that encompassed all of them had led to stable relationships between them. Gradually, the newly established Ta'ifas reached a stage where they balanced each other out and could no longer expand. This naturally occurred after the lesser provinces had been absorbed into the larger ones. However, the political world-view of the provinces had undergone irrevocable change. While prior to the fitna they viewed themselves as part of a single system, the collapse of that system led them to view themselves each as an independent system within itself. The ramifications of this change on the politics of Muslim Spain vis-á-vis the Christian north was fundamental. A coordinated course of action against any external threat became much more difficult. This was partly because those not directly involved in the conflict saw no reason to become involved, since they began to think in terms of the interests of their self-contained provinces. The politics of the Bani Razin in the province of al-Sahla and of 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia are good examples of this.

Another reason was a lack of trust. Since there was

no overall order to protect the various components of the Muslim State in the peninsula, each province felt threatened by its neighbours. An attack on a potential enemy, even by the Christians, was not to be discouraged. Finally, in a separatist atmosphere, there developed the view that a Muslim enemy was as dangerous and to be fought as vigorously as any other including a Christian one. Alliances with a Christian power against a Muslim neighbour for local gain therefore began to gain acceptability. That 'Abd al-'Aziz's confrontation with Mujahid in which both sides used Christian allies, led to contemporary comment, reflected the initial unease felt for such a concept.

The breakdown of the old system was gradual, which added to the confusion of the Ta'ifa rulers. Their assumption of Caliphal titles was no indication of their assumption of kingship, for they followed a tradition established by the 'Amirids. In any case in the early part of the century the titles they assumed had clear ministerial connotations. Both Sulayman and 'Abd al-'Aziz at first assumed titles given them by Caliphs.

In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the Ta'ifa rulers tried to establish means to deal with the new situation within their A'mal and with the relationship with each other. These included the upgrading of the previously fairly basic chanceries of the provinces into more sophisticated apparatuses. In this they were helped by the existence of a corps of unemployed civil servants from Cordova, who served in the provincial chanceries (among the ministers taken as

hostage by 'Abd Allah was the famed Abu al-Mughira Ibn Hazm [293]). In the relationship with each other, they sought to bring a degree of stability to replace that imposed by the Caliphate with matrimonial alliances. Probably, matrimonial alliances between members of the leading families of Muslim Spain were common before the fitna, but the period under the Ta'ifas added a more political dimension to these alliances in that they came to represent alliances between states rather than between factions within a single state.

Within this general picture there were differences between provinces that had traditionally exercised a greater degree of autonomy and ones that were further inland. Once the upper march was controlled by a strong ruler, or as in the case of Sulayman and Yahya I, shared by two rulers, the mechanics were already there for each "state" to function fairly quickly as an efficient independent unit. Those provinces such as Valencia to whom autonomy was fairly new faced a more difficult time of adjustment. Furthermore, because the upper march had had a history of relative autonomy, it had developed within it factions whose power was locally based. This added to the internal stability of the province as a whole. Valencia on the other hand, presented a picture where power resided with factions that had little or no local power base, whether 'Abd al-'Aziz himself or the 'Amirid faction in Jativa. Arguably this added to the instability of provincial government, although with time the

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[293] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p.188.

emigré factions became locals.

The Ta'ifas had emerged in a slow evolutionary process where the majority of the main players did not seem to realise that they were developing independent states, but seemed to be perpetually preparing themselves politically for the return of the Umayyad system. By the time these lords realised that the Umayyad system was never to return, they had already established the boundaries and governmental and political mechanics of the Ta'ifa city-states.

4. The Era of City-States

4.1 Introduction.

The last chapter attempted to look at the way in which the provinces developed through the period of civil war that followed the collapse of the 'Amirid dictatorship into independent states. In the case of Valencia, the establishment of the 'Amirid government had been the result of fortuitous circumstances that had delivered the province to a young man who would have otherwise not been able to rule or establish a state. In the case of Zaragoza, a local man had established his power in a province already used to autonomy. In both cases, the states had not developed as a result of a policy specifically aimed at creating "kingdoms". Yet, at some stage towards the end of the fourth decade of the C11, the various rulers of the Ta'ifas came to realise that the old Umayyad system was past reviving and moved consciously towards a system where they perceived themselves as rulers of independent city-states. This shift was gradual and subtle, but its effects were quite profound. By the end of the century, this system had already been described as that of the muluk al-Tawa'if (party kings).[294] This was not necessarily a compliment, as the title malik was normally associ-

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[294] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, p.723.

ated with Christian rulers. Moreover, the sources (Ibn Bassam and other later chroniclers, such as Ibn 'Idhari) show a degree of mockery at the pomposity of these rulers who presumed to take on Caliphal titles while ruling states that were obviously weak especially in terms of their inability to stem the Christian tide.[295]

The effects of the collapse of the Umayyad framework of government on provinces both in terms of their internal and external policies, which were touched upon in the last chapter, became more pronounced. Indeed, one of the main reflections of this was the way in which provinces' relations with each other came to be perceived firmly in the realm of "foreign" policy.

The decades between 1040 to 1060 certainly saw a move towards a more insular outlook by the Ta'ifas. The political stage had already been set with the main players established by the end of the fourth decade of the C11. This period saw the Ta'ifa states continue to consolidate their positions vis-á-vis each other, through a mixture of diplomacy and war. The period also saw the increased interference of the Christian states in the affairs of the Ta'ifas. This interference began hesitantly and mostly at the instigation of the Ta'ifa states themselves, but gathered momentum as the Christian states discovered that with the south so clearly divided the balance of power had

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[295] ibid. Part I, p.731. Although Ibn Bassam as well as later writers referred to the Christian (Nasara) advance, when discussing the events of the second half of the century, the reference is clearly primarily to the advance of Castile under Alfonso VI.

begun to favour them. Eventually, this was to develop into a more aggressive attitude towards the south bolstered by increased unity under the "greater" Castile and militant "Frankish" Christian ideology imported through greater contact with the rest of Europe. During this period, however, the Christian states mostly acted on an opportunistic basis, as they used their newly acquired position as power brokers to tap the tremendous wealth of the south. After centuries of being militarily dominated, the north began to build up confidence on the back of the perceived weakness and lack of political vision in the Muslim south. This was the period in which the foundations for the reconquest were laid.

It is in this period that the northern Christian states began to extract tribute (Parias)[296] from their southern Muslim neighbours, not simply a payment for a specific act of military alliance, but a regular payment to "protect" the Muslim states from northern attacks. It was of course a symbolic turnaround from the situation where the Muslim south used to extract tribute (Jizya) from the northern states up to the first decade of the century. These tributes resulted in a transfer of wealth from south to north and helped weaken the Ta'ifa states considerably. They also served to blur the relationship between south and north further. Whether the Christian north learnt to

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[296] For a brief discussion of the theological problems raised by the Ta'ifas' need to pay parias, see de Epalza, 'El Cid y Los Musulmanes: El Sistema de Parias-Pagas, La Colaboración de Aben Galbón, El Titulo de Cid-León, La Posadita fortificada de Alcocer', El Cid en el Valle Del Jalón, pp.107-125.

extract tribute from the example set by the Muslim south is arguable. Tribute, however, had different connotations for the Muslim mind (payment by a dhimmi (Christian or Jew) implying no further bond) than for the Christian Spanish mind, where it involved connotations of vassalage.

Certainly, later Christian sources claim that in some cases the Ta'ifa kings became vassals to the Christian kings. Whether the Ta'ifa rulers thought of themselves as vassals, or indeed even understood this essentially northern framework of relationship is debatable.

Valencia was guided through this period by 'Abd al-'Aziz whose long reign added to the stability of the state's political policy towards its neighbouring Ta'ifas. By the fifth decade of the C11, however, his attempts to remain outside the field of infighting in the peninsula began to come under strain, not so much because of pressure from other Muslim Ta'ifas, but rather as a result of Christian incursions that had begun to strike deeper southwards. Zaragoza, on the other hand saw Ahmad, titled al-Muqtadir succeed his father Sulayman in 1046. In many ways this represented a real as well as a symbolic break with the old type of government as al-Muqtadir came to represent an ideal of a successful Ta'ifa ruler.

4. 2 The War for Guadalajara.

The years between 435/10 August 1043-28 July 1044 and 438/8 July 1046-27 June 1047 [297] saw a major border conflict between the upper and middle march. Sulayman Ibn Hud decided to take the opportunity of the death of Isma'il and the disputed succession of his son Yahya [298] to consolidate and expand the territory of Zaragoza southwards. To some degree, what must have lent him confidence was Toledo's isolation among the Ta'ifa states. 1043 was a time when the Ta'ifas were still behaving as if a Caliphate existed at least in theory. The Caliph who was widely acknowledged was the pretender Hisham in Seville. That this acknowledgement had become meaningless in a practical sense was reflected in the fact that the Bani 'Abbad in Seville had failed to make as much political gain out of having the pretender reside with them as they would have liked; although this might partly have had something to do with general scepticism as to whether the man in Seville was Hisham, [299] and if so, how he had managed to be resurrected twice. It is possible to glimpse the way in which the Spanish Muslim elite viewed this pretender, through Ibn Hayyan who wrote

> And in the year [4] 51 [17 February 1059 -

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[297] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.282.

[298] Both Yahya and his brother 'Abd al-Rahman tried for the succession. Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.281.

[299] See,for example,Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira. Part II, pp.16-18.

> 5 February 1060], when he [al-Mu'tadid Ibn 'Abbad, lord of Seville] was victorious, we heard in Cordova that his mosques no longer declared for his imam, Hisham Ibn al-Hakam, he of the resurrection (Sahib al-Raj'a). . and it was mentioned that he [al-Mu'tadid] called the dignitaries of his realm and declared the death of their imam Hisham, telling them that he had died from an old illness. . This became the third death of the bearer of this name, and let us hope, God willing, that this should be the last, for how often he was killed and died to rise from the earth and tear his shroud before the coming of the Day of the judgement.[300]

Toledo, however, had been the first Ta'ifa to formally break from this system. Yahya's father, Isma'il, had refused to acknowledge any Caliph and Yahya had followed suit.[301] Sulayman's aggression against the lands of another province could be justified, in part, on the basis that by not acknowledging the Caliphate, the Bani dhi al-Nun had forgone the legitimacy of their authority over the middle march. This clearly illustrates that the process towards the total renunciation of the Umayyad system was a very gradual one. Yahya had to eventually rejoin the fold and accept the Caliph in order to meet this threat from Sulayman,[302] which suggests that up to the beginning of the fourth decade in the C11, the idea of total indepen-

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[300] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp.37-38. It is interesting to note that Ibn Hayyan, a believer in the Umayyad system, refers to this Hisham as his, that is, al-Mu'tadid's, imam showing his own scepticism on the pretender's identity. The tone of the text is also clearly mocking.

[301] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp.278-279.

[302] ibid.

who was widely suspected of being a fraud) was still unacceptable in the political polemic of Muslim Spain.

Sulayman started the campaign by sending an army to Guadalajara under the command of his eldest son Ahmad,[303] in 435 (10 August 1043-28 July 1044).[304] The position of Guadalajara between the states of Zaragoza and Toledo lead to some lack of clarity as to which A'mal it was meant to belong. It is nearer to Toledo than Zaragoza and can therefore be seen as more reasonably part of the greater A'mal of the former. However, the question of where it naturally belonged was debatable in that it used to belong to the march centred on Medinaceli created by the Caliph 'Abd al-Rahman to counter the power of Zaragoza. With the decline of Medinaceli as the centre of the upper march, Zaragoza could conceivably see itself as the natural inheritor of its A'mal. Moreover, Sulayman had not embarked on a campaign to occupy a country totally opposed to him. There was a faction in Guadalajara which believed that the city belonged within the sphere of Zaragoza. Following Ahmad's attack on the city, this faction allowed the Zaragozan army into the city.[305] Relations between the Ta'ifas had therefore not developed into a stage where they behaved as entirely separate city-states and where, in times of conflict, one would occupy

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[303] ibid. p.277.

[304] ibid. p.282. Ibn 'Idhari mentions that the conflict lasted from 435-438 A.H.

[305] ibid. p.277.

the lands of another in an act of outright conquest. The sanctity of the borders of the provinces, especially the clearly defined ones was still relevant, even after the system that had guaranteed these borders had so obviously disintegrated.

Yahya mobilised an army which moved under his command to Guadalajara.[306] Yahya's campaign was not successful and he was forced to retreat into Talbira where he was besieged by Ahmad. [307] Ahmad wrote to his father for further orders and was told to lift the siege and return to Zaragoza.[308] Sulayman's decision not to press forward in a situation where the Zaragozan army had the upper hand clearly demonstrated the limited objective of his campaign. Had he been interested in the outright conquest of Toledo, he would have ordered his son to carry through the siege and capture or kill Yahya. Sulayman could have then either attempted an occupation of the middle march or he could have installed Yahya's brother as a puppet ruler in Toledo. However, Sulayman's objective seemed to have been limited to expanding his domain within the march area. Yahya's response was to ask the "two counts, the sons of Shanjah" for aid.[309] The campaign that followed the intervention of Navarre was somewhat peculiar. Sulayman seems to have decided that he lacked

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306 ibid. p.278.

307 ibid.

308 ibid.

309 ibid. One was probably García III Sánchez of Navarre.

the power to meet them outright and had his forces sit within their fortifications (Husun). This seems to have been a very early acknowledgement that the forces of a single march were incapable of resisting the might of a northern force. The Christians on the other hand, occupied the fertile area of the upper march for the two months of the harvest, collecting the harvest themselves and transporting it north. [310]

Despite this successful outcome for Yahya, he still felt isolated in the political arena of Muslim Spain. He therefore entered into an alliance with the Bani 'Abbad of Seville, acknowledging Hisham the pretender.[311] This was a reversal of the policy of his father who had from an early stage decided not to acknowledge any Caliph, and it represented an acceptance on Yahya's part of the continuation of the importance of the Caliphal institution if only on a cosmetic level. The acknowledgement of Hisham also had a more practical dimension in that Yahya hoped for military assistance from Seville. Seville, however, was engaged in hostilities with its neighbour, the lower march centred on Badajoz and could offer no help.[312]

Despite the lack of military support, this alliance clearly made Sulayman feel vulnerable. One of the main weaknesses of Yahya had been his refusal to acknowl-

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[310] ibid.

[311] ibid. pp.278-279.

[312] ibid. p.279.

edge any Caliphate. The reversal of Yahya's policy on this issue combined with his Christian and Muslim alliances led to a situation where Sulayman was in a weaker and potentially more dangerous situation than before. Sulayman responded by calling on Fernando I of Castile-Léon and Ramiro I for aid, and trying to bribe Fernando I to enter the conflict.[313] Like the incident with the rebellion of Mujahid in Denia, a situation had developed where Christian states were involved on both sides of a Muslim conflict and while in the case of the war between Mujahid and 'Abd al-'Aziz, the involvement of the Christian states led to comment from other Ta'ifas, their involvement in this war caused no such comment; the idea had gained more acceptability, not necessarily as a correct course of action but as a credible one for a lord.

Interestingly, the "people" of Toledo decided to settle the dispute themselves. In their representation to Sulayman they highlighted the unacceptable consequences of allowing Christian troops to weaken and loot Muslim lands. The reference to the Ahl is an intriguing one. The "people" of Valencia had invited Labib to govern in 1018-1020. The "people" of Toledo played a particularly important role in the politics of the middle march, especially with regards to Yahya's grandson, also named Yahya. It seems unlikely that "the people" referred to were merchants (Tujjar) or commoners (al-'Ammah), although the influence of merchants in the city-states must have been quite strong. The term

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313 ibid. p.279.

probably referred to the groups representing the interests of the leading families in the city. This group was probably made up from a landed, educated elite, some of whom would have claimed to belong to the Arab aristocracy. This group would have overlapped with the one termed the elders (al-Mashyakha) and would have also included the jurists of the city. The leading families were the main source from which civil servants and jurists were recruited. The representation to Sulayman is therefore probably a reflection of the views of the body of the educated leading members of the community. Given the respect and authority accorded to age, the majority of the decision making body within this group would have belonged, at this stage, in its education and political outlook, to the pre-fitna era.

Sulayman pretended to accept the proposed peace, especially since Yahya was advancing on the upper march aided by (unidentified) Christian troops. Yahya was persuaded to accept the peace which was initiated without his participation by the people of his capital, and withdrew.[314] Sulayman then directed his Christian allies under Fernando I of Léon-Castile to attack the middle march and he himself occupied Medinaceli; as well as reoccupying forts lost to Toledo.[315] Yahya responded in kind with his ally, García III Sánchez of Navarre wreaking havoc in the upper march between Huesca and Tudela, eventually taking

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[314] ibid. p.280.

[315] ibid. pp.280-281.

the castle of Calahorra [316] at the beginning of 437/ July-August 1045.[317] Sulayman's response was again to avoid direct confrontation, preferring to sit out the attacks in his castles and fortifications.[318] This suggests that Sulayman was unwilling to risk battle, either because battles were generally perceived to be unpredictable,[319] or because he faced an additional particular problem to do with a limited number of trained fighting men. This conjecture is based on the following argument. Although the upper march traditionally had a corps of trained troops, it used to rely on reinforcement from the troops of the Caliphate. After the fitna, the Caliphal and 'Amirid troops were dispersed throughout Muslim Spain often, as in the case of Mujahid or the Zirids in Granada, having set up their own Ta'ifas. While the upper march could, therefore, muster its normal contingent for a raid or a skirmish, Zaragoza simply lacked the resources to do anything other than sit tight in its strongholds in the face of a concerted attack.

Yahya took the opportunity of the immobility of

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[316] ibid. p.281.

[317] ibid. p.281. See also Ibn al-Khatib:A'mal al-A'yan for a similar description of this conflict. pp.205-206.

[318] ibid. p.281.

[319] see J.Gillingham: 'Richard I and the science of war in the middle ages', War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. Gillingham and Holt, pp.78-91 and 'William the Bastard at War', Studies in Medieval History Presented to R.A. Brown, ed. Harper-Bill, Holdsworth and Nelson, pp.141-158.

the forces of the upper march to reoccupy Medinaceli.[320] Sulayman again responded by getting Fernando I to raid the middle march, [321] this time escalating the fight by attacking Toledo itself. With Yahya away in Medinaceli, the people of Toledo again responded by attempting to make peace, this time with Fernando who refused to treaty.[322] The confrontation between Fernando and the people of Toledo was a particularly interesting one. In refusing to treat, Fernando asked for impossible sums of money. When told the city could not pay those amounts he responded:

> As for your saying that you cannot pay these monies, that is an impossibility; for if the roofs of your houses were transparent, they would glint with gold because of its abundance within.[323]

This exaggerated view of the wealth available in the south must have acted as a great incentive for the Christian states in their southern expansion.

More interestingly, Fernando I dismissed the threats by the Toledans that they would invite the Berbers to aid them and continued, according to Ibn 'Idhari:

> We only ask for our lands which you wrested from us in the past at the beginning of your rule (amrikum). You have lived in them for as long as fate allowed and we have now defeated you because of your weakness (rada'tikum) so leave to your country

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320 Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.281.

321 ibid.

322 ibid. pp.281-281.

323 ibid. p.282.

('Adwatikum) and leave us our country.[324]

This speech appears to be the earliest reference, in an Arab source, to a Christian monarch specifically referring to Muslim Spain as occupied land which is to be liberated. It articulates the idea that the Muslims, after over three centuries of occupation, were outsiders and that Fernando had legitimacy as a representative of the authentic inhabitants. This particular reference, which sounds like propaganda, has, however, to be treated with caution. Ibn Hayyan's record of this border war does not seem to have survived, nor does it seem to be mentioned in the Latin sources. It could be that some troops from Léon-Castile and from Navarre were involved, but that the rulers of these states were not present. Ibn 'Idhari, or even his source, if it were a later Arab chronicler, could have put in the names of these two rulers to add weight to the Christian forces involved (in the same way that the author of the Poema de Mio Cid wrote that the attack on Valencia repulsed by the Cid towards the end of the century was led by the Moorish "King Yusuf").[325] As discussed in the introduction, Ibn 'Idhari is a much later author who uses Ibn Hayyan extensively. This can be seen by comparing passages from Ibn Hayyan quoted in Ibn

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[324] ibid. The use of the term 'Adwatikum is interesting. In its Spanish Muslim usage, it clearly meant the other shore. That is to say, it meant Spain when talking of north Africa and north Africa when talking of Spain. In effect, Fernando was telling the Toledan delegation that the Muslims should leave Spain altogether and go back over the sea to north Africa.

[325] El Poema de Mio Cid, Second cantar, 95,p.113.

Bassam's al-Dhakhira written at the end of the C11, with the narration of the history of the early to mid C11 by Ibn 'Idhari. Unlike Ibn Bassam though, Ibn 'Idhari does not necessarily use long verbatim quotes from Ibn Hayyan and often uses his own summary.

Parts of this speech appear as if they belong to the post Ta'ifa period. For example, Fernando's dismissal of the Toledan's threat to invite the "Berbers" sounds as if it referred to the Almoravids. The Almoravids, however, were not an established force in the early 1040's. Similarly, the reference that the Muslims should leave Spain altogether sounds as if it belonged to a later period. There is at least one reference to Alfonso VI toying with the idea in 1086 of being "The Emperor of the Two Faiths". [326] If one accepts that Fernando was personally involved in this campaign, as Ibn 'Idhari claimed (as opposed to some Castilian knights under a lesser leader), then one can construct a case where there was a reference to a speech by Fernando in which he showed an awareness of fighting to dislodge the Muslims. This could have then been reported to a Muslim writer. This speech would correspond with the sentiment beginning to

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[326] For a discussion of whether Alfonso ever used the title Emperor of the two faiths al-Imbaratur dhu al-Millatayn see articles by Mackay and Benaboud, 'Alfonso VI al-Imbaratur dhul Millatayn, BHS, vol.56, 1979, 95-102 and Roth 'Again Alfonso VI:"Imbaratur dhul-Millatayn", & some new data', BHS, vol.61, 1984, 165-169.

surface in Spanish sources at about this time.[327] In other words, one can conjecture that while the speech might have been embellished by later Muslim writers, the sentiment that Fernando was the representative of the indigenous population who were reoccupying their country from foreign settlers, was expressed by him at one stage. Fletcher expresses some doubts about the authenticity of the speech, partly because he sees it as being at variance with what is known of Fernando's policies. [328] While I share his doubts as to the authenticity of the actual speech, I am inclined to believe that the sentiment expressed in it might have started to find expression among the elite of the Christian kingdoms by the mid 1040's. If so, then in copying Fernando's speech, it is likely that Ibn 'Idhari would have embellished it to make it sound appropriate and in doing so, he would have added elements which belong to the political awareness of the C12-C13 rather than the C11. The earliest record of such a sentiment being expressed surviving in an extant contemporary Muslim source belongs to the second half of the century,

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[327] Lomax in Reconquest of Spain argues that such sentiment began to appear as early as the reign of Alfonso III (866-911). The Chronicle of Albelda talks of the Asturian Kings as Visigoths fighting to recover lost lands.pp. 38-41. Barkai,on the other hand,in his Cristianos y Musulmanes sees the shift in Spanish chronicles coinciding with the disintegration of the Caliphate,after which tolerance of co-existence begins to disappear. Part 2, chapter 1, p.105.

[328] Fletcher: 'Reconquest & Crusade in Spain c. 1050-1150', TRHS 37, 1987 p.37.

after the battle for Barbastro in 1064.[329]

The Zaragozan-Toledan conflict eventually ended with the death of Sulayman in 438/8 July 1046-27 June 1047.[330] It had been a particularly damaging war both in an economic and political sense. It also allowed the Léon-Castile and Navarre to weaken two of the main marches that protected the south. Lomax argues that Fernando I began to change his policy towards the south to one of conquest, that is to say aiming to conquer lands as opposed to simply exact tribute, from the mid-1050's onward.[331] Certainly, one can see a concerted push by Fernando I into the Duero basin, which fell under his control with his occupation of Lamego on 29 November, 1057. At the same time, the Navarrese kingdom started to exert pressure on the Rioja region from about 1045, with the Navarrese kings transferring their base of operations from the old heartland around Pamplona to Najera in the upper Ebro.[332] These moves, by Castile and Navarre, must have been partly the result of the two states helping to weaken the defence of the middle and upper march in the latter part of the 1040's. Sulayman's death did not solve the issue. The rivalry between Zaragoza and Toledo continued, although it

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[329] See the view expressed by a Christian in occupied Barbastro,quoted by Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.187. See p.265 below for a translation.

[330] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.282.

[331] Lomax: Reconquest of Spain, pp.53-55.

[332] Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031-1157, pp.35-36.

tended to take more diplomatic rather than military forms especially with regards to influence over Valencia. On a more general level, the breakdown of the governmental system that defined and protected the borders of provinces continued to have an effect on the relationship between them. No sooner had Yahya patched up the war with Zaragoza, than he entered into a similar border conflict with Badajoz, the other march protecting the borders of Muslim Spain. [333]

4. 3 The new Era: Lords (Ashab Buldan) or Kings (Muluk) ?

So far, the rulers of the Ta'ifas have been referred to as "lords" , "governors" or simply "rulers". The question is really what they called themselves. As I mentioned earlier, the period has been known as that of Muluk al-Tawa'if. If these rulers had used the title malik (king), it would imply a particular political outlook. There is also the issue of the Caliphal titles that they assumed. As discussed above, contemporaries saw a difference between the titles assumed by these rulers in the first half and those assumed in the second half of the century.

There are, in effect, three extant contemporary sources for the period. First, the memoirs of Prince 'Abdullah, the last Ta'ifa ruler of Granada. Since the discovery of this manuscript, it has provided an insight

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[333] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.283.

into the way in which a Ta'ifa ruler perceived the political situation towards the end of the C11 in Muslim Spain and the history leading up to it.[334] This source, however, was concerned with the fate of one Ta'ifa and was written at the end of the period under conditions of some duress. Secondly, the Siraj al-Muluk (the Lantern of Kings) written by al-Turtushi towards the end of the C11.[335] It was written in Egypt, where al-Turtushi had settled and its terminology and outlook could have been influenced by the political thought and expectations of its audience in the East, although it does show that by then, at least in Egypt, the connotations of the title malik were not derogatory. Finally, the al-Dhakhira, the most useful source because it is in reality a collation made at the end of the century of a variety of earlier sources, including verbatim quotes from the al-Matin of Ibn Hayyan and, of equal importance, verbatim, albeit selected, quotes from a great corpus of correspondence of the civil servants of the Ta'ifa era, including "official" letters from one ruler to another. It therefore provides the best indication of the terminology in use at the time to designate the Ta'ifa leaders.

The most common title used by contemporary literary men in Muslim Spain to describe the rulers of these city-states was sahib. Examples of this can be seen

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[334] Prince 'Abdullah Ibn Buluggin:al-Tibyan. This has been translated as The Tibyan by A.T.Tibi.

[335] Al-Turtushi:Siraj al-Muluk. see the discussion in the Introduction.

in Ibn Hayyan's al-Matin.[336] The term was the same one used to describe a ruler of a province or a city in the pre-fitna period. The best way to translate this term is either as governor or lord. I prefer the term lord because the term governor carries connotations of ruling in the name of a central government and might better reflect the usage of the term in the pre-fitna era. After the break-up of Umayyad Spain, the term lord conveys more of the independent of the authority of each city-state ruler. The term (Sahib) continued to be in use to describe the Ta'ifa rulers to the end of the century. It was used by Ibn Bassam himself [337] and its usage was taken up by later sources. At some stage in the middle of the century this term no longer sufficed to fully describe the rulers of the Ta'ifas. They still remained Sahib Saragusta or Sahib Tulaitula, but given their increased and apparent independence, they were something else in addition to being simply a sahib of a province.

Ibn Hayyan obviously felt this shift in the power and political standing of the Ta'ifa rulers towards the middle of the century and sought to find a term to reflect this position of enhanced authority. The term he started to use was amir (literally one who commands) which is normally translated as prince. It is interesting because it was used to describe the Umayyad ruler in Cordova in the

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[336] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.20 & part I, p.730 as two among many examples.

[337] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.257 is one of many examples.

C8 and C9 when the 'Abbasids had taken over the Caliphate and before the Spanish Umayyads declared the new Umayyad Caliphate. Ibn Hayyan uses it, for example to describe 'Abd al-Malik in Valencia [338] as well as 'Abd al-'Aziz, his father [339] and even Hisham al-Mu'tadid.[340] In the case of Hisham, Ibn Hayyan was clearly using the term in the way previous Umayyad rulers were described, especially since the claim of the various contenders to the Caliphate became contentious. In the case of 'Abd al-'Aziz the term seems to have connotations of hereditary military command, in the sense of 'Abd al-'Aziz being an amir of the 'Amirid fityan (professional or slave mawali soldiers). The term amir does seem a fairly satisfactory one. It conveys a more elevated position than that of Sahib and is clearly below that of Caliph.

Towards the end of the century the term malik (king) began to be applied to the leaders of the Ta'ifas. Ibn Hayyan seems to have used it as well as the term 'Alat Mulukiyya (Kingly paraphernalia).[341] It does appear, however, that this term began to be more commonly used after the Almoravid intervention. Examples of its use by Muslim Spanish civil servants after the Almoravid invasion can be found in al-Dhakhira.[342] By the time Ibn Bassam

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[338] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part I, p.732.

[339] ibid., part III, p.516.

[340] ibid. p.515.

[341] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, PartI, pp.664-665

[342] Ibn Bassam:ibid. part II, p.254, as one example.

was writing, the term had acquired wide usage; he uses it frequently to refer to the Ta'ifa rulers.[343] So in all probability, the Ta'ifa rulers were seen in the early and middle part of the C11 as, ashab buldan, lords of provinces or (umara') princes. The evidence provided by al-Dhakhira would suggest that they were not seen nor represented themselves as (muluk) kings.[344]

The question is made more complicated by the Caliphal titles they chose to adopt. It is quite clear that in the period of the fitna the use of titles by the Ta'ifa rulers was an imitation and extension of the usage introduced by the 'Amirids. The step between assuming, or indeed being awarded, the title al-Mu'tamin dhu al-Sabiqatayn (the first title 'Abd al-'Aziz assumed)[345] and a plain al-Mu'tamin(the title which Yusuf Ibn Hud assumed)[346] is a thin one although the second was clearly that of a Caliph while the first, while peculiar, could have been presented as an extraordinary ministerial title. These titles appear to have been the most common form of

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[343] ibid. Part I, pp.732-733 as two examples.

[344] Ibn Mandhur in Lisan al-'Arab, which was compiled towards the end of C13 gives one meaning of malik as he who has power over a region, which is called mamlaka. This is very close to the modern usage of the term. As mentioned earlier, al-Turtushi's work implies that the term was in use in the East, but in Spain, it was used to describe the Ta'ifa lords towards the end of the century and mostly by their detractors, which strongly suggests that its use by Almoravid propagandists was meant to be derogatory.

[345] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, part III, p.250.

[346] ibid. p.464.

address in "official" correspondence between Ta'ifa rulers.[347] This was no doubt in part because their use was flattering for the recipient, but their usage serves to illustrate the ambiguity which surrounded the position of these rulers; clearly, they never saw themselves as Caliphs, but equally they found in the use of Caliphal titles a reflection of the authority they believed they enjoyed. The titles did indeed reflect a sense of divorce from the Caliphal system.

As pointed out above, this separateness mostly took the form of neglecting to declare for any Caliph. There is however, one reference to an explicit declaration of independence from Caliphal authority by one of the Ta'ifa rulers; that of Isma'il Ibn dhi al-Nun of Toledo. When discussing the various pretenders to the Caliphal throne with civil servant Ibn 'Abbas, Isma'il stated, much to the surprise of the latter:

> By God, I would not declare for anyone but myself, nor would I stand [as a ruler] except by my own authority (sultani), even if I were challenged by fulan & fulan, and mentioned the Virtuous Predecessors (al-Salaf al-Salih), whose memory God honours.[348]

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[347] ibid. pp.464,468,473 as one of many examples, in this case written by the convert Jewish wazir Ibn Hasdai in the service of the Hudids.

[348] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp. 144-145. The term al-Salaf al-Salih and which I translated as the Virtuous Predecessors refers to the early companions of the Prophet who were looked upon by Muslims with particular veneration. The term (Fulan) is an Arab equivalent of "so & so" (Cf. p. 41). Ibn Hayyan (or perhaps Ibn Bassam) chose to use the term presumabely because to have mentioned the names of the companions of the Prophet alluded to in this speech would have been disrespectful.

While Ibn Hayyan recorded that Abu al-'Abbas was aghast at this outburst, and reported it to others, Ibn Bassam added his own comment that he preferred Isma'il despite his boorish manners and peculiar beliefs to those Ta'ifa rulers who came after him, because Isma'il had some ability to meet the Christian threat, while later Ta'ifa lords allied with the Christians and were unable to defend their realms.[349]

The most surprising aspect of this speech was that it came relatively early in the period(in the early 1040's). It was in fact an unsustainable public stance and Isma'il's successor Yahya reversed this policy until the whole of Muslim Spain had ceased to declare for an Umayyad Caliph. The speech does seem to reflect the political outlook that was being developed by the Ta'ifa rulers by the middle of the century as they developed into independent lords of separate domains. In fact, the best illustration of this shift from the Ta'ifa rulers being lords in the pre-'Amirid sense of sahib to lords in the sense of a totally independent ruler of a province was their succession.

4.4 Ta'ifa Succession:Two Examples.

By the time Sulayman died in 438/8 July 1046-27 June 1047, he had established his authority over the whole of the upper march. His war with the Bani dhi al-Nun

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[349] ibid. p.145.

had not been entirely successful, especially as it led to two major raids by the Léon-Castile and Navarre into the upper march, but he had maintained his supremacy in the province. His presence in the political arena of Muslim Spain was such that when Ibn Hayyan sought to make sense of the jigsaw of separate provinces in 435/10 August 1043-28 July 1044, he described the rulers of the peninsula as falling into two parties, the first of which included 'adhimuhum, their great man, Sulayman Ibn Hud.[350] The influence of the upper march extended at that time eastward to the sea through an allied Tortosa and south towards an allied Valencia.[351] In the years since the beginning of Sulayman's separation from the Tujibids and his establishment as a leader of a Ta'ifa, around 1018 to the time of his death, he had built the foundation of what was probably the strongest city-state in the peninsula. He had by 1046 a united upper march (with the exception of Tortosa) with an established experience in autonomous government. Moreover, being a march it had the ability to draw upon a tradition of military experience, despite the relatively limited nature of the military resources of the province as an independent entity.

Had Sulayman believed he was founding a kingdom, he would have been able to hand on to one of his sons an established domain which would have been among the leading powers of the peninsula. While primogeniture was not

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350 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.219.

351 ibid.

established in Islam, the concept of a ruler, that is to say a Caliph, being succeeded by a single son (not necessarily the eldest) or a relative who fulfilled the qualifications of the right lineage was quite acceptable. Sulayman, however, in accordance with the laws of Islamic inheritance divided the march among his five sons.[352] This, more than any other action of his reflected his conviction that he had merely established his authority over a province; one which was bound to return, at some stage, to the fold of a reestablished state centred on Cordova. Such an outlook was not surprising. Sulayman was, after all, a part of the pre-Ta'ifa era. Moreover, his reputation for championing the Umayyads must have been based, in part, on a real belief in the Caliphal institution, unlike for example his rival Isma'il Ibn dhi al-Nun, lord of Toledo, who also belonged to the pre-Ta'ifa period in terms of upbringing and formative years, but who had no conviction in the Caliphate once its real power disintegrated. I would therefore suggest that Sulayman's action was meant to give his sons the power base upon which to build once the Caliphate was re-instituted. Otherwise, he would have handed over the entire state to a single successor. What this legacy resulted in was to launch the province into a weakening and long civil war.[353]

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[352] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.221.

[353] Interestingly, Navarre had a legal tradition of the equal division of the realm among male heirs. Reilly in The Kingdom of León-Castilla under Alfonso VI, pp.14-20, argues that while the application of this Navarrese principle is not enough as a sole explanation of the motivation behind Fernando I's

The legacy of Sulayman was divided as follows; Ahmad received Zaragoza, Yusuf, the eldest, received Lérida, the second power centre in the march, Muhammad received Calatayud, Lubb received Huesca under the nadhar, supervision, of his brother, probably Yusuf in Lérida and Mundhir received Tudela.[354] Each of the brothers declared independence, but Ahmad launched a campaign to dislodge his brothers, which he managed to do, imprisoning some and killing the others, with the exception of Yusuf who held out in Lérida.[355] Clearly, Lérida had maintained its ability to pose a challenge to the authority of Zaragoza as it did under Sulayman during the Tujibid rule there. Ahmad's authority then faced another challenge, this time emanating from the "people" of the march, who, disliking what he had done to his brothers withdrew their loyalty to him and declared for his brother Yusuf. Ibn 'Idhari recorded:

> And when the Ahl of the thaghr saw what Ahmad Ibn Sulayman had done to his brother, they hated him for it, and rescinded their loyalty to him (Khala'u ta'atahu), then gave authority to his brother Yusuf.[356]

Ahmad's writ was pushed back to Zaragoza while Yusuf took

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decision to divide his kingdom among his three sons in late 1063, it was a contributory factor. As in the case of Zaragoza, one of the brothers, Sancho II, decided to move against the others, in the years that followed Fernando's death in 1065.

354 Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.222.

355 ibid.

356 ibid. p. 223

on the title al-Mudhaffar.[357] This seems to have been a declaration on Yusuf's part that he had become the lord of the whole of the upper march. Prior to this, while he ruled in Lérida, he had assumed the uncontroversial title Husam al-Dawla, which could easily have applied to a lesser prince.

The reversal of Ahmad's fortunes reflected several underlying factors in the political scene of the upper march. It seems that the "people", like their deceased lord Sulayman, had not come to fully accept the concept of the upper march as a totally independent state. Their opposition to Ahmad might have been partly fuelled, as mentioned above, by a repugnance at his ruthlessness towards his brothers, although the history of the Caliphate was not entirely devoid of similar examples. It may be that Ahmad's attempts at unifying the march by force was seen by the Ahl, which as discussed earlier referred to the elite and would have therefore included men trained in jurisprudence, as contradicting what was seen as a legitimate legacy, especially if this elite viewed the thaghr, not as an independent state, but as a province which legally belonged to a Cordovan-controlled Muslim Spain. Alternatively, the elite of the thaghr might have been alarmed at this manifestation of Ahmad's ambition which might have been seen by them as encroaching on their own influence within the province, and so they supported his brother in the hope of protecting their own interests.

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357 ibid.

Faced, therefore, with only two remaining powers, the Ahl chose to support Yusuf, and presented their actions as being a response to Ahmad's unacceptable treatment of his brothers. This aspect of finding legitimate justification for switching allegiance is in some ways similar to the way in which Sulayman found support in his effort to become the lord of the whole province as a result of his allegiance to the Umayyad cause. That Ahmad was forced to retreat to Zaragoza, demonstrated the power that the "people" enjoyed in the province. This reflected the parallel influence of the "people" in Toledo and Valencia touched upon above.

Although Ahmad had an established claim to Zaragoza and its immediate A'mal, he lacked the legal and practical support for such a claim to authority over the whole of the upper march which he would have enjoyed within the framework of the Umayyad system. The collapse of that system seems to have strengthened the power of the different interest groups, that is the "people", within the province. One can argue that in the new framework governing the relationship between a lord and his A'mal, the lord needed, in order to bind the A'mal to a relationship with him, to demonstrate the cost to them of breaking out of his protection. Ahmad's opportunity to demonstrate this arose when Tudela faced a failed harvest and sent to Yusuf, their overlord for help. Yusuf could not send a convoy directly from Lérida to Tudela as it would have had to pass within the immediate A'mal of Zaragoza. He therefore paid Ramiro I for free passage through Aragón. Ahmad

learnt of this and doubled the offer to Ramiro. He then launched an attack on the Léridan convoy in Aragónese land and destroyed it.

This episode must have demonstrated to the "people" of the march that Yusuf was unable to deliver his part in a relationship between a lord and his A'mal. Ahmad on the other hand had demonstrated the power of Zaragoza and the importance of its geographical position within the march. If Yusuf could not coordinate aid for those A'mal which needed it from the resources of the other A'mal, or protect convoys bearing that aid to the stricken A'mal, then he would have lost the practical basis on which his authority stood. Irrespective of their dislike of Ahmad's original vision of the march as a single independent state, the "people" decided that their interests would be best served if they reverted to their loyalty to Ahmad. Ahmad had, with the sole use of force, imposed his concept of an independent "greater" Zaragoza on a reluctant A'mal, while Yusuf's authority contracted back to Lérida and its immediate A'mal.[358] The relationship between Ahmad and his reacquired A'mal was based primarily on force. This suggests that the new framework of relationship between a lord and his A'mal demanded that the lord constantly reassert his authority. To keep the province from shifting back to his brother, Ahmad used a similar tactic in 1064 to the one described above and which will be looked at in the next chapter. As his power became reestablished,

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[358] ibid. pp.223-224.

Ahmad adopted the Caliphal title al-Muqtadir bil-Lah,[359] to signify his lordship over the whole of the province.

Ahmad, however, was not lord of the whole of the upper march. Even with the combined resources of the province behind him, Ahmad was still unable to dislodge Yusuf from Lérida. To some degree this demonstrated the power of Lérida, which like Zaragoza had a tradition of independence, but it also suggests that the military power of the upper march was limited. As shown above, Sulayman had been unable to meet the Christian forces that raided Zaragoza head on even when they spent two whole months in the province. His son seems to have been unable to fully extend his authority over the province (in some ways the pattern for Zaragoza's inability to do so was set during the Tujibid reign when they were forced to concede Tudela and Lérida to Sulayman). The differences between Ahmad and his brother had become public, especially as far as Aragón was concerned (and presumably, news of this conflict also reached Léon-Castile). After all, the two brothers had involved the north in their disputes. The vulnerability of the march must have therefore become apparent to the north who took advantage of the weakness resulting from a disunited march.

The march became the target for several Christian campaigns. In 443/15 May 1051-2 May 1052, Zaragoza itself was sieged by a Christian force.[360] In the 1050's Tarra-

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[359] ibid. p.224.

[360] Ibn Khaldun:Al-Tarikh, Vol.4, p.350.

gona to the north of Tortosa was the subject of a campaign by Catalonia.[361] Aragón attacked Zaragoza in 1057 and August 1058. [362] The picture was clearly of a Zaragoza under an immense amount of pressure. Al-Muqtadir was equally clearly unable to stem the Christian tide militarily with the resources of a united province. It is now possible to see from al-Dhakhira that his first strategy was to try to establish a better relationship with his brother in Lérida. We can see that from some correspondence between them which suggests a "normalisation" of their relationship.[363] This was clearly not enough for al-Muqtadir who needed to control Lérida, which he could not do as long as Yusuf held out in it. He therefore arranged for a meeting to make peace in Ramadan 450/22 October-20 November 1058 in neutral territory. The proposition of peace stopped Lérida from joining Barcelona in a campaign against Zaragoza in that year.[364] At the meeting Ahmad tried to have Yusuf assassinated.[365] The attempt failed; al-Muqtadir claimed he had nothing to do with it but he had clearly lost any chance for a rapproche-

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[361] McCrank, 'Norman Crusades in the Catalan Reconquest: Robert Burdet and the Principality of Tarragona 1129-55',JMH,vol.7, 1981, pp.67-82.

[362] M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán,p.149.

[363] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp.468-474.

[364] Ibn Hayyan, ibid., p.425.

[365] ibid. p.423.

ment.[366] Zaragoza was forced into attempting to consolidate its position within those areas within the march over which it already had control. In 453/26 January 1061-14 January 1062, Tortosa, which had been simply an ally became directly part of the A'mal of Zaragoza.[367] To meet the threat from Aragón, Ahmad resorted to an alliance with the emerging Castile in about 1060.[368]

It can therefore be argued that Sulayman's division of his legacy led to a situation where fifteen years after his death, the upper march was still divided and where Zaragoza was expending much energy and resources in attempting to bring its authority to bear on the domain which Sulayman controlled at the time of his death. This civil war also led to an increased involvement of the three main northern Christian powers in the political affairs of the province. This is not to say that had the province been united from 1046, Zaragoza could have challenged Christian incursions, as it clearly could not do so under Sulayman in the early 1040's, but arguably, a united Zaragoza could have met its three main northern Christian enemies as well as its Muslim neighbours from a position of greater strength had it not been forced to wage civil war for a decade and a half;nor was the situation settled by the early 1060's.

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[366] ibid. pp.424-426 for Yusuf's understandably bitter reaction.

[367] A.Prieto y Vives:Los Reyes de Taifas, p.38.

[368] M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán,p.149.

The succession of 'Abd al-Malik in Valencia in 452/6 February 1060-25 January 1061 offers a very different case from that of Zaragoza. This was partly a reflection of its occurrence at a later stage than that of Sulayman's sons. By the 1060's any hope for a revival of the Cordovan government was clearly dead. Moreover, 'Abd al-'Aziz, the longest reigning of the Ta'ifa lords had his whole political experience rooted in the disorder of the C11. One can speculate that he might have been even warned by the civil war that followed Sulayman's death not to divide his domain. The province of Valencia was wealthy, but not particularly powerful. Following the suppression of the rebellion in Jativa mentioned above, Valencia's authority extended over that city. It became weaker further south where it clashed with the sovereignty of Denia. Valencia's influence extended as far south as Murcia, where Ahmad Ibn Tahir ruled from about 1044/1045.[369] Ibn Tahir assumed a wazir's title and declared for Valencia.[370] Murcia, however, was not part of Valencia's A'mal, simply a close ally, in the same way that Tortosa was allied to Zaragoza prior to 1061/62.

Moreover, the power of the 'Amirids was not fully established in the province despite its outward appearance of loyalty. 'Abd al-'Aziz had remained in residence in Jativa following the rebellion there in 1042.[371] This

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369 Remiro:Historia de Murcia Musulmán,pp.102-103.

370 Ibn al-Abbar:Al-Hulla al-Siyara', Vol.2, pp.116-117.

371 Anon:Fragment B,Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.302.

suggests that he felt it necessary to make his military authority felt there at all times to keep it from rebelling again. The steps which 'Abd al-'Aziz took to bolster his authority can now be seen through al-Dhakhira. He arranged a marriage alliance between the daughter of his powerful neighbour Yahya Ibn dhi al-Nun and his son 'Abd al-Malik.[372] This served as a warning to internal as well as external enemies that the 'Amirids could draw upon the considerable resources of Toledo. Finally, 'Abd al-Aziz had established a strong chancery headed by abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz known as Ibn Rawbush.[373] A capable wazir was of immense value to a newly appointed lord. Al-Qadir of Toledo's failure to use the wazir of his grandfather, al-Hadidi, was one of the main causes of his weakness in the 1080's and will be discussed below.

'Abd al-'Aziz died in dhi al-Hijja 452/27 December 1060-25 January 1061. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the wazir insured that 'Abd al-Malik succeeded despite

> the weakness of his support due to the absence of money, the scarcity of men and the corruption of the majority of the A'mal.[374]

The absence of money probably referred to a depleted treasury. A lord who was not in total command of his province would have found it difficult to impose his taxation vigorously on his subjects. The scarcity of men

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372 Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.250.

373 ibid.

374 ibid.

might have partly been the result of a lack of a full treasury, but it could also be partly due to the fact that Valencia, unlike the upper march, did not have a corps of local professional soldiers. The remnants of the 'Amirid corps would have been quite old by then and in any case many of them must have perished in the rebellion of the 1040's. The corruption of the A'mal probably indicates that most were loyal to 'Abd al-Aziz in name only.

The efforts of the wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz were not enough. The position of 'Abd al-Malik must have been perceived to be weak. Yahya, the lord of Toledo and 'Abd al-Malik's father-in-law moved in force to the castle of Cuenca at the borders of Toledo and Valencia and sent his Katib Ibn Muthanna with a military contingent to protect 'Abd al-Malik from the commoners.[375] This served to establish 'Abd al-Malik's succession. The interesting question is why Yahya chose to support 'Abd al-Malik. Possibly, the fact that he was his son-in-law influenced his decision, although as was shown in the case of Ibn Samadih, relation through marriage was no guarantee of political loyalty. One can argue that Yahya perceived Valencia to be very much within the sphere of Toledan influence. By insuring that 'Abd al-Malik succeeded his father, Yahya was preserving this situation. The presence of his troops in Valencia could be seen as not only displaying support in front of the populace, but also letting the neighbouring Ta'ifas know that Toledo wished to

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375 ibid.

see Valencia remain within its sphere of influence. The weakness of 'Abd al-Malik's authority can be seen as a source of attraction to Yahya who would have been uncomfortable with a stronger and possibly more independent ruler. Had Yahya allowed 'Abd al-Malik's succession to fail he could not guarantee that the power which took over Valencia would keep the province on friendly terms with Toledo. In this, Yahya must have been particularly wary of his old rivals, the Hudids, in the upper march who had been busy with their civil war but who also liked to view Valencia as falling within their sphere of influence. Strategically, if Zaragoza gained control over Valencia, they would have surrounded Toledo from the north the east and possibly part of the south.

In the case of Zaragoza, an unclear succession had led to several incursions by the Christian north. Interestingly, a clear succession in Valencia did not protect it from similar raids. This may have been, in part, the result of the weakness of the military power in Valencia. It also reflected the growing strength and confidence of the Christian states. Valencia was situated deep within the Muslim south. Towards the end of 455/ 4 January-24 December 1063, a force of Christians (called Rum by Ibn 'Idhari [376] and Ifranj by an several unidentified Valencian eyewitness,[377] which might suggest that

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[376] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3,p.252.

[377] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp.854-855. Interestingly, ibn Bassam states that he could not find a reference to this battle in Al-Matin, and so had to rely on

they were from Barcelona) attacked the lands of Valencia. They arrived at the gates of the city at the beginning of 456/ 25 December 1063-12 December 1064. The Valencians refused to fight, preferring to keep within the walls. That was, as seen from Sulayman's actions an acceptable military option. The Christians then pretended to fall back to the hilly countryside around the city. The Valencians poured out of the gates with much pomp and were duly massacred.[378] The eyewitness account of the battle of Baterna conveys a feeling of farce (down to the detail of two effeminate men leading the Valencian forces into battle).[379] Whether the details of the behaviour of the Valencian forces in battle was accurate or not is somewhat immaterial. What the account manages to convey is the total lack of military experience on the Valencian side. Remaining within the walls (although scorned by the eyewitness) was sound military strategy. Falling for a basic trick of the

besieging force pretending to fall back was a particularly primitive mistake. One could argue that the Valencian forces were led by someone who had a vague notion of military procedure but very little actual experience of conflict.

By the 1060's the shift to total Ta'ifa

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eyewitness accounts which he himself collected.

[378] ibid.,pp.854-857.

[379] ibid.

independence had been established in the peninsula. This incorporated a new framework of relationship between a lord and his A'mal based primarily on the militarily enforceable authority of the lord. This shift also coincided with ever increasing military action by the northern Christian states who ventured ever deeper south into the heartland of Muslim Spain.

4.5 The Payment of Parias.

As the incursions of the northern Christian states into Muslim Spain became more frequent, they began to extract tribute on a regular basis. The extraction of tribute can be seen partly as an imitation of the Jizya which the Muslim south extracted from these Christian states up to the beginning of the C11. The payment of Parias by the Ta'ifas was the most poignant indication that the political situation had changed in the Iberian peninsula and the Muslim presence had begun its retreat. It can also be argued that the extraction of Parias came as a natural extension to the involvement of the Christian states in the affairs of the Muslim Ta'ifas. The step for a Christian state from attacking one Ta'ifa because another paid it to do so to threatening a Ta'ifa that it would

attack unless paid was a relatively small one. The Christian states became involved in what can almost be described as "auction" situations with two warring Ta'ifas trying to outbid each other for Christian support. A good example of this can be seen when Ahmad doubled Yusuf's payment to Ramiro I so that he might attack the Léridan party. Again, the step from being involved in such a situation to demanding payment in order not to support the opposing Ta'ifa was also relatively small.

The instance of payment of Parias by the upper march started from the fourth decade. In 1048 they paid them to the Count of Barcelona and the Count of Urgel, in 1063 to Ramiro I of Aragón and García of Pamplona, while in 1060 to Fernando of Castile.[380] The economic ramifications of this must have been quite profound. The Christian states managed to tap the economic resources of the wealthier Muslim south which can be seen as serving a dual purpose. It sapped the economic and therefore the military ability of the Ta'ifas and it bolstered that of the Christian states. This was the reversal of the situation that had existed until the turn of the C11, when the Muslim state tapped the lesser economic resources of the north and insured that the north never developed the power to challenge it. The payment of tribute by the Ta'ifas became such an established part of the income of the Christian states that the right to an area's Paria was divided up as part of the estate of a deceased king. An

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380 M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán,p.148.

example of this can be seen following the death of Fernando I of Castile in 1065. His sons received not only a division of his kingdom but also of the right to tribute from Zaragoza, Toledo and Badajoz.

The payment of Parias was interpreted by later Christian sources (for example the chronicle of Alfonso X) and some modern historians as indicating a situation where some of the Ta'ifas became bonded in vassalage to the Christian kings to whom they paid these Parias. Such a conclusion is questionable. Vassalage was a specifically northern Christian framework of relationship which was very different to that understood and practised by the Muslim Ta'ifas. That is not to say that at some stage some Christian states might not have believed that they had made a Ta'ifa into a vassal, but that it is highly unlikely that the lords of the Ta'ifas would have understood this essentially Christian framework or seen themselves as falling within it. Their understanding of relationship between lord and overlord was based on a framework which was either rooted in the legitimacy emanating from the Caliphate or, once that failed, in the military power of the lord of the Ta'ifa. However, it can be strongly argued that the lords of the lesser A'mal never saw themselves as the "men" of the lord of the Ta'ifa in the feudal sense of the north. It is therefore highly improbable that the Ta'ifa lords saw themselves as tied to any Christian king in a bond of vassalage.

To the lords of the Ta'ifas, the payment of

tribute represented no more than a political necessity. The tributes were a form of "protection" payment and implied no further relationship than that. It can also be argued that this was separate from instances of alliance with Christian states such as the one between Castile and Zaragoza, although Zaragoza had to pay for the alliance. The motivation for the payment of Parias by the Ta'ifa lords was summed up by al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad, the last Ta'ifa lord of Seville. He believed that the "enemy" could not be resisted and had therefore to be placated. The money paid was seen as stopping Christian campaigns and protecting the country under his rule. In a letter to his military commanders he stated:

> The situation with the Enemy -May God break them- is clear and does not need exposing, and since we cannot meet them with force, we have to appease them. And he [the enemy] -May God scatter his army- had thought to attack our country this year with a greater number of troops than those used last year, and had completed his preparations for this, but God Almighty has allowed us to make peace. We have therefore agreed to pay him a sum of money which will allow us to avoid the harm we feared from him.[381]

Nor was the significance of the Christian involvement in Muslim infighting as a source of weakness (since it exposed the weak points of the Ta'ifas to the north) lost on the Muslims of Ta'ifa Spain by the end of the century. Ibn Bassam's comment on the above letter was

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[381] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp.252-253. The letter was composed by the wazir Ibn al-Qusayra, who was sent as an ambassador to Yusuf ibn Tashfin and whose description of the battle of al-Zallaqa is quoted in the next chapter.

Because the majority of the muluk of this region used to treat with the tawa'if of the Christians (al-Rum). And each would buy from them [the Christians] military aid which he would direct at the lands of his rivals out of envy and greed, in the hope of gaining control [of these neighbouring provinces]. For that reason, the fires of fitna were constantly inflamed, while the flock (ra'iyya) were ignored, and thus most of their produce would perish at the hands of these tyrants (tawaghit).[382]

4.6 Conclusion.

As the provinces tried to come to terms with the uncertainties of the political situation in Muslim Spain, the concept of independent statehood seems to have begun to take root in the political outlook of the Ta'ifas. Arguably, this vision of a new order which was leading gradually towards a total separation from the whole concept of Caliphal government in the peninsula met with resistance from those whose political formation and experience belonged to the pre-fitna era, including some, like Sulayman Ibn Hud, who were founding independent city-states themselves. This shift towards independence can be seen to be reflected in the adoption of outright Caliphal titles towards the middle of the century, as opposed to titles disguised to look like ministerial ones in the

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[382] ibid. p.254.

'Amirid fashion. Another indication of the development of this concept of independent statehood can be seen in the move towards the succession of a single ruler to a particular city-state. The lords of the Ta'ifas seem to have undergone a process, where they first came to see the provinces over which they ruled as theirs outright (as opposed to ones held from a Caliph) then decided that unlike normal property in Islam, the inheritance of these provinces belonged to the realm of state succession. Yet even this process seems not to have been universally accepted, with some of the stronger Ta'ifas, such as Zaragoza, never quite resolving this issue.

Independence, however, resulted in increased problems for the lords of the Ta'ifas. Within the framework of Umayyad government, the relationship between the lords of the provinces and their subjects, whether the lords of the A'mal within the provinces or power groups within the main cities, was established and well defined. The collapse of that system and the framework it supported led to a period when these relationships needed to be reexamined and redefined. Ultimately, it resulted in increased power for the power-groups (the so called Ahl) and the more powerful lords of the A'mal. This was because the lords of the Ta'ifas lacked the moral support and the military sanction which would have reinforced their authority under the Umayyad system. The overall effect was of a weaker government in the centre of each province, unable to fully utilise the resources of the province

against outside threats.

The Umayyad system had also defined the relationship between provinces and with its disintegration that also had to be reexamined. It resulted in an increased insular outlook on the part of each city-state which not only led to occasional wars, but also to a situation where the northern Christian states were perceived as one more enemy on a par with a Ta'ifa one. Clearly, this destroyed the ability of the city-states to coordinate in order to pool the resources of the Muslim part of the peninsula against the increased threat from the north. While lords of a province within the Caliphal state, the rulers of the upper march could dabble in the politics of the north with impunity, whereas as lords of the Ta'ifa in the upper march they were in the much weakened position where the northern states interfered in their politics. One can therefore suggest that particularly for the traditionally more autonomous march lords, the advent of the Ta'ifa system led to a reduction of their real authority both within the province and towards the Christian states, as compared to the power they enjoyed under the Umayyad (although not the 'Amirid) system.

In the north, on the other hand, León-Castile under Fernando I was developing into a major power with the ability to exert pressure on the Muslim states. At the same time, other northern Christian states, notably Aragón and Barcelona, also started flexing their muscles with relation to the southern Muslim states. As the confi-

dence of the Christian states grew with each new involvement in Muslim civil strife, so their ambition to strike deeper must have grown. There are also indications that this period saw the tentative emergence of a "reconquest" philosophy, particularly from the middle of the century. This seems to have found support in the dogma of an outwardly thrusting united Christendom which was beginning to seep into the Spanish Christian states with the Cluniac reforms and which will be touched upon in the next chapter. A sign of this shift in the balance of power to the north was the increased demand for regular tribute which the Ta'ifas, having lost the ability to coordinate their military and economic resources, were forced to pay and which financed further Christian aggression. This created a downward spiral in which each raid forced more tribute that weakened the stricken Ta'ifa reducing its ability to withstand the next raid, while increasing the ability of the Christian states to mount even more campaigns. Although the reconquest of Spain only started to gather momentum by the beginning of the sixth decade of the C11, one can argue that by the end of the fourth, it was well on its way.

5 Holy War

5. 1 Introduction.

At the same time that the structure of Umayyad Spain was pulled apart by the civil war that followed the fall of the 'Amirid state and the establishment of a separatist Ta'ifa ethic, the northern Christian states also experienced some far reaching changes that ultimately had as profound an effect on the unfolding of the history of the peninsula as the changes that occurred in Muslim Spain.[383] While it is not the aim of this thesis to examine the history of the Christian Spanish states, some of the developments that these states experienced, and especially those developments that had a particular effect on Ta'ifa Spain, will be touched upon.

Of the changes that the Christian states were undergoing, one can see two broad themes which had a strong impact on the political scene of Ta'ifa Spain. The first involved a steady move by the Spanish Christian states towards a closer alignment with Europe north of the Pyrenees. Through the years of Muslim conquest, these

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[383] For a recent study which looks at the changes in northern Spain at this time, and the confrontation with Muslim Spain, see B.F. Reilly, The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain 1031-1157.

states had moved slowly away from the political and religious mainstream of Christendom. One can argue that in a sense, their use of the Mozarab liturgy as opposed to the Latin liturgy symbolised this distance from the Latin world; a distance which was enhanced by their military and political domination by Umayyad Spain. By the C11, the northern Spanish Christians sought to bridge that distance with the rest of the Latin world by a variety of methods, including the establishment of marriage alliances. This resulted, among other things, in an increased involvement by some of the northern powers, especially those in southern France, such as Burgundy and Aquitaine, in the affairs of Spain.

At the same time it increased the contact between the rulers and the ecclesiastical establishment of the Spanish states with some of the ecclesiastical centres in Europe, especially Cluny. This contact paved the way for the transfer of the Cluniac reform into northern Spain and with it ideas of an outwardly thrusting Christendom. [384] At the same time, the papacy was undergoing a period when it sought to strengthen its influence in Europe and showed more interest in the affairs of Spain, partly because of the ancient papal claims of sovereignty over the peninsula. Moreover, as León-Castile began a period of southward expansion first under the vigorous rule of Fernando I (1035-65), and later under Alfonso VI (1065-1109), this

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[384] For a discussion of the increase in Cluniac influence in northern Spain in the C11 see Reilly, ibid.,pp.66-73.

expansion began very gradually to assume the "ideology" of a reconquest. Fernando's speech discussed in the previous chapter might have contained much later embellishment, but seems, nonetheless, to contain an echo of a reconquest ideal. This idea of reconquest also seems to have found expression in the battle for Barbastro, which will be looked at below. At the same time, the involvement of the papacy, meant that as the ideal of crusading began to develop in the mid 1060's, there was a natural progression towards wanting to apply it to Spain. As will be shown below, there is some evidence that the papacy was involved in attack on Barbastro in 1064.

The other main theme that can be seen in the Christian Spanish states in the C11 involved a move towards greater unity, resulting from the expansion of Castile under Fernando I and later Alfonso VI. Part of the effects of the growing power of Castile was to force Aragón into a closer alignment with the papacy to protect its independence. A "greater" Castile was to play an vital role in the dismantling of the Muslim occupation of Spain.

The Muslim Ta'ifas enjoyed a brief period in which the system of separate city-states reached its nadir towards the third quarter of the century, but even then they could not withstand the increasing pressure from the north and were being forced into giving up an ever larger proportion of their wealth to protect their domains from attack. The Ta'ifas also began to become conscious of a "militant" Muslim movement developing among the Berbers of

north Africa and which they, having experienced the "Berber" fitna, perceived as a threat. Their disunity and the undoubted wealth of the peninsula eventually led to a situation where the Muslim Ta'ifas of Spain became caught between two expanding entities, both of whom looked to Ta'ifa lands as an attractive area in which to expand.

This North African movement, the Almoravids, was also to play an essential role in the history of Muslim Spain. The beginnings of the involvement of the Almoravids in Spain will be looked at in this chapter, and in particular the possible motivation of the man who usurped its leadership, Yusuf Ibn Tashfin. With the exception of those sources which Ibn Bassam quotes in his al-Dhakhira, including the extracts from Ibn Hayyan, almost the entire history of Muslim Spain in the C11 was compiled after the conquest of the Almoravids or their spiritual heirs the Almohads and it, not unnaturally, presents the Almoravid involvement in the peninsula in the best possible moral light. One would assume that even the selection of material made by Ibn Bassam was also meant to find favour with the new masters of what remained of Muslim Spain. Most, although by no means all, of the totally unsympathetic portrayal of the Ta'ifa lords originated in the propaganda assault made by authors writing for an Almoravid or Almohad audience. This propaganda campaign was so successful that the image of the "pure" Almoravids rescuing a wasted Spain from "corrupt" Ta'ifa rulers remains a common one today.

The friction between Toledo and Zaragoza

remained, but continued to find expression on the diplomatic front, especially with attempts by each to bring Valencia firmly within its sphere of influence. Zaragoza itself remained divided between the two brothers, although al-Muqtadir tried to extend his authority over the whole of the A'mal of the march and limit the assaults by Aragón, sometimes by allying to King Sancho García IV of Navarre.[385] The position of the Hudids, however, remained secure. In Toledo, the succession of the young Yahya at the end of this period signalled the end of the power of the dhu al-Nunids, largely through his incompetence. This fall from power, which will be looked at in more detail below, had a profound effect on the history of Spain as a whole, but also specifically on the history of Valencia. Valencia, on the other hand, witnessed what must have been a very unusual transfer of power from the ruling family, the 'Amirids, to 'Abd al-'Aziz's main wazir, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. The lack of "legitimate" rule in the city led to a position where it became vulnerable to internal political instability and external interference. Eventually, this paved the way for the establishment of a unique Ta'ifa lord there.

By the end of the eighth decade of the century, only forty years after the consolidation of the Ta'ifas, one can clearly see signs of decline beginning to show on almost all of them. The exception was Zaragoza which continued to entrench its position despite the divisions

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[385] ibid. P.106.

within it. It did this, in part, through playing off its enemies one against the other and partly by paying Parias. However, the weakness of the other Ta'ifas led to a situation where Zaragoza found itself totally exposed not only to the threats from the north, but also to the new Almoravid threat in the south. As the next chapter will attempt to show, this eventually led to a situation where it became pincered between the expanding powers of the north and south, mirroring, in a sense, the position of the whole of Ta'ifa Spain towards the beginning of the last quarter of the century.

5. 2 **Changes in the North.**

Cluniac reform was first introduced to the peninsula through Catalonia in the late C10.[386] Given the closeness that Catalonia enjoyed with southern France, it is not surprising that the reform should have first entered Spain through its territory. Monastic reform, however, began to infiltrate into the main kingdoms of northern Spain by the first half of the C11. In 1025, Paternus led a band of Spanish monks who, like him had spent some time at Cluny, to reform the monastery at San Juan de la Pena in Navarre along Cluniac lines. This was at a time when

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[386] Vicente Cantarino:Entre Monjes y Musulmanes, p.154.

Sancho of Navarre began to bestow gifts on Cluny.[387] Paternus, as abbot of San Juan then played an important role in encouraging the spread of reform to other houses in northern Spain. In 1030, San Millan de la Cogolla accepted the reform;in 1032 Ona followed suit, as did Gardena in 1033. Irache, Leyre and San Victoriano de Asan all shifted to the Cluniac reforms. [388] By the 1055, the new spirituality had gained such widespread acceptance that the council of Coyonza declared that all monasteries should abide by the Benedictine rule (although, clearly, not all Benedictines were Cluniacs). [389]

The effects of the spread of the influence of Cluny permeated the northern Spanish political scene on several levels. It can be argued that Cluny played an important part in the efforts of bringing northern Spain into closer alignment with the rest of Europe by encouraging matrimonial links, which will be briefly referred to below. Cluniac spirituality also helped shape the way in which the Christian north perceived its fight against the Muslim south placing it more in the domain of a battle between the representatives of God and His enemies. Cantarino argues that as the reconquest proceeded, God was increasingly represented in Spanish chronicles as a direct antagonist, with the saints as His

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[387] C.J.Bishko:'Fernando I and the origins of León-Castile's alliance with Cluny', Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History, ch.2, p.4.

[388] Vicente Cantarino:Entre Monjes y Musulmanes.p.155.

[389] ibid.

emissaries and the Christians as the instruments of the Divine; and that this change in perception can be attributed to the influence of Cluny.[390] One aspect of this new perception was to give the Christian north the "ideology" to counter that of Jihad as introduced into the peninsula by the Almoravids. The ideal of Jihad had, of course, been used by Spanish Muslims. It was, after all, the ideology that originally drove the conquest of Spain in the first place, and although it tended to receive less emphasis once the Umayyad state was established, it formed, as we have seen, one of the main planks of the policy of Ibn Abi 'Amir in the C10. One can argue, however, that the Almoravids brought with them to the peninsula in the latter half of the C11 a more dynamic and less tolerant interpretation of that same ideal. In the same way, one can argue that this view found a parallel in the shift on the Spanish Christian side to a less tolerant and a more dynamic view of their struggle against the Muslim invaders as being a struggle for the supremacy of Christianity.

The spread of the reforms also led to a greater amount of involvement in the affairs of the peninsula by both the Papacy and Cluny itself. There has been a lot of discussion of whether Barbastro formed the first Crusade or not and this will be touched upon below. The Papacy also increased its involvement in the affairs of the Spanish Christians as part of the effort to consolidate its

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390 ibid. p.179.

authority. Gregory VII confirmed the territory of the see of Jaca and the church de las Musas de Zaragoza.[391] Gregory also proposed that whatever territory Ebles II (brother-in- law to Sancho Ramírez, king of Aragón) liberated, should be held in vassalage to the papacy.[392] This can clearly be seen as representing the Papacy's move to begin to claim overlordship over the whole of Spain. The Papacy's claims were rejected by Alfonso VI, but accepted by Sancho Ramírez of Aragón. Cluny too seems to have taken a more active role in the politics of Spain. In 1072, St. Hugh helped free Alfonso VI from his captivity at Burgos.[393] In 1077-78 Cluny appears to side with Castile against claims by Gregory VII for the suzerainty of the Papacy over the peninsula. Cluny also appears to have encouraged expeditions against the Muslim Ta'ifas, such as the one mounted in 1073 by Ebles Count of Roucy against Zaragoza.[394]

It can be argued, however, that despite its increased interest, Cluny remained, like the rest of Europe, largely insensitive to the reality of politics in Spain. This can be exemplified by the bizarre attempt to convert al-Muqtadir, lord of Zaragoza, in the 1070's.

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[391] G.Zurita y Castro:Anales de la Corona de Aragón.,p.95.

[392] B.F. Reilly The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI pp.80-81., also B.F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain,pp.46-47.

[393] B.F. Reilly The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, pp.63-64.

[394] B.F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain pp.46-47.

While it is not my intention to discuss this incident in detail, it stands out as an example of how those from outside Spain could totally misinterpret the politics of Spanish Muslims.[395] A letter, in Arabic, was sent from an unidentified "the Monk of France" to al-Muqtadir calling on him to convert. Whether this letter was from St. Hugh, as Cutler argues, or simply from a monastery with Cluniac connections, it is interesting to see why it was believed that al-Muqtadir could possibly convert. The main reason must have been al-Muqtadir's various alliances with the Christian kings of northern Spain and especially Castile, which at this time was particularly close to Cluny. However, Al-Muqtadir's alliances were aimed at the protection of his domain and were not intended as part of a general realignment with the north against the Muslim south. This mistaken view that because the Ta'ifas allied with Christian states they must have therefore moved closer to them and away from the Muslim mainstream was also shared by the Almoravids. In the case of al-Muqtadir, the "Monk of France" might have been further misled by distorted stories of al-Muqtadir's flirtation with more spiritual interpretations of religion.[396]

Parallel to the spiritual movement closer to the main Latin world was a move by the aristocracy of northern

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[395] For a discussion of the letter sent to al-Muqtadir see:DM Dunlop: 'A Christian Mission to Muslim Spain in C11' al-Andalus 1952, 259-310 and A Cutler, 'Who was the Monk of France and when did he write?', al-Andalus, 1963,249-269.

[396] Al-Turtushi :Siraj al-Muluk, p.39.

Spain to form matrimonial links with the aristocracy of France. Ramiro I of Aragón married the daughter of William Duke of Aquitaine, Alfonso VI of Castile married Ines daughter of the Duke of Aquitaine, while his daughter Urraca married Raymond of Burgundy, a union that produced Alfonso VII. His bastard daughter, Teresa, married Henry of Burgundy, while Felipa de Tolosa, widow of Sancho Ramírez of Aragón married the ninth Duke of Aquitaine, whose sister married Pedro I of Aragón.[397] This long list serves to illustrate the close ties that were being forged especially with Aquitaine and Burgundy. It is interesting to note the similarity with the Ta'ifa states in using marriages to cement ties with possible allies, although in the case of the Christians, the allies were from outside the peninsula. The growth of these ties certainly led to the increasing intervention of Aquitaine and Burgundy in the politics of northern Spain, especially in the fight against the Muslims and was reflected in the combined campaign against the upper march in 1064.

Finally, at the time when the south was increasingly divided the north was moving towards a greater unity, first under Fernando I and later under Sancho and Alfonso VI in Castile as that state became the dominant one

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[397] V Cantarino: Entre Monjes y Musulmanes p.166. B.F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, p.71 is non-committal about the lineage of Ines, Ramiro I's second wife, but states that the name suggests a non-Iberian origin. Ramiro's first wife was Giselberga, daughter of Count Roger Bernard of Couserans-Foix. Ramiro's son, Sancho Ramírez I took as a second wife the sister of Count Ebles of Roucy.

in the north.[398] In a sense one can argue that the situation in Spain had turned full circle. So that while prior to the C11, Muslim Spain was united and played off the divided Christian kingdoms of the north (the marriage alliance arranged by Mundhir I being probably the last of the major interventions in the politics of the north), the C11 saw a progression to a situation where the north became increasingly united under the influence of an increasingly more powerful Castile and played off the divided Ta'ifa states against each other. The growth of Castilian power, however, had an equal effect on other Christian powers in the north. Aragón sought to limit the power of Castile by allying with Navarre, publicly against the Arabs but privately against Castile.[399] When it realised that it could not guard its independence Aragón sought protection by accepting Papal suzerainty in the 1060's.[400] In some ways one can see the rivalry between Aragón and Castile being conducted very much through their opposing claims to the territory of the upper march, in the same way that Zaragoza and Toledo conducted their rivalry by attempting to pull Valencia within their respective spheres of influence.[401]

However, the move by the northern Spanish states

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[398] For a study of the reign of Alfonso VI, see B.F. Reilly The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI. Reilly notes that a study of the internal consolidation of León-Castile under Fernando I remains to be researched and written, p.8.

[399] G.Zurita y Castro:Anales de la Corona de Aragón p.89.

[400] C.J. Bishko:The Spanish and Portuguese Conquests, p.403.

[401] For a brief discussion of Aragon in this early period, see T.N. Bisson:The Medieval Crown of Aragon, chapter 1.

closer to the Latin mainstream clearly had limitations. Barkai argues that the Historia Silense, probably written in the first half of the C12 exhibits xenophobia especially in terms of anti Frankish feelings.[402] There are also clearly anti-Catalan feelings in the way the fight between the Cid and the Count of Barcelona is portrayed in the poem of the Cid. Nor was there a clear shift in spiritual terms to the Latin ideal as far as attitudes to the Muslim south was concerned. Whether Alfonso VI ever used the title al-Imbaratur dhul Millatayn when addressing Yusuf Ibn Tashfin after Zallaqa,[403] or whether he simply used a similar Latin title in private,[404] one can argue that as late as the last quarter of the C11, Alfonso still harboured the idea of ruling a Spain which was partly Muslim. Alfonso's background and his exile in Toledo (where he went after he was freed from Burgos in late May/June 1072 and remained under the protection of al-Ma'mun, its ruler, until he heard of the death of Sancho II in October[405]) would have made that idea seem reasonable. He belonged to a generation which while gradually adjusting to the shift in the balance of power to the north, and while beginning to

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[402] R. Barkai:Cristianos y Musulmanes, p.108.

[403] For a discussion of the use of the title,see A.MacKay and Benaboud:'Alfonso VI:al-Imbaratur dhul Millatayn', BHS, 1979, 95-102, N.Roth:'Again Alfonso VI', BHS, 1984,165-169 and A.Turki:'La lettre du "Moine de France"etc.', al-Andalus, 1966, 73-153. One Arabic reference is to be found in al-Turtushi, Siraj al-Muluk, pp.88-89.

[404] R.Menéndez Pidal :Españia del Cid.pp.223-225.

[405] B.F. Reilly: The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI,pp.64-68.

formulate the ideology of "reconquest", arguably did not believe at that stage in pushing the Muslim population back over the sea. However, if one accepts the speech of Fernando I discussed in the previous chapter as genuine, one can construct a case that such an idea was beginning to emerge. Both ideas could have co-existed for a time, and at this juncture it could be argued that the idea was developing that the Muslim south could be defeated and brought under the hegemony of the northern Christian states. In some ways this was an extension of the Umayyad "ideal" of government who had after all ruled a Spain that was partly Christian, so that one could argue that Alfonso was seeking, as the Christian king of Castile, to replace (or more accurately fill the vacuum left by) the Muslim Caliph in Cordova.

5. 3 **Barbastro.**

The fall of Barbastro can be seen as the symbolic turning point in the history of Ta'ifa Spain. It can even be argued that it marked one of the major watersheds in the history of Muslim Spain as a whole. The fall of the city and the ensuing massacre clearly indicated the shift in the balance of power firmly to the Christian north. The campaign against Barbastro has been the subject of study by historians because of the belief that it could be seen as

a prototype crusade.[406] The question of the involvement of the Papacy in the campaign is made more intriguing by the reference of Ibn Hayyan to the leader of the expedition as Qa'id Khail Roma (lit. the Commander of the Horse of Rome). The campaign itself had many unusual characteristics. It was the first full-scale siege to be carried out to conclusion against a Muslim town. Unlike the Cid's seige of Valencia later in the century, the besieged town put up a strong defence and only surrendered when its outer walls were breached. The population of the town was first evacuated then massacred. Finally the town seems to have been recaptured with relative ease after another siege. The aim of this section is to look at Barbastro from a Muslim Spanish point of view and especially from a Zaragozan perspective.

In 1063 Ramiro I of Aragón attacked the lands of Zaragoza, possibly in an attempt to force it to pay tribute[407] which led to the interference of Castile in support of Zaragoza. This was partly because of an alliance forged with al-Muqtadir in Zaragoza but it can also be argued that this partly represented an extension of the rivalry between Aragón and Castile over the upper march. Interestingly, the Castilian force that came to aid Zara-

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[406] For a good discussion of Barbastro, see A Ferreiro: ' The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; a reassessment', JMH, 1983, 129-144. Also V. Cantarino 'The Spanish Reconquest: A Cluniac Holy War Against Islam?',Islam and the Medieval West, ed. K. Semaan, pp. 82-109.

[407] G. Zurita y Castro:Anales de la Corona de Aragón, p.95.

goza included Rodrigo Vivar.[408] What happened at the ensuing battle at Graus is not clear. The accepted version of events is that the combined Zaragozan Castilian forces defeated the army of Aragón and that during the battle Ramiro I was killed.[409] There is, however, one near contemporary Arab source that gives a slightly different version. Al-Turtushi in his Siraj al-Muluk refers to Graus, but claims that al-Muqtadir was losing the battle against (Rumil), Ramiro, and as a result sent an assassin named sa'dada who killed the Aragónese king.[410] Several factors weigh in favour of al-Turtushi's version. Having emigrated to Cairo, he could afford to record exactly what he had heard without taking account of factionalist considerations. The assassin is named, although admitted-ly if the story were fabricated, the name could have been fabricated also. Finally, al-Turtushi seems to have been not unsympathetic to the Hudids and yet records an incident which did not particularly reflect positively on them. However, one ought to keep in mind that he does record at least one other story about the march which suggests a symbolic rather than factual basis.[411]

The Christian sources do not record an

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[408] M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán, p.149.

[409] ibid. B.F. Reilly in The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI, pp.37-38 questions whether Rodrigo Diaz partici-pated in the battle.

[410] Al-Turtushi:Siraj al-Muluk, p.309.

[411] He refers to a story of some march warriors cannibalising the bodies of their dead enemies.ibid. p.297.

assassination but simply that Ramiro died in battle. His death, whether by the hands of an assassin or in combat led to the launch of the campaign against Barbastro. Duke William VIII of Aquitaine (referred to by Ibn 'Idhari as al-Baytabin,[412] which seems to be an Arabisation of the name) Ramiro's father-in-law, became involved in Sancho Ramírez's plans for a revenge attack. Possibly he felt a sense of duty towards his relation and possibly he felt that the succession of Sancho Ramírez offered him an opportunity to extend his influence into Aragón. The assembling forces also included the Count of Chalon from Burgundy and Count Armengol III of Urgel from Catalonia. The latter was already in confrontation with the upper march and so his involvement was not surprising. What is unusual is the presence of a Norman contingent led by Roger Crispin. Amato de Montecassino in his Storia dei Normanni gives no reason for the Norman involvement.[413] Whether this unusual collection of Spanish and European forces made up what amounted to a prototype crusade or not is not the subject of this research.

It was, however, an extraordinary army;one can conjecture that what made Sancho Ramírez allow so many forces to become involved in what amounted to the affairs of his kingdom was that this campaign took place so soon after his succession. A further assumption would be that at that stage the whole affair was dominated by his uncle

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412 Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.225.

413 Amato de Montecassino:Storia dei Normanni. p.13.V.

William VIII of Aquitaine, although interestingly Ibn Hayyan in the earliest extant description of the campaign clearly refers to the attacking army as jaish al-ardamaniyyin[414] (the army of the Normans). It is clear from the description that Ibn Hayyan was in Cordova when he heard of the attack. It could be that he found the involvement of the Normans so unusual that he deemed it worth recording. Alternatively, his informant may have been convinced that the attacking army was made up mostly of Normans. It is worth noting that he does not seem to record the presence of Sancho Ramírez (although that may be because he had not heard of his succession by then) nor does he seem to mention the Duke of Aquitaine (although one can never be sure that Ibn 'Idhari was not quoting Ibn Hayyan when he mentioned the Duke of Aquitaine referred to above). He also recorded that the senior among their commanders akbar ru'asa'ihum was the Commander of the Horse of Rome.[415]

> And the army of the Normans attacked it [Barbastro] and continued to besiege it, greedy for conquering it, while their Amir [that is, the Amir of the people of the city] Yusuf Ibn Sulayman Ibn Hud left them [the people of the city] to their fate, leaving them to their own devices and refusing to move to their relief.

Further on, Ibn Hayyan states

> And they [the Christians] gained untold loot from Barbastro. It was claimed that the

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[414] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.181.

[415] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp.179-190 for the full description of the campaign and the reconquest of the city. The quotes selected below are on pp.181-182.

> share of the Commander of the Horse of Rome, the most senior of their commanders, [in the loot] included 1500 slave girls (jariya).

This supports the view that at least in Cordova the attack was seen, despite the involvement of Aragón and Aquitaine, as a Norman affair. Why this should be so, and who the Commander of the Horse of Rome was, will be looked at below.

Barbastro was not a particularly obvious choice for attack. It was a fortified city in the advanced region of the upper march, north of Monzon. It was seen as an important part of the defence of the upper march. Ibn 'Idhari's source seems to suggest that the Christian army happened on Barbastro almost by chance. At first, the force of "10,000" horse tried for the larger centre of Huesca, which they attacked, then left for Barbastro[416] where they arrived on about July 1064. Barbastro, under the command of Ibn al-Tawil[417] was well equipped to stand a siege. The Christian force besieged it for forty days, during which supplies ran short. The attacking forces then breached the outer walls, while the defenders retreated to the citadel where they managed to momentarily halt the advance of the Christian forces killing 500. During the battle the tunnel supplying water to the citadel

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[416] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, pp.224-225.

[417] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam,Al-Dhakhira, part III,p.182

collapsed.[418] The lack of water built up into a major problem for the besieged, especially the civilians which forced Ibn al-Tawil to capitulate accepting safe passage in return for surrender of the town.[419]

The events that followed shocked the whole of Muslim Spain. As most of the defenders along with the civilian population left the citadel(700 continued to hold out), the Christians panicked because of their large numbers and massacred a large number (Ibn Hayyan mentions the figure 6000). They then desisted and ordered the survivors to leave. In the panic to leave, a further number died.[420] The Christians then ordered them to return to their homes where they were made slaves.[421] This appears to have been a turning of the Muslim concept of <u>siba</u>[422] against the Muslims. Three days later, the Christian forces allowed the force that held out in the citadel safe passage to Monzon. As they left Barbastro, they met another Christian contingent that had not witnessed the fall of the town and did not know of the safe passage, and were massacred.[423]

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[418] ibid.

[419] ibid.p.183.

[420] ibid.

[421] ibid.p.184.

[422] The institution of <u>Siba</u> predated Islam. When one tribe in Arabia defeated another in battle, they carried off their women as loot. This survived to some degree after Islam, when some captured women were taken as concubines.

[423] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam,<u>Al-Dhakhira</u>, Part III,p.185.

One further point needs to be made regarding Ibn Hayyan's description of the fall of Barbastro. He emphasised the loss of honour suffered by the Muslims and in particular as related to the protection of female honour. There are several references to rape and the making of thousands of girls into concubines. In part, Ibn Hayyan must have been lobbying for political action and was trying to shame the Muslims into avenging Barbastro. However, it is clear that he was truly shocked by the degree of the massacre and shamed by the subsequent loss of honour. Finally, Ibn Hayyan recorded a conversation between a Jew sent to ransom a girl and a Christian who held her as concubine after the fall of the city. The reasons given by the Christian for refusing to give the girl back are the earliest extant Muslim record of the growth of an awareness among the Spanish Christians that the tide was turning in their favour and a wish to extract revenge for past wrongs

> For she is the daughter of the owner of the house, who is held in high esteem among his people. I have chosen her because of him [i.e. his position] and because of her beauty, as my concubine, in the manner in which her own people used our women in the days of their power, and now we have the upper hand over them (Rudda lana al-karratu 'alayhum).[424]

Besides the unprecedented massacre, what was truly extraordinary about this incident was that Barbastro fell in the first place. The town held out for forty

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[424] ibid.p.187.

days;enough time to allow a relief force from Huesca or even Zaragoza to arrive. It was clear from the way in which the attacking Christian force chose not to besiege Huesca that they did not wish to confront a larger Muslim one. Had a relief force arrived, the besiegers would have probably lifted the siege without much fight. Moreover, the town was recaptured a year later with relative ease. A Zaragozan force, backed by 500 Sevillian horse attacked and captured Barbastro in Jumadi al-Awla 457/ April- May 1065, killing about 1000 Christian horsemen and 500 men.[425] Admittedly the forces that remained in the city, under the command of Count Armengol III of Urgel,[426] were only part of the original attacking force. Ibn Hayyan states that after the fall of the city, the "king" (malik) of the Rum left 1500 horse and 2000 men, while he returned home.[427] Nonetheless, that a relieving army could so easily displace an occupier from a fortified town, especially after the new defenders had a year to repair its fortification, would strongly suggest that this relief army could have posed a very serious threat to the full original Christian force.

Despite the importance of Barbastro in the framework of the history of Muslim Spain as a whole, an understanding of the incident from a Muslim perspective

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[425] ibid.pp.189-190.

[426] A. Ferreiro:' The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A reassessment', JMH, 1983, 129-144.

[427] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III,pp.185-6. This is clearly a different personage from the Commander of the Horse of Rome.

requires that one place it firmly within the context of Zaragozan politics. As pointed out in the last chapter, the upper march was in reality divided between al-Muqtadir in Zaragoza and his brother Yusuf al-Mudhaffar in Lérida. Barbastro was a town that had clearly chosen to remain loyal to Yusuf.[428] He had been unable to raise a relief force and was forced to leave the city to its own devices. As demonstrated by his effort to relieve the famine that struck Tudela, which was discussed in the previous chapter, Yusuf did not have the ability to raise a substantial military force to carry out his will.

It can be argued very strongly that al-Muqtadir chose not to send a relief force because of Barbastro's loyalty to his brother.[429] This would have been similar to the tactic he used in punishing Tudela for its loyalty to Yusuf, although it is very unlikely that he would have realised that the attack would degenerate into such a massacre. A year later, with a token force from another Ta'ifa, probably to symbolise the involvement of the rest of Muslim Spain (because the massacre had so shocked every one), he managed to capture the town with ease. This would have strengthened his position in the march to a tremendous degree, since it would have demonstrated to all the A'mal of Zaragoza that Yusuf was unable to fulfil the obligation of a lord to defend his domain and was therefore unsuitable as a lord to whom the A'mal would declare

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[428] ibid.p.181.

[429] ibid.p.189.

allegiance. Al-Muqtadir on the other hand, by recapturing the city, demonstrated his ability to defend his A'mal and defeat the Christians. The power of al-Muqtadir over the upper march must have become near complete. Interestingly, Ibn Hayyan seems to lay the blame on him for not rescuing the town while it was under siege, and indicates that there was a degree of hostile gossip against him as a result of this.[430] This was probably because irrespective of the internal struggle within the upper march, Zaragoza was very much perceived to be the centre of government there with all the responsibilities to the A'mal that that would entail.

Finally, the reaction of the other Ta'ifas to the fall of Zaragoza underlined the insular attitude that had developed within each city-state in Muslim Spain. A strong Caliphal government in Cordova would have coordinated the resources of the peninsula and directed either a relief or failing that a force to recapture and avenge the city. This would have been partly as a response to the attack itself and partly directed at ensuring that similar attacks would not be launched in the future. It would therefore have represented the most sensible utilisation of the provinces' resources to ensure their long-term protection and well being. The Ta'ifa rulers, however, reacted by panicking. Their first thought was to bolster the fortification of their own cities by building their walls higher and digging

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[430] ibid.p.189.

moats around them.[431] In the long term such a policy was unwise as it demonstrated to the northern powers that each Ta'ifa did not view the security of any other Ta'ifa as related to its own security. In practical terms this allowed the northern states to launch attacks on individual Ta'ifas in the knowledge that provided they were on "friendly" terms with the others they would be immune from a united defence. As will be shown below this was very much the case when Alfonso VI launched his attack on Toledo.

The main unresolved mystery in the seige of Barbastro is the identity of the Christian leader identified by Ibn Hayyan as Qa'id Khail Roma. It may be that the reports which Ibn Hayyan heard in Cordova were mistaken and that the title did not refer to any particular leader. The title could also be the result of an error by a later copyist and the original text should read Qa'id Khail al-Rum which would simply have referred to the commander of the Christian (or strictly speaking 'Byzantine'- in the normal eastern usage) cavalry. However, the same spelling appears in all manuscripts edited by 'Abbas which would suggest that Ibn Hayyan meant to specifically use the term Roma.[432]

Further, Ibn Hayyan was aware of, and did use, the word Rum to refer to Byzantine Christians (which was, as indicated above, the accepted eastern usage of the

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[431] ibid.p.181.

[432] One cannot totally dismiss the possibility that all extant manuscripts of the text were copied from a single source which contained a copyist's error with regards to this title.

noun).[433] Nor was this reference by Ibn Hayyan to Roma unique among Spanish Muslim scholars of the period. It is now possible to see that there is at least one other reference in a letter by the wazir Ibn al-Qusayra who talks of Sahib Roma, that is the lord or ruler of Rome, which probably referred to the Pope.[434] The letter is from Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, to the lord of the castle Bani Hammad, in which Yusuf blamed Ibn Hammad for allowing Alfonso to extend his power (by refusing to co-operate with the Almoravids). In one part it reads:

> And if Sahib Roma, who in common with him [Alfonso] is covered by the blanket of disbelief (Kufr) and polytheism (Shirk), and who has taken up the words of falsehood (Zur) and lies (Ifk), should be as close to us as you are.. his victory would not have achieved more [for his side] than you have ...nor would the damage he would have inflicted on the Muslims be greater than that which you have done.

One is therefore led to the conclusion that the word Roma was not the result of a later copyist's misspelling an original reference to Qa'id Khail al-Rum. Fletcher, in common with Ferreiro, dismisses the interpretation of the term Roma in Ibn Hayyan as meaning Rome and puts forward the argument that it simply meant Christians or Rum. He then goes on to argue that one cannot see the campaign for Barbastro as a prototype crusade.[435] While I do not wish

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[433] Ibn Hayyan: Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira part IV, p.86, where he refers to an ambassador from the Christians of Constantinople (Rasul al-Rum min al-Qustantiniyya).

[434] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira: Part II, p. 260.

[435] R.A. Fletcher: 'Reconquest & Crusade in Spain c 1050-1150.' TRHS, 1987. p.42.

to enter into the discussion as to whether there was a lost Papal bull offering indulgence to those who fought in this campaign, I would argue very strongly that Ibn Hayyan meant to use the term Roma as distinct from Rum and that, further, he meant it to signify the city of Rome. As far as Ibn Hayyan was concerned, the attack on Barbastro was launched by a Norman army led by the Commander of the Horse (that is the cavalry) of Rome, although who that personage was is not clear.

The title most probably referred to Roger Crispin, the commander of the Norman forces. During his career, he became the commander of the cavalry of the Emperor in Italy and died in Constantinople.[436] The problem with this solution is that Crispin appears to have become commander in Italy after the campaign in Barbastro. However, it is clear that Ibn Hayyan wrote about Barbastro some time after the event, as his narrative includes an account of its reconquest the following year, although the exact date of his writing is not known. Ibn Hayyan died in 1076/1077, which means that he could have written, or indeed edited, his account of the siege up to twelve years after the event. By 1072, Ibn Hayyan would have heard that the Byzantine armies were defeated at Manzikert. Reports of Manzikert might have included news of Crispin, and in this way news of his later career might have reached Ibn Hayyan.

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[436] Amato de Montecassino: Storia dei Normanni, p.13, section VIII.

The question that remains is why Ibn Hayyan viewed the attacking force as being essentially a Norman one. I would suggest that the answer to this question is related to the issue of Papal involvement in the campaign. The Latin sources do not provide conclusive evidence that Alexander II instigated the campaign. There are allegations that Alexander II issued a Bull in 1063 granting indulgence for the participants in Barbastro, but such a Bull, as Ferreiro points out, is not mentioned by Amato de Montecassino.[437]

Reilly, on the other hand, argues that Alexander II was instrumental in organising the campaign for Barbastro, which he sees as having the aspect of a crusade.[438] He sees the campaign as part of a history of Papal involvement in the reconquest, and which included the attempt by the Pope Gregory VII in 1073 to organise a crusade in Spain by the south French, led by Ebles, Count of Roucy, and which in the event never materialized.[439] For Ibn Hayyan, two aspects of the campaign were especially significant. First, the involvement of the Norman forces, in what appears to be their first sortie into Spain. He would have been well aware of the connection between the Papacy and the Norman forces against the Moslems in Sicily from 1061. Secondly, news that in some way Sahib Roma was

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[437] A. Ferreiro: 'The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A reassessment' JMH, 1983,129-144.

[438] B.F. Reilly The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain, p.69.

[439] ibid.pp.46-47.

involved in organising this campaign. Drawing the two strands together, Ibn Hayyan might well have concluded that the attacking force must have been primarily a Norman one acting on behalf of the Pope. This may be why he describes their leader, Crispin, as the most senior among the commanders of the campaign, despite the fact that he was aware of the presence of another important Christian potentate, whom he refers to as the king of the Christians (Malik al-Rum), and which could have either been William of Aquitaine or Sancho Ramírez of Aragón, although the choice of the word Rum would suggest a non-Iberian potentate and might therefore be seen as a reference to the Duke of Aquitaine.

There is no other evidence to substantiate Ibn Hayyan's description of Crispin as holding the title Commander of the cavalry of Rome during the campaign. However, I would argue that the use of the term Qa'id Khail Roma clearly indicates that Ibn Hayyan believed that the Christian forces present at Barbastro were those of the Pope. Since he probably connected the Pope with the South Italian Normans, and since Normans were present at Barbastro, he assumed that the commander of the Norman force was the senior military commander of the expedition; an expedition which was primarily a Norman one, although other Christians also participated in it.

5. 4 The Almoravids.

The history of Ta'ifa Spain became intertwined with the history of the Almoravids especially towards the last quarter of the C11. It was the Almoravids who finally occupied what was left of Muslim Spain from the lords of the Ta'ifas and who affected, to a large extent, the shape of the latter's politics towards the Christian north. Moreover, the history of Ta'ifa Spain that came down to us was mostly an Almoravid version, and the Ta'ifas as the losers in the contest were painted in the least favourable light. While it is not the aim of this study to look at the wider issues of Almoravid history, it is relevant to look at some aspects of their origins and in particular to look beyond the myth that they cultivated regarding their sect. This is important in trying to interpret their actions in the political arena of later C11 Spain. The Almoravid presentation of the history of the period is somewhat simplistic.

The Ta'ifas were weak, corrupt states that were losing Muslim territory to the Christian north. The Almoravids selflessly intervened to save that part of the Muslim world from ruin. Despite their best efforts, Ta'ifa weakness and incompetence lead to a loss of a large part of the peninsula before the Almoravids could stop the rot. This version of the history of C11 Spain was taken up by the Almohads, another north African militant Berber movement, who defeated the Almoravids. Their version of

history claimed that as the Almoravids became enthroned in Spain, they in turn became corrupted by luxury and it was up to the puritanical Almohads to save that part of Islamdom yet again from the advance of Christianity.

It is the contention of this study that Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, the commander of the Almoravids was driven by more selfish motives. Irrespective of the origins of the movement, he himself was fond of power and looked at Muslim Spain very much as a province ripe for conquest. An acceptance of this view of him as a leader would alter the way in which his actions in Spain can be interpreted. It is therefore worth looking at the incident early in Yusuf's career when he assumed command over the movement.

Yusuf Ibn Tashfin first came to prominence when his cousin Abu Bakr Ibn 'Omar, the commander of the Almoravid movement placed him in charge as a commander in Marrakesh during his absence to avenge an attack on his tribe in the desert.[440] With only a third of the Almoravid forces under his command he bolstered their position in Marrakesh, proclaiming his loyalty to his cousin. At the same time he increased his personal wealth and power, marrying his cousin's divorced wife and equipping from his own money a private fighting force loyal to him.[441] In 465/ 17 September 1072-5 September 1073, Abu Bakr returned to Marrakesh to find Yusuf in total control. Yusuf's wife had correctly anticipated that Abu

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[440] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.4, pp.20-21.

[441] ibid.pp.22-23.

Bakr was an idealist who would not fight over personal power. Abu Bakr surrendered his authority to Yusuf and returned to the desert.[442] Yusuf went on to declare for the 'Abbasid Caliph but took on the title Amir al-Muslimin, which although not a Caliphal title was close enough to the Caliphal title Amir al-Mu'minin to place it in the same category as the titles assumed by the 'Amirids or even the lords of the Ta'ifas.

The relevance of this to the history of Ta'ifa Spain is in interpreting the motives behind his actions. He viewed Spain as a candidate for conquest and despite Almoravid propaganda, Yusuf was quite willing to see the Ta'ifas weakened by attacks from the north. He was interested in stemming the advance of the north only in so far as it preserved the lands he wanted to conquer but viewed both Ta'ifas and the Christians as enemies. This was most clearly demonstrated in the battle of Zallaqa in 1086 which will be looked at in the next chapter. During the battle he held back from aiding the force of his main Ta'ifa "ally" al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad. A non-Almoravid source recorded him as saying "leave them to death for a while; both parties are enemies".[443] Yusuf almost consistently managed to arrive just too late to save the Ta'ifas. When Mubashsher of Majorca suffered a 10-month siege by the Count of Barcelona, Yusuf managed to arrive

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[442] ibid.pp.24-25.

[443] Ibn al-Kardabus:Tarikh al-Andalus, p.94.

after the island had fallen.[444] The Ta'ifas themselves must have been aware of his real motives and that must have played a part in their actions when dealing with him. This played a particularly important part in determining the actions of Zaragoza towards the Almoravid invasion.

5. 5 Changes in Valencia.

At the same time that al-Muqtadir Ibn Hud consolidated his authority over the upper march by the recapture of Barbastro, the political situation in Valencia underwent a fundamental change that threatened to isolate Zaragoza. The rivalry between the upper and middle march was very much alive and it must have been obvious to Toledo that by extending its control over Valencia it would put Zaragoza in a position where it became surrounded on all sides either by Toledan or Christian forces. The situation would have become more urgent for Toledo as Zaragoza gained total control over Tortosa thus gaining access to the sea in 452/6 February 1060-25 January 1061.[445] Control over Tortosa would also have allowed Zaragoza easy access to the A'mal of Valencia through the coastal plain. The whole debacle over Barbastro might have given the impression to Toledo that Zaragoza was too involved with internal affairs to pose any threat to its expansionist strategy at that instant and that the time was therefore ripe to strike.

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[444] Ibn Khaldun:al-Tarikh, Vol.IV, p.355.

[445] Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.250.

Toledo had already forged links with Valencia through the marriage of 'Abd al-Malik to the daughter of Yahya al-Ma'mun of Toledo. Al-Ma'mun had obviously believed that by supporting his son-in-law at the time of his succession he would extend Toledo's influence further. That policy had apparently not been successful. There were allegations that 'Abd al-Malik had treated his wife badly and that his sexual preferences favoured boys which angered his father-in-law.[446] Whatever the declared cause for the intervention, al-Ma'mun launched an attack on Valencia in 8 Dhi al-Qi'da 457/10 October 1065.[447] The 'Amirids had never established a particularly strong power base in their domain, so that their displacement seemed to have been a smooth affair. Moreover, al-Ma'mun had the support of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz who had helped 'Abd al-Malik succeed his father four years earlier. The transfer of power to the wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz shared some characteristics with the succession of 'Abd al-Malik. The army of Toledo remained in Valencia to ensure a trouble-free transfer of power. News of trouble in Toledo forced al-Ma'mun to leave Valencia.[448] He then left Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in command as a reward for his support.[449]

The success of al-Ma'mun's venture had alarming implications for the upper march. Zaragoza was now isolated

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[446] ibid.p.267.

[447] Anon:Fragment B,Ibn 'Idhari:Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.303.

[448] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.151.

[449] Ibn Hayyan:Ibn Bassam,ibid.p.40.

in facing the Christian north, unable to draw on support from the middle march or from Valencia, it's southern anchor. One can argue that this incident emphasised for the Hudids in Zaragoza the importance of Valencia to their security, whether against a hostile Toledo or the north. Unable to exert any pressure against Toledo or change the situation in Valencia, Zaragoza spent the following ten years trying to limit the damage it suffered by attempting to reach an understanding with the Christian north.

Al-Muqtadir's first concern was to try to stop another invasion by non Spanish forces into his A'mal. To this end he concluded a treaty with Sancho Ramírez I in 1069 in which both parties agreed not to ally with French or any other foreign force against one another.[450] For Sancho Ramírez, it seems that the involvement of the non-Aragónese forces in the campaign for Barbastro was unwelcome. It is not unreasonable to assume that as he established his power, he would have wished to see less interference into the affairs of his kingdom. Interestingly the treaty did not preclude a war between the two powers and indeed they engaged in a war 1069-70.[451] Al-Muqtadir tried to further limit the attacks by his northern enemies with the payment of tribute.

The death of al-Ma'mun of Toledo in 1075 made for substantial change in the situation in north east Spain.

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[450] A. Ferreiro:'The Siege of Barbastro 1064-5; A reassessment', JMH, 1983, 129-144.

[451] M.J. Viguera:Aragón Musulmán, p.157.

Al-Ma'mun had undoubtedly been a strong ruler who ruled with the able help of a chancery headed by Ibn al-Hadidi. He had by the time of his death consolidated the power of Toledo both against the Christians and against Zaragoza. His successor, titled al-Qadir, was to prove a different kind of ruler. The time of succession and the transfer of power to a new ruler was clearly one in which government was particularly vulnerable. Al-Muqtadir took this opportunity to launch a campaign south towards Denia in 467/27 August 1074-15 August 1075. His original intentions seem to have been to acquire certain forts on the edge of the A'mal of Denia which he hoped to add to the A'mal of his son al-Mundhir in Tortosa.[452] This would have added to his ability to exert pressure on Valencia and force it back within Zaragoza's sphere of influence. In this he would have probably been encouraged by the weakening of Denia following its loss of Sardinia.[453] What followed seems to have been something of a fiasco. Al-Muqtadir received the forts he asked for and on his way back to Zaragoza discovered that 'Ali of Denia intended to double cross him. He returned to negotiate further and was surprised when Mu'izz al-Dawla, 'Ali's son who was sent to negotiate with him, seemed to be discussing terms for the surrender of the whole province. Al-Muqtadir took this opportunity, adding Denia to the A'mal of Tortosa.[454] He was, however, unable

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[452] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp.266-7.

[453] ibid.p.265.

[454] ibid.pp.266-268.

to bring Valencia directly within his sphere of influence. This was probably because the force he took with him was incapable of enforcing such a solution on Valencia. Gossip in Zaragoza made much of al-Muqtadir's ability to acquire Denia but his failure to get the closer and more politically sensible acquisition of Valencia.[455]

Meanwhile, the change in government in Toledo gave Abu Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz his opportunity to break away from the Toledan sphere of influence.[456] Up to then he had been regarded most probably as a governor appointed by Toledo. By declaring independence, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz had in fact established a new Ta'ifa in Valencia which he headed. Al-Muqtadir again tried to extend his authority over Valencia and again failed, although Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz did acknowledge his general influence over the area.[457] This independence of Valencia marked a period when it returned into the Zaragozan sphere of influence. Abu-Bakr, however, entered into a relationship with Al-Muqtadir that was nearer to that of equals(unlike his relationship with al-Ma'mun of Toledo).

This new closeness to Zaragoza was cemented with marriage alliances. At least one source records a marriage between the daughter of al-Muqtadir and Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd

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[455] Ibn Hayyan: ibid. Part III, pp.42-3.

[456] ibid. Part IV, p.156.

[457] ibid. Part III, p.43.

al-'Aziz in 1075.[458] Other sources, recorded a marriage between the daughter of Abu-Bakr Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and al-Muqtadir's grandson Ahmad at the later date of 1085.[459]-

The first marriage was said to have been organised by al-Muqtadir's convert wazir Ibn Hasdai. It is conceivable that two marriages took place, although it is also possible that the reference is to a single marriage. Whether one marriage took place or two, it is clear that Zaragoza and Valencia had come closer together politically to the exclusion of Toledo. Within a very short time after al-Ma'mun's death, al-Muqtadir and Abu-Bakr had reversed the gains that he had made for Toledo so that it was Toledo that faced a position of isolation in the north east and not Zaragoza.

5. 6 **The collapse of the Toledan government.**

The succession of Yahya, inappropriately titled al-Qadir (the Able) to Toledo, precipitated a series of events that were to influence the history, not only of the north east of the peninsula but of Muslim Spain as a whole. He had inherited a strong domain, whose influence spread eastward to the sea, with its main Christian and Muslim enemies(which included both the upper and the lower march)held in check. The government he had inherited from

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[458] Ibn al-Kardabus:Tarikh al-Andalus, p.81.

[459] Anon:Fragment B,Ibn 'Idhari,al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.304.;also Ibn Khaqan:al-Qala'id al-'Iqyan, p.184.

his grandfather, al-Ma'mun, had relied in domestic politics on the skills of his main wazir al-Hadidi. Before his death al-Ma'mun had asked his grandson to trust al-Hadidi and asked al-Hadidi to help insure his grandson's succession.[460] Despite the strength of the dhu al-Nunid government in Toledo, al-Ma'mun had faced internal dissent from some factions within Toledo and had quelled that danger with the help of Ibn al-Hadidi by imprisoning the leading dissenters. One of Yahya's first actions after his succession was to release the dissenting "elders" from prison.[461] His reasons for doing so are unclear. Possibly he wished to emphasise his independence from his grandfather's policies, or he may simply have wished to start his reign with a general amnesty. A strong case can be made for the former interpretation. Not only did al-Qadir release the dissenters from prison, but he slowly turned against Ibn al-Hadidi, eventually having him murdered.[462]

The importance of a strong civil service to Ta'ifa government has been discussed above. Interestingly, the gap created in the Toledan civil service with the death of Ibn al-Hadidi was interpreted as a sign of weakness by Toledo's enemies. It was that event that triggered Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's independence in Valencia. It also signalled the general weakness of Toledan government to Zaragoza.

Al-Muqtadir not only extended his influence south to Denia,

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460 Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.151.

461 ibid. p.157.

462 ibid.

eventually bringing Valencia out of Toledo's sphere of influence and into that of Zaragoza, but also launched direct attacks on Toledo's A'mal. Al-Muqtadir's target was Cuenca on the Valencian Toledan borders and his object must have been to drive a wedge further between the two states. In this he was aided by Aragón.[463] The murder of Ibn al-Hadidi was also interpreted as a sign of weakness by Alfonso VI of Castile, who had spent a period of exile in Toledo and who began now to put pressure on al-Qadir extracting further tribute as well as the surrender of key fortifications.[464]

Within five years of his succession, the position of al-Qadir had deteriorated so substantially that internal opposition to him grew openly. This opposition was still being led by those whom he had released from prison and who had advised him to have Ibn al-Hadidi murdered. Al-Qadir's control disintegrated so much that he was forced to flee Toledo as the "elders" led the commoners in an attack on the palace.[465] Yahya retreated to castle Cuenca, which al-Muqtadir had failed to occupy. These series of events bring into focus several themes relating to the political structure of Ta'ifa Spain which were discussed in the previous chapters.

One is again confronted with the striking power

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[463] Ibn al-Kardabus:Tarikh al-Andalus, p.82.

[464] ibid. pp.83-84.

[465] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.157.

of the "people" also referred to as "elders". That this term referred to a few is evident from the fact that al-Ma'mun had managed to imprison them to stop their opposition. Interestingly, their power remained intact despite a period in prison. They also seemed able to mobilise the commoners. Further, as in the case of Valencia and Zaragoza, they could and did take a very active role in determining the political direction of Toledo, although their ability to force out al-Qadir was in part aided by his own ineptitude. The party which is glaringly noticeable by its absence from the internal turmoil were the army. They appear neither on the "people"'s side nor as defenders of the ruler. This may be because Ta'ifa lords maintained relatively small armies especially within the main cities, so that these forces would have been unable or unwilling to participate in political change. Mention of the army was also absent in the case of internal change instigated by the "people" in Valencia and Zaragoza(except that which arrived with Sulayman Ibn Hud). It is possible that in the same way the civil service under the Umayyads did not involve itself in disputes over succession, preferring to remain on the sidelines and congratulating the winner, the armed forces of the Ta'ifas also preferred not to involve themselves in disputes over government, declaring their loyalty to the eventual winner.

Another theme that is brought into focus by these events is the importance of a strong civil service as part of the supports necessary for government in Ta'ifa Spain.

Even the powerful al-Ma'mun relied on a civil service revolving around two main wazirs. When he faced internal opposition, it was the civil service which arranged for the move against the opposition and their imprisonment. It is particularly interesting that Ibn al-Hadidi's murder was perceived by others within Ta'ifa Spain, including Alfonso VI, as signalling a weakening of the structure of Toledan government. Al-Qadir, in having Ibn al-Hadidi killed removed an experienced statesman from his government without finding an equivalent replacement. His freeing of the opposition was another indication of his recklessness.

Finally, the attempts to establish an alternative government to that of the Bani dhi al-Nunids by the victorious "people" of Toledo provides a fascinating insight into the question of the "legality" of authority which was discussed in the previous chapters. When al-Qadir fled, the people did not advance an alternative ruler. The only time that that occurred in Ta'ifa history was when the jurists of Cordova abolished the Caliphate and advanced Ibn Jahwar as ruler. That, however, was a very special case and those jurists that abolished the Umayyad Caliphate were among the most respected men of law and civil servants in the peninsula. The people of Toledo elected instead to invite al-Mutawakkil Ibn al-Aftas of Badajoz to come to rule them.[466] The only reason for choosing him appears to have been that one of the leaders of the opposition, Yusuf Ibn

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[466] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.159.

al-Qallas al-Batliusi, was originally from Badajoz.[467] Al-Mutawakkil entered Toledo towards the end of 472/Spring 1080 and remained in the city for ten months.

One can put forward a strong argument that despite the disintegration of the Umayyad system of government that bestowed a legal basis on the authority of the rulers of the provinces, that concept of legitimacy had remained very much a dominant one in the political ideology of the period. Rule clearly was not open to anyone. Despite the people of Toledo having the de facto authority in the city they chose not to elect either a council or nominate a person to assume power. Such a person or council would have had their authority based solely on the power of the commoners and that seems to have been unacceptable. Even at that late stage "legitimacy" of authority played an essential role in the political arena of Ta'ifa Spain, hence the need to "invite" a ruler the legitimacy of whose authority was established. One could argue that the case of Abu-Bakr in Valencia tends to negate this case since he was only a wazir. However, he derived his legitimacy from his appointment as governor by al-Ma'mun. Once the legitimacy of his authority was established, he could break away from allegiance to the original source of that legitimacy, which remained acceptable practice in Ta'ifa Spain.

From his exile in Cuenca, al-Qadir tried to regain Toledo by appealing to Alfonso VI and reminding him of the help he had received as an exile in Toledo. At the

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467 ibid.

same time, al-Mutawakkil seems to have viewed his reign in Toledo as a short term affair, probably because he had no local power base whatsoever, and decided to flee the city as Alfonso advanced on it (having commandeered its treasury). Al-Qadir recaptured Toledo ten months after being forced to flee, in 473/22 June 1080- 10 June 1081. Because al-Qadir was reinstated in Toledo by Alfonso, the "people" seem to have taken the view that his legitimacy was henceforth derived from Alfonso. This seems to have been the reason for their choosing to complain to Alfonso about al-Qadir's shortcomings following their rebellion against him in 'Id al-Nahr 474/May 1082.[468] By that stage the outlook of the Toledans had become so Toledo-centred that they failed to perceive Alfonso within the wider and pre-Ta'ifa context of Muslim Spain versus the north. The dissolution of the unity of Muslim Spain as a political concept in the minds of its inhabitants was thus complete by the beginning of the eighth decade of the century.

5. 7 **Conclusion.**

While the campaign against Barbastro was an exceptional event, it did underline the changes that the

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[468] ibid.pp.159-163. Reilly in The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI leans towards dating the episode in 1080 and sees Alfonso's capture of Coria in 1079 as part of the campaign to re-instate al-Qadir. Ibn Bassam, however states that al-Mutawakkil entered Toledo at the end ('Aqiba) 472 and stayed for ten months, which suggests he left in 1081.

Christian Spanish states were undergoing. In particular it demonstrated the closer alignment with the mainstream Latin world and the strengthening of the belief that the fight against the Muslims was not only territorial but also to do with the upholding of Christianity against its enemies. Whether Barbastro was the first crusade or not, the north was moving in the direction where its struggle to regain the lands it lost to the Muslims took on more of the characteristics of a Holy War.

This occurred at a time when the Spanish Muslims had increasingly moved away from identifying with Spain as a unified Muslim state and more towards a segmented political view based on the localised identity of their city-states. The political weakness that this system created insured that the apex of the power of the Ta'ifa states marked the beginning of their very quick decline as they were ill-equipped to individually stand up to the rejuvenated and dynamic north. This was not only in terms of inferior military power. It also manifested itself in the lack of a political ideology capable of resisting the idea of reconquest that was being born in the north.

The apparent weakness of the Ta'ifa states also served to bring them to the notice of a militant Muslim movement which was gaining in power in north Africa. The Almoravid movement, despite the propaganda it spread about itself after its victory, had come under the control of an ambitious and expansionist leader, who came to view Muslim Spain as the natural area for his movement to expand. The

intervention of Almoravids in Spain only started in the middle of the eighth decade of the C11, but they managed to dominate the political scene there very quickly. They also brought with them a more dynamic interpretation of Islam and came to see and represent their fight against the Ta'ifas and the Christian north not only as a territorial conflict but also as a Holy War.

The actions of the lords of the Ta'ifas have come to be interpreted and were judged by Muslim historians within the context of an "Islamic" political system. However, a better understanding of the actions of the Ta'ifa lords and in particular those of Zaragoza and Valencia would be achieved from looking at them within the context of a "Ta'ifa" political system. Thus, while al-Muqtadir can be judged as criminally negligent in not rushing to the aid of Barbastro as soon as it was attacked if one is examining the situation from an "Islamic" perspective, his actions seem sensible and even necessary when looked at from a "Ta'ifa" perspective. It was the only way in which he could limit the power of his brother in Lérida and strengthen the power of Zaragoza as a unit. This "Ta'ifa" perspective will help define the actions of Zaragoza in relation to the Almoravids and Valencia towards the end of the century which will be examined in the following chapter.

Finally, certain themes that were seen in the development of the Ta'ifas such as the increased power of the interest groups within the cities, the "people", and

the importance of an efficient civil service as a tool of Ta'ifa government, remained part of the political fabric of C11 Muslim Spain. Moreover, despite the total collapse of the Umayyad system of government, the Muslims of Ta'ifa Spain continued to lay considerable stress on the importance of legitimate government within the confines of the new political system which had come to be established in Spain. Ta'ifa Spain began to crumble by the mid 1080's under the pressure from both the Almoravid and the Christian advance. The Ta'ifa that managed to survive longest, Zaragoza, did so by exploiting the Ta'ifa system most efficiently. Zaragoza can be seen, in the final analysis, as having been the Ta'ifas' ideal of a Ta'ifa.

6. The Cid and Zaragoza

6. 1 Introduction

The history of (although by no means the events in) the Iberian Peninsula during the ninth and tenth decades of C11 can be said to be dominated by a single figure; a Castilian knight who later came to epitomise the spirit of the reconquest and who, having been exiled from his native land came to conquer and rule over a Muslim city-state. Much has been written about Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, known as el-Campeador (from the Latin Campidoctor) and also as el-Cid (from the Arabic al-Sayyed) not least because of the epic poem written about his exploits and which is a source of interest not only to historians but also to literary scholars.

The place of honour, which the Cid occupies in Spanish history is reflected not only in the scholarly works written about him, notably Menéndez Pidal's La España del Cid[469], but also in popular recognition culminating in a Hollywood epic.[470] And yet, despite the important role which the Cid played in the history of the

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[469] A more recent study is R.A. Fletcher's The Quest for El-Cid.

[470] For which Menéndez Pidal was historical advisor.

upper march in the latter part of C11, and which shall be looked at below, his role in the general history of Spain was much exaggerated by later legend. He is notable by his absence from the two momentous events in the latter part of the century. He did not participate in the recapture of Toledo in 1085, significant both symbolically as Toledo was the old Visigothic capital of Spain, and strategically, since the capture of the middle march broke the back of the Muslim march defences and marked the irreversible advance of the reconquest. Nor was he present at Zallaqa, where the North African Almoravids inflicted a disastrous defeat on the forces of Castile.[471]

Nevertheless, the Cid's role in the history of the upper march is deeply entwined with both these events and in particular the former. This chapter will try to look at the Cid's actions within the context of Zaragozan politics and reinterpret them accordingly. Although there has been some revision of his role from that of "Castilian hero par excellence" as painted by the poem and maintained by Spanish historians, especially Menéndez Pidal, the general heroic slant still influences the study of his history. Why this Castilian knight became the hero of the period is not properly part of this research, although one

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[471] The prominent place which the Cid occupies in Spanish history owes much to Menéndez Pidal's work. Recently, Reilly in his The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI has presented a reassessment of the history of Castile in this period and brings out the role of Alfonso VI. See also Reilly's The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain.

would hazard a guess that it had something to do with the fact that he was the only Castilian to inflict a major defeat on the Almoravids. However, it is worth pointing out the documentary basis for the divergence in the interpretations of his action as discussed below from the mainstream of Spanish history.

Menéndez Pidal believed that the Historia Roderici was an account written by a Mozarab cleric who accompanied the Cid on his campaigns 1082-1090 and was written in 1110.[472] He further believed that the Poem of the Cid, which in his eyes represented a vernacular history, was written around forty years after the Cid's death.[473] Menéndez Pidal therefore believed that he had two main contemporary or near contemporary sources, one of which was written by an eyewitness, from which to construct the history of the period. This lead him to place less emphasis on the Arabic source of al-Dhakhira. However, some recent studies place the Historia at a later date. Ubieto Arteta tentatively suggests 1144-47 as the date for its composition, although Fletcher has recently put forward arguments for an earlier date.[474] Recent studies of the Poem of the Cid place it around 1201 to

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472. R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid, p.5

473. ibid.

474 A. Ubieto Arteta:'La "Historia Roderici" y su fecha de redacción', Saitabi, 1961,241-246. R. Fletcher, The Quest for El Cid, pp.93-99.

1207.[475] In other words these two Christian sources were written perhaps up to fifty years and one hundred years after the Cid's death, when elements of the folklore myth were very much established. In essence this leaves the al-Dhakhira as the only near contemporary account[476] of his exploits, although this by no means implies that it is therefore an accurate one, nor that the poem and the Historia lose their usefulness. Rather, by placing the latter two sources in their historical context, their contents could be better assessed and that more weight can therefore be given to the account related in the al-Dhakhira than has hitherto been the case.

The 1080's was a decade in which Zaragoza faced its greatest challenges as an independent Ta'ifa. The decade started with a concentrated attack by Lérida as Mundhir Ibn Hud in alliance with Barcelona and Aragón tried to oust his nephew from the centre of the march. Zaragoza managed to avert this threat only to face a more far reaching one as Alfonso advanced on and occupied Toledo. Not only did this represent an increased danger from the middle march which could no longer be viewed even as a possible anchor against the north, but as Alfonso placed al-Qadir, Toledo's ousted ruler in Valencia, Zaragoza

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[475] Anon: The Poem of the Cid ed. I Michael Introduction p.16. Also C.Smith: The Making of the Poema de Mio Cid p.1.

[476] There is no controvery as to the dating of al-Dhakhira, while the dating of the Historia, to my mind, still remains unsettled.

felt itself totally cut off and isolated.

Finally, the fall of Toledo led to the advent of the Almoravids, who, notwithstanding their propaganda, were clearly perceived by the Ta'ifas as a definite threat to their independence. The Hudids tried to meet this threat and that of the thrusting Castile by playing off one faction against the other. They chose not to get involved in Zallaqa nor in Aledo and by helping the Cid secure Valencia, Zaragoza ensured that the Almoravid advance was checked south of its domain as well as breaking the cordon which Alfonso had thrown about the upper march.

The dynamics of the political scene in Spain were undergoing rapid and fundamental changes during this period. Zaragoza, by choosing not to get involved in the larger political struggle between Castile and the Almoravids and by concentrating its efforts on securing a dependable ally in Valencia to counteract the threats from Castilian Toledo and the Almoravid south, managed to prolong its period of independence, although by the tenth decade of the C11 it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Ta'ifa system could not survive in the new political arena which had developed in Spain.

Part I

6. 2 A Castilian Knight in the Service of Zaragoza

While the reasons leading to the exile of Rodrigo Diaz from Castile and his eventual employment by Zaragoza are outside the bounds of this research, some aspects of the history of his estrangement from Alfonso VI are important to this chapter as they may help clarify the background to a political arena where these two protagonists who were later seen as the main figures in the Christian drive southwards in the C11, at times appeared to be on opposite and conflicting sides. As mentioned in the introduction, there is some controvery as to whether the Historia Roderici was composed in the in the middle of the C12, or its beginning, as believed by Menéndez Pidal and Fletcher, and whether it was therefore written by an eye-witness. Nevertheless, it remains an important source for the history of Rodrigo's early exploits, although if one accepts a later date for its composition, one would assume that it was coloured by the politics of the mid C12. This, however, provides a good source for what was accepted by the time of its composition as the early history of Rodrigo Diaz.

It seems accepted that Rodrigo Diaz was a friend of Sancho of Castile.[477] He was, it is also alleged the

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[477] R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid p.133.

Alferez or standard bearer of the Castilian army under Sancho.[478] This would have been a position of great importance and implies a prominence in the Castilian court.[479] Whether he was, or whether this friendship with the murdered King and his exalted position in the court were a later embellishment and rightly forms part of the myth which was built around the man, it would not be unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo's political inclinations were coloured by those of Sancho's court. This, one assumes, included an antagonism towards Sancho's exiled brother Alfonso. When, following Sancho's death, Alfonso became King of Castile, it is again not unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo, possibly the Alferez of the deceased King, was not particularly happy at this transition of power.

It is not appropriate at this juncture to discuss fully whether Rodrigo led a faction which accused Alfonso VI of being involved in the murder of his brother, forcing him to take an oath at Santa Gadea attesting to his innocence. There are elements within this story which

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[478]. ibid.

[479] Reilly in The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI, pp.37-38, questions whether Sancho's Castile, which he sees as more primitively organised than contemporary León, had an office of Alferez. He further argues that charter evidence suggests that Rodrigo Diaz's position at the Royal Court was of the second rank at best. In this, I defer to Reilly's study of the charter evidence. However, this does not change the argument that as a member of Sancho's court (even of second rank) Rodrigo's politics would have been influenced by those of the court, including an antagonism towards Alfonso.

perhaps suggest a later date. However, this story and other indications in earlier sources do seem to point to a tradition that Rodrigo was, if not hostile, then at best cool towards the new King.[480] There are other indications of friction between the ensign of the murdered King and Alfonso VI. When Alfonso, in a move of realignment towards the mainstream of European Christianity introduced the Roman Liturgy, it appears that Rodrigo led a faction which opposed this move. Menéndez Pidal discusses this episode and points out that Rodrigo, when in command of Valencia, himself introduced the Roman Liturgy.[481] What is relevant to this chapter in that episode is that again there is evidence of a tradition that Rodrigo's relations with his new King from the start of the latter's reign were not trouble free and that when the break did occur between the two, there was perhaps an element of a personality clash involved in addition to the "trouble makers" of the poem. In the final analysis, the demotion of Rodrigo from favour is best illustrated by the fact that the new King brought with him a new Alferez, García Ordonez, who took this post from Rodrigo.[482]

Interestingly, the episode leading to Rodrigo's first exile provides the first instance of divergence

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[480] For a discussion of this episode see ibid pp.71-72. Also R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid, pp.132-134.

[481] R. Menéndez Pidal:La España del Cid, pp. 163-174

[482] ibid.

between the Christian tradition of Rodrigo's early history and evidence provided by Arabic sources. The Christian tradition has Rodrigo playing a prominent role in the Castilian expedition to extract tribute from 'Abdullah Ibn Ziri, lord of Granada. However, 'Abdullah in his memoirs, clearly recalls the incident. He does not mention Rodrigo at all. He states that Alvar Fáñez (who later was to become in the Poem in relation to Rodrigo what Oliver is to Roland in the Chanson de Roland) was the one sent to collect tribute, and that it was Fañez who fought and defeated Count García Ordoñez.[483] It may be that 'Abdullah writing in captivity under Almoravid supervision, chose not to mention Rodrigo, since his captors might have been sensitive about the only Christian commander who inflicted a major defeat on their army. Alternatively, Rodrigo might have been part of the expedition to Granada, although if so, his role was clearly not that of the leader; it seems, rather, that as he became the centre of a myth, new roles were attributed to him. Whether Rodrigo accompanied the expedition to Granada under Fanez's command, or whether he was excluded altogether from this important expedition, what this incident seems to suggest is that Rodrigo's position at the Castilian court had weakened. His subsequent fall from favour was not brought about simply by trouble markers who misrepresented his actions to the King, but rather it seems, that it was the culmination of a period where, if he was not pushed out of

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[483] 'Abdullah ibn Ziri: Al-Tibyan:(tr.A.Tibi),pp.130-131.

the mainstream of Castilian politics altogether, he appears to have been at least marginalised.

The actual incident which directly led to his exile is a particularly interesting one if looked at from a Zaragozan perspective. While Alfonso was busy campaigning in the South in April/May 1081 Rodrigo remained in Castile, apparently ill,[484] although one wonders whether it was illness which kept him away from Alfonso's side; a tendency which was to become a habit with him. During the campaign, Alfonso had re-instated al-Qadir in Toledo once al-Mutawakkil of Badajoz had evacuated the city (taking with him much of Toledo's treasury). That Alfonso then chose to remain in the march area perhaps reflects something of an uncertainty on his part about the best course of action to pursue next. His resolve to occupy Toledo seems to have developed gradually. Possibly, he did not believe such a move feasible, even when he entered Toledo to reinstate its deposed dhu al-Nunid ruler. Such a move would certainly have appeared as a momentous one and he might not have believed originally in his ability to successfully carry it off, although as his sojourn in the middle march extended, so his resolve seems to have hardened. In any case, Alfonso VI realised that by reinstating al-Qadir in Toledo, his grip over the middle march had strengthened enormously.

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[484] R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid, p.184

The Castilian thrust southwards must have been viewed with alarm by Zaragoza. The dhu al-Nunids were rivals, but in theory, at least, they formed the anchor on which the upper march rested. Their fall within the sphere of Castile, led to a situation where Zaragoza became almost surrounded on all sides by the hostile Christian north. Zaragoza's only remaining outlet in this situation would have been Valencia. The latter, however, was hardly a reliable ally. The Bani 'Amir had given Valencia, and by extension Valencia's foreign policy, something of a stable nature. The new ruler in Valencia, however, was an unknown quantity. The Wazir Ibn 'Abd al 'Aziz had declared independence from Toledo, but his seizure of Valencia was instigated, in the first instance, by an agreement to enter Toledo's sphere of influence. The Bani Hud would hope to draw him into an alliance, but could not rely on his loyalty (someone who changed sides once is not unlikely to do so again). Alfonso's move into the middle march would have therefore put pressure on Zaragoza, increasing its feeling of impending isolation.

During Alfonso's absence in the middle march, Rodrigo Diaz conducted a raid against Toledan lands; lands which had come under Alfonso's protection as a result of his installation- in modern terminology, his sponsorship- of al-Qadir in Toledo. Such an attack would have had the effect of weakening Alfonso's influence over Toledo - because of his inability to extend his protection against

attacks from Castile itself - and, by extension, of weakening al-Qadir's own authority over the march, since his sponsor was unable to deliver the protection he promised even from attacks emanating from his own domain and therefore might not be able to afford al-Qadir support against attacks from other sources. Menéndez Pidal tries to argue that this attack by Rodrigo was an indignant response to an Arab attack on San Esteban de Gormaz, an important Castilian outpost.[485] He further tries to argue that Rodrigo did not aim this against Alfonso's political manoeuvring in the middle march. However, Menéndez Pidal himself also argues that Rodrigo Diaz was well acquainted with Ta'ifa politics from the mid 1060's when he participated in attacks on the south and was present at treaties concluded with the payment of Parias.

It is therefore highly unlikely that Rodrigo Diaz was unaware that his raid, whether it was in response to an attack on Gormaz or not, would serve to weaken the net which Alfonso was building around the middle march, and was therefore to be seen as a direct blow against Alfonso himself; which is exactly how Alfonso seems to have interpreted it.

In an incidental way, this attack by Rodrigo, because of its negative repercussions for Alfonso's policies in the middle march, would have been interpreted in

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[485] ibid pp.184-5. See also Reilly The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI,pp.128-129.

a favourable light by Zaragoza, for whom even a partial blow against Castile's drive into the Toledan march, helped bolster Zaragoza's position, if only in a marginal way. I am not, however, suggesting that Rodrigo conducted his raid in a way calculated to please Zaragoza as a prelude for seeking employment there. Rather, what is being suggested is that Rodrigo having been distanced from the main arena of Castilian court politics, and possibly excluded from the major Castilian expedition south into the middle march, chose to respond to a raid on a border castle in a manner which was, at least in part, intended to show disregard for Alfonso and his political ambitions. Possibly, Rodrigo did not intend to bring the tension between him and Alfonso to a head. However, when Alfonso's patience did run out, Rodrigo had under his belt, as he went into exile, a military action, which, he would have realised with his knowledge of Ta'ifa politics, would not have been displeasing to the strongest Ta'ifa in the region; even if Zaragoza in no way entered his calculation when he conducted his raid.

A question which has perhaps not received much attention when looking at Rodrigo's career, partly because the myth of the Cid as a Castilian hero continues to influence, if only to some degree, the way in which the history of his exploits are analyzed, is why al-Muqtadir Ibn Hud chose to give him employment. Possibly, the raid which Rodrigo conducted against the Toledan march did find

favour with al-Muqtadir. Furthermore the Bani Hud were not averse to using Christian troops. However, the Historia Roderici seems to suggest that Rodrigo was given a place of prominence among the Hudid forces. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the armed forces of the city-states of C11 Muslim Spain were notable by their absence in periods of internal strife. It was suggested that the reason for this might have been that Ta'ifa lords kept relatively small standing armies and possibly had them concentrated on the borders (Barbastro for example which was referred to as a fort seemed to have far more civilians than troops and the final number which continued to hold out in the citadel -which presumably represented the core of its military contingent- was reported by Ibn Hayyan as only 700). This may have been the result not only of financial, but also of demographic constraints (as pointed out in chapter one there is some evidence that the upper march was under-populated). The arrival, therefore of a band of mounted, disciplined and well trained horsemen would have been a welcome addition to the march's defence forces.

It is tempting to put forward the hypothesis that Rodrigo's reputation as a fighter preceded him and that therefore the Bani Hud were particularly pleased to have him fighting on their side. Ibn Bassam does refer to him as the Campeador[486] (although interestingly, never as the Cid) and clearly states that he was a famed warrior who had

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[486] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part III, p.95

routed with his few troops superior numbers of Christian foes, including the Count of Barcelona and Garcia "crooked mouth" also referred to as head of the Franks.[487] However, although Ibn Bassam was writing only ten to fifteen years after Rodrigo's death, he was writing to an Almoravid audience and would have been aware of the humiliation of the defeat which Rodrigo inflicted on them before the walls of Valencia. He might have therefore built up Rodrigo's military prowess to lessen the rankling of that defeat. Certainly the final part of that particular description, where Rodrigo is also portrayed as one who liked Arabic books to be read to him, especially on the exploits of

al-Muhallib [Ibn abi Safra -an early Muslim military commander] seems to have been a literary embellishment.

A more pragmatic attraction which the troop led by Rodrigo would have presented to the Bani Hud was that they formed what appeared to be a heavier cavalry to the normal Spanish Muslim troops. There is no early evidence directly pointing to Rodrigo's troops using heavier armour. However, an eyewitness account of the battle of Zallaqa, which took place five years after Rodrigo's exile into Zaragoza, clearly describes the Castilians as covered in "iron", which probably meant chainmail.

> [they had] fortified themselves with iron from their heads [lit. horns] to their

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[487] ibid. p.100

feet.[488]

It would not be unreasonable to assume that Rodrigo, a Castilian horseman, leading a Castilian troop would have been attired in a similar manner. A heavier cavalry would have greatly enhanced the striking power of the lighter cavalry traditionally employed by the Spanish Muslims. Finally, an argument can be put forward on the basis of the Poem of the Cid, laisse 35 that Rodrigo employed a new cavalry tactic of charging with lances, the body of the horsemen under his command protected by shields and bent low over the horses, bursting through the enemy line; regrouping and charging through the back of the line just pierced[489]

> The men clasped their shields to their hearts and lowered their lances, each with its pennon flying. With heads bent down over their saddle-bows, they dashed to the attack courageously. . They assailed the Moorish ranks. . . There were three hundred knights with lance and pennon, and with every lance thrust a Moor fell dead. On returning to the charge they killed as many more.[490]

However, as the poem was written at the turn of the C13, this could easily be a description of current Castilian

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[488] Ibn al Qusayra: letter written the morning following the Almoravid victory and quoted by Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.243.

[489] Anon: The Poem of the Cid, 1st Cantar, Laisser 35, p.59

[490] It is worth noting that a cavalry charge with the spear clasped under the arm is similar to the methods used by the Normans at Hastings. See R.A. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest, pp.146-147, footnote 137. However, the Bayeux tapestry does not show the Norman Knights "with heads bent down" as in this description. See R.A. Brown, The Norman Conquest, plate 201, p.177.

cavalry tactics, and might not have been employed by Rodrigo over a century earlier.

The reasons for the rulers of Zaragoza accepting Rodrigo into their service were probably a combination of all the points discussed above. Whatever the motivation behind the Bani Hud recruiting Rodrigo, he went on to prove a valuable asset for the upper march. The traditional view of Rodrigo's exile is to see him as allying with the ruler of Zaragoza and eventually aiming to put Zaragoza under his protection as part of the drive for reconquest. However, as Barkai points out, the Christian sources do not differentiate between Rodrigo's Christian and Muslim enemies.[491] Moreover, they describe within a feudal framework his relationship with al-Mu'tamin, lord of Zaragoza during the campaigns against Sancho Ramírez of Aragón and Berenguer Ramon of Barcelona.[492] This tends to be supported by Ibn Bassam who represents the views of near-contemporary Spanish Muslims and who describes Rodrigo as an instrument of Hudid political strategy:

> And it was the Bani Hud who earlier had awakened him from his slumbers . . . . . and directed him against the provinces of the Peninsula [lit. island][493]

This would suggest that he entered the service of Zaragoza,

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[491] R. Barkai: Cristianos Y Musulmanes part 2, p.128

[492] ibid. p.130

[493] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.95

not as an equal hoping to conquer (as portrayed by the myth) but as a knight employed by the lord of the upper march.

Zaragoza, under Ahmad al-Muqtadir had established itself as the leading Ta'ifa, having successfully kept its independence against invasions from Barcelona, Aragón and Castile, as well as having kept the power of Toledo under the dhi al-Nunids in check. As mentioned above, the interference of Castile in the politics of Toledo had alarming connotations for Zaragoza. Where they thought an old enemy had become a weakened power, they faced by 1080 a situation where the danger from Toledo was rejuvenated with the added danger from its newly found close alignment with Castile. As a result, al-Muqtadir's major strategic aim became the securing of Valencia since if it fell into the hands of Toledo or re-entered Toledo's sphere of influence -which would have implied that Valencia would have entered, via its relation with Toledo, Castile's sphere of influence -Zaragoza would have become totally surrounded by hostile forces (except, of course, its access to the sea via Tortosa).

Al-Muqtadir had taken the opportunity of the Wazir Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz declaring his independence following Yahya's death and al-Qadir's ensuing problems in maintaining his authority over Toledo,[494] to launch a

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[494] ibid: part IV, p.156.

raid south, possibly aiming to bring Valencia directly within Zaragoza's control and linking the area he controlled from his capital to Denia via Valencia. Ibn Bassam wrote that al-Muqtadir launched his campaign after obtaining Alfonso's approval in return for payment of 100,000 d.[495] For Ibn Bassam, however, the Bani Hud were responsible for Valencia's subsequent fall to Rodrigo and were, moreover, at the time of his writing the last Ta'ifa bastion of resistance to the Almoravid hegemony over Muslim Spain, which he, Ibn Bassam, was supporting. The accusation, therefore, that al-Muqtadir paid Alfonso to attack Valencia should be treated with care. On the one hand, it would not have been in Alfonso's long term interest to allow Zaragoza to consolidate its power southwards. On the other, one could argue that he would not have been able to stop such a move and that there is a logic in al-Muqtadir consulting Alfonso before this raid on the basis that the Wazir Ibn 'Abd al 'Aziz, despite his declaration of independence, had been appointed by Toledo. Al-Muqtadir could therefore, have been ensuring that his attack was not seen as hostile to the new power which was beginning to assert its control over the Toledan march.[496] On balance, given that the raid predated Alfonso's re-instatement of al-Qadir in Toledo, the payment of a Paria for the privilege of this campaign

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[495] ibid: part III, p.43

[496] ibid: part IV, p.156. Alfonso had started attacking the forts of the middle march putting pressure on al-Qadir by then.

sounds as if it might be a late addition, intended in part to be a jibe against the reputation of the Bani Hud.

Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz responded by shifting his allegiance to Zaragoza, declaring himself to be al-Muqtadir's man and the province to be within Zaragoza's sphere of influence.[497] This assurance was enough for al-Muqtadir to desist and return to Zaragoza. In other words, al-Muqtadir did not consider it necessary to physically occupy Valencia to assure himself of the preservation of Zaragoza's strategic aims. It was enough, in his eyes, to have in Valencia, a governor who owed even titular allegiance to Zaragoza, and who would have had the implications of breaking this alliance with Zaragoza spelt out by the Zaragozan expedition. This is an important aspect of Zaragozan politics and was to play a role when they again ensured Valencia's friendliness by helping instal in Valencia a Commander who was, if not a Zaragozan "man", then at least an ally and who provided both a southern anchor on which the upper march could rest, and a buffer which would protect the upper march against northward attacks from the south.

Rodrigo therefore entered the service of a relatively secure Zaragoza, the main threat against which came from Aragón and Barcelona. Zaragoza had met the threat of a Toledo which seemed to be falling under

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[497] ibid: Part III, p.43.

increasing Castilian influence by applying the soundest political and military strategy at its disposal; in modern terminology by neutralising Valencia. However, soon after Rodrigo's entry into Zaragozan service, the march faced a major crisis. Ahmad al-Muqtadir's reign had provided the march with thirty five years of internal stability. The exception was, of course, his brother Yusuf in Lérida, but the latter's power was eventually contained. The death of al-Muqtadir in 1081/2 precipitated the march into another succession crisis. His son Yusuf received Zaragoza and overall command of the march. His other son Mundhir received Tortosa, Denia and Lérida. Quite clearly, the issue of succession had not been satisfactorily resolved by Hudids. This breaking up of the march was not as disruptive as the one following the death of al-Muqtadir's father Sulayman in 1046, but it demonstrated the difficulty which Spanish Muslims had in dealing with Ta'ifa states as "Kingdoms" to be handed down to a single heir; treating their provinces, at least in part, as property or governorships to be dividend among the sons of the deceased lord as an inheritance.

Yusuf Ibn Hud, titled al-Mu'tamin, started his reign by imitating his father's strategy when he took over Zaragoza in 1046. Using the heavy cavalry which had come under his command, he directed Rodrigo against Lérida the seat of his brother's government, in an attempt at consolidating his power. Having, thus contained his bro-

ther's power, al-Mu'tamin rebuilt and fortified Castle Almenar, which was in close proximity to Lérida, to keep up the pressure on his brother.[498] Mundhir responded by allying with the Counts of Barcelona and Cardeña.[499] This cycle of fraternal rivalry in the upper march in many ways echoed the earlier struggle between the protagonists' father and uncles thirty five years earlier. For Barcelona, this internal struggle in the upper march and the resulting alliance with Lérida, offered a great opportunity to extend its influence southwards. However, the combined Catalonian-Léridan forces were defeated by the Zaragozan army, led, it seems, by Rodrigo. It was this decisive victory which put a halt to Barcelona's renewed pressure on the march and kept Lérida very much in check. This victory seemed to have secured al-Mu'tamin's power and to have led to Rodrigo being particularly honoured in Zaragoza.[500]

With Lérida thus contained, and the ambitions of Barcelona also clipped by the new lord of Zaragoza, al-Mu'tamin could direct his attention to other aspects of the strategic threats which threatened his domain. It seems that Valencia, taking up the opportunity created by al-

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[498] R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid, p.198

[499] ibid pp. 198-9

[500] ibid p.200-201. A. Turk in 'Relación Historica entre el Cid y la Dinastia Hudi', in El Cid en el Valle del Jalón,pp.28-29, sees this incident as resulting in the honouring of Rodrigo and his being awarded the title Cid, either from (Sayyed) meaning lord or from (Sid), which Turk translates as lion, but which Ibn Mandhur in his Lisan al-'Arab lists as meaning wolf. The origin of the title Cid will be looked at briefly below.

Muqtadir's death and the internal Zaragozan struggle which followed, began to renege on the deal they had made with al-Muqtadir following the latter's southern campaign. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz did not go as far as openly defying the authority of al-Mu'tamin - he would have probably been aware of his vulnerability to a direct Zaragozan attack, but, Ibn Bassam suggests, he became uncooperative with al-Mu'tamin's emissaries.[501]

> And [dhu al-wizaratayn Abu-Bakr] Ibn 'Ammar, when he visited those parts of Ibn Hud's realm, used the influence bestowed on him by al-Mu'tamin, except that the Bani 'Abd al-'Aziz gave him much trouble [lit. made him choke on his saliva (kanu yusharriqunahu bi-riqihi)] and made his paths, which should have been easy, difficult. And he would hear of them that which would inflame his ribs and bring tears to his eyes.

It may be that Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz seeing Alfonso's influence growing in the middle march as well as feeling that the foreign policy of Zaragoza was being neglected because of its internal problems, was simply experimenting with the degree with which he could remove his city-state from the upper march's sphere of influence. His alliance with the upper march was, after all, one entered into under duress. This experimentation on the part of Valencia does suggest, however, the degree to which Zaragoza's influence was being counteracted by the succession issue and the possibly also by the growing power of Castile in the middle march.

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[501] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part II, p.410

With this background in mind one can look at the unusual "incident" which occurred at Rueda towards the end of al-Mu'tamin's reign. Rueda was a castle, 35 km from Zaragoza and used by the Bani Hud as a final bolt-hole in times of strife. It appears that in January 1083 the Commander in charge of Rueda sent messages to Alfonso VI to the effect that he was willing to change sides and shift his allegiance to Castile. Such a move would have given Alfonso the opportunity to establish a strategic toehold in the upper march, in close proximity to Zaragoza, from which he could increase pressure on and eventually, he would have hoped, to take over the march. For Alfonso, the threat faced by Castile was not only from a strong Zaragoza but equally from a Zaragoza which had fallen within the domain of either Aragón or Barcelona.

Alfonso VI, therefore, suspended his campaign in the middle march and moved, with some force, to Rueda. The Commander of the castle either reneged on his intention or his original plan was to trick Alfonso into a trap. In January 1083, he ambushed the Castilian party, killing many nobles. Alfonso VI, who decided not to join the expedition, escaped the massacre.[502] It is not clear whether this was a grand scheme by the Bani Hud to assas-

sinate Alfonso VI. The explanation could simply be that

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[502] R. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid pp. 202-203. Also B.F. Reilly: The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI, p.165. The evidence for this massacre appears to exist only in Christian sources, including the Crónica Nájerense, ed. Ubieto Arteta, p.117 and in a document in Documentos de Sahagun, ed. Vignau, p.270.

the Commander of Rueda having offered the castle to Alfonso panicked and in an attempt to convince his lord in Zaragoza of his loyalty, carried out the ambush pretending that it was his intention all along. However, it should be kept in mind, that the Bani Hud did use, at least in one instance, assassination as a method of ridding themselves of a dangerous Christian King.[503] Having done so once, it would not be beyond them to employ a similar tactic again. Alfonso, having escaped, retreated and reconcentrated his efforts on the middle march.

Al-Mu'tamin, possibly having failed in his attempt to rid himself of Alfonso, seemed unable to do more to counter the threat in the middle march and concentrated instead on other aspects of Zaragozan politics. Valencia remained a source of uncertainty in Zaragoza's foreign policy and the solution which al-Mu'tamin eventually arrived at in some way acknowledged his inability to repeat his father's campaign to force Valencia into an alliance. On 27th Ramadan 477/28 January 1085, Ahmad, al-Mu'tamin's son and successor married the daughter of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz.[504] This marriage had been negotiated by

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[503] Al-Turtushi: Siraj al-Muluk p.309 - al-Muqtadir sent Sa'dada to kill Ramiro I.

[504] Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan Vol.3 p.304

al-Mu'tamin's convert Wazir Ben Hasdai.[505] In many ways this marriage alliance was very much in the mainstream of Ta'ifa foreign policy. It does, however, suggest that Valencia was no longer under Zaragoza's control, at least not de jure. Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was, by this marriage, treated as an equal and independent lord of Valencia, with whom Zaragoza had entered into an alliance. For Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the marriage would have been seen not only as desirable in the context of Valencia's foreign policy -he too would have been apprehensive of Alfonso's increasing influence in the middle march- but it would have also been desirable in the context of Valencia's internal politics, in that it would have added legitimacy and social standing to what was essentially the rule of a usurper.

This concession on the part of al-Mu'tamin, with its implications of his inability to force his will on Valencia politically, was probably due to the strain which the struggle between Zaragoza and Lérida was putting on the upper march's military resources. The threat from Lérida had been contained but not eliminated. In the summer of 1084 (four months prior to the marriage alliance) Lérida, this time in alliance with Aragón, had launched another campaign against Zaragoza. The combined forces of Aragón and Lérida were defeated on that occasion (14th August,

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[505] Ibn Khaqan: al-Qala'id al-'Iqyan p.184. Ibn Bassam reported a rumour that he converted because he fell in love with a Muslim concubine (jariya), whom he married.Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.458.

1084) by the Zaragoza forces led by Rodrigo Diaz.[506]

Al-Mu'tamin's reign was a short one, but he was able, at his death in 1085, to pass onto his son Ahmad, titled al-Musta'in II, a march which had survived several major crises. The achievement of al-Mu'tamin was realised partly through diplomatic means and partly through military action. In this latter, al-Mu'tamin undoubtedly benefited from having Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar and his troop of heavy cavalry in his service. It is difficult to judge, given the mythology surrounding Rodrigo Diaz, the extent to which Zaragoza's successful campaigns were particularly due to Rodrigo's military ability. Nonetheless, as his later career attested, Rodrigo was a remarkable military figure, whose ability in the field seems to have been of an especially high calibre and who perhaps was perceived as the Campeador, or the battler, even before he took over Valencia. In seeking to re-examine Rodrigo's role in the upper march during his first exile, what transpires is not so much a divergence from traditional interpretations as to his outstanding qualification as a fighter and military commander, but rather a new emphasis on the way in which he utilised his military capability primarily for the service of Zaragoza. The rulers of Zaragoza found Rodrigo's heavy cavalry a helpful addition to their forces. In the event, his outstanding ability as a military commander meant that his military service was particularly

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[506] R.Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid, p.207

valuable. However, during this period, it was clear that Rodrigo was acting neither as an independent adventurer nor as an instrument for "Christian Spanish" policy. Rather, he was acting as the man of the lord of Zaragoza. His service to Zaragoza was important, but he was only one of several instruments which the Hudids used to implement their policies.

6. 3 The Campaign For Toledo

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the capture of Toledo formed a watershed both strategically and symbolically for Castile. Symbolically, it signified the return of the Visigoths (there is at least evidence that Asturian chronicles painted the Asturians as Visigoths) to their ancient capital. Strategically, the capture of the middle march broke the back of the Muslim march defence structure. In the long run, it left the upper march too isolated and unsupported to be able to survive, and indeed the upper march fell to Aragón less than fifty years after the capture of Toledo. The capture of the middle march also represented a very deep thrust into Muslim Spain. With the exception of Zaragoza, it reduced the area which the Muslims controlled to less than the southern half of the Peninsula. The middle march gave the north a defendable gateway through which to launch their attacks, through the central Meseta against the

southern Muslim strongholds such as Seville, Cordova and Granada.

Despite the weakness inherent in the Ta'ifa system which allowed Castile and the other southern states to reverse the political situation of the previous century and place Muslim Spain under constant military and financial pressure (through the payment of Parias), the fall of Toledo cannot be understood solely through the dynamics of the political arena of the late C11 and its interplay of a more powerful north versus the divided Ta'ifas in the south. Another factor which played a very important role in the fall of Toledo was the part played by its singularly inept Muslim ruler. Al-Qadir had inherited from his grandfather an especially vibrant and even expansionist march, which could withstand (partly through military action and partly by paying Parias) the pressure from the north, and which was perceived as one of the stronger Ta'ifa states in the Peninsula. Within a ten year period, al-Qadir first allowed his authority to weaken internally and finally surrendered the whole march to his enemies.

Al-Qadir has been, naturally, portrayed in a very unsympathetic manner by later Arabic sources. His ineptitude, however, can be clearly demonstrated by examining his record. His release of the Toledan opposition, discussed in the previous chapter, and the murder of his grandfather's wazir al-Hadidi, was inept. His

flight from Toledo, and also his allowing Alfonso to reinstate him (when he could have probably moved on Toledo on his own from Cuenca once al-Mutawakkil had left the city) was singularly short-sighted. He might not have gone as far as walking before Alfonso (while the latter was mounted), treating the Castilian King as one would a Caliph when they reentered Toledo,[507] but he clearly put himself under Alfonso's authority and by so doing publicly weakened his own authority over his people. Moreover, when Alfonso's forces became cut off in the Toledan march in the winter, an episode which will be looked at below, al-Qadir failed to utilise this opportunity and strike his enemy at the moment of the latter's greatest weakness and isolation. Finally, given a new governorship in Valencia, al-Qadir managed to lose control of his new domain within a short span of time. This is not to suggest that had Toledo been ruled by a more able lord (rather like al-Qadir's grandfather) it might not have fallen before Castile's advance eventually, but one strongly suspects that its fall might have been delayed. I would therefore argue that it seems clear that al-Qadir was inept and that his ineptitude, when lord of the middle march, was one of the major factors which led to the reconquest of the march.

The other major factor which led to Castile's reconquest of Toledo was undoubtedly Alfonso's ability to

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[507] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part IV, p.162

take up an opportunity when it presented itself to him. The constant pressure on the upper march in many ways indicated that the natural way for the north to advance on Muslim Spain would have been to roll up the marches starting from Zaragoza and advancing south-west through Toledo and Badajoz. However, as Alfonso entered a Toledo weakened by a year of opportunistic rule, the morale of whose people was obviously low (else why would they complain to Alfonso about al-Qadir's shortcomings[508]) and the weakness of whose ruler was so apparent, he must have compared it to the more vibrant Toledo ruled by the able al-Ma'mun in which he took refuge during the period of his exile, and perceived an almost unimaginable opportunity.

Having witnessed Toledo's weakness, Alfonso, rather than return to Castile, chose to remain in the middle march. In return for re-instating al-Qadir, Alfonso demanded the dismantlement of certain forts and the payment of a Paria.[509] Alfonso then, it seems, refortified these castles to use as a base for attacking Toledo.[510] In effect, this placed the middle march in the grip of a vicious circle. Already weakened by a year of occupation, its foreign policy towards Valencia (and therefore Zaragoza) in disarray, the middle march was forced to weaken itself further by destroying its own defence

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508 ibid. p.163

509 ibid. pp.163-164

510 Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, pp.83-84

structure, while depleting its already depleted treasury, which led to its further weakening in a vicious circle.

Alfonso continued to apply pressure on Toledo, and seems to have decided to allow a part of his force to spend the winter of 1084/1085 in the middle march, encamped in a pleasure complex called al-Muniyya al-Musawara, originally built by al-Ma'mun. There the winter cut off the Castilian force from any supplies from Castile for nearly two months.[511] For some reason, neither al-Qadir nor any other of the Ta'ifa rulers chose to use this opportunity to attack the Castilian force, which was clearly isolated in the heart of Muslim territory. Al-Qadir's support in the city, already weak, had probably collapsed by this time. Such an assumption is supported by the fact that it appears that Toledo (whether by order from its ruler or pressure from its elders) had decided not to put up a fight against the Castilian forces. As the winter ended, they did not mount a campaign, but rather sent an embassy which lamely claimed to await relief from other Ta'ifa rulers. The scene which Ibn Bassam describes when Toledo's embassy met with an uncombed, bad-breathed, dirty-fingernailed Alfonso, was one clearly designed to convey a pathetic picture of a weakling Ta'ifa

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511. Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp.164-5 Ibn Bassam clearly indicated that he believed Alfonso to have been with the troops which were cut off. Reilly in The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI, pp.167-168, points out that charter evidence shows the Castilian monarch to have been in Leon by December 12th 1084. This would suggest that having established the camp, Alfonso moved north with the court.

surrendering to an uncivilised barbarian.[512] It also conveyed to Ibn Bassam's Almoravid audience a picture of the Ta'ifa embassies sent to Alfonso behaving in a repulsively obsequious way, thus justifying, from an "Islamic" point of view, the Almoravid invasion. Although Ibn Bassam wrote that all Ta'ifa's were represented (presumably meaning all major Ta'ifas) in the gathering giving Alfonso tribute in front of the Toledan embassy, it may be significant that he only mentions that of Ibn 'Abbad of Seville by name (the significance of this might be no more than Ibn Bassam trying to provide the Almoravids with a moral excuse for having turned against Ibn 'Abbad, their former ally who had originally invited them to cross over to the peninsula).

Al-Mutawakkil of Badajoz had clearly signalled by his retreat from Toledo three years previously that he had no further interest in the middle march. The upper march could have conceivably launched an attack on Toledan territory, but, with its pre-occupation with internal strife, especially given the recent accession of al-Musta'in II and the pressure it faced from Aragón and Barcelona, was unlikely to do so. Conceivably the only major military force left was that of the Bani 'Abbad who by then controlled Seville and Granada. However, the

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[512] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.166 Alfonso, according to Ibn Bassam, was with his force at the end of the winter. This seems to fit in with the available charter evidence. Reilly The Kingdom of León-Castilla Under King Alfonso VI, pp.169-170, which shows him to have rejoined them.

presence of an embassy from them at Alfonso's headquarters symbolised for the Toledan elders present the futility of expecting relief from other Ta'ifa states. The elders (and it is highly significant that it was they and not al-Qadir who were conducting the negotiations, which suggests a breakdown of al-Qadir's authority over Toledo during the winter) decided to surrender the city, which Alfonso entered three days later on 25th May, 1085. Ibn Bassam spoke to a witness who claimed to have seen al-Qadir after the surrender of Toledo engaged in calculating the astrologically most opportune time for him to travel amid the derision of the Christians.[513] Alfonso then symbolically engaged in converting the main Mosque of Toledo into a church, in Rabi' al-Awal (27 June - 26 July)[514] of that year.

Alfonso's strategy appears to have been, once Toledo was secured, to turn his attentions to the upper march. In doing so, he employed a strategy which was tried and tested by the Bani dhi al-Nunids in their diplomacy against the upper march; Alfonso first turned his attention to Valencia.

Although, the Bani Hud had managed to salvage their relationship with Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in Valencia through the marriage alliance negotiated by Ibn Hasdai,

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[513] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, p.167

[514] ibid. p.168

the dependability of that alliance rested on several factors, among which was the ability of the usurper Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz to maintain power in Valencia. The authority of the lords of Valencia seems to have been weaker in general than that of the march Ta'ifas. Moreover, Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's reign, from the time he declared independence from Toledo, was relatively short, lasting only ten years. His death in June, 1085, while Alfonso was consolidating his position in Toledo, seems to have led to a succession crisis.[515] This was resolved in favour of his son 'Uthman who succeeded his father on 9th Safar 478/6 June, 1085.[516] It is perhaps a sign of Zaragoza's internal pre-occupations that there is no mention of their interference to support either faction, although this may be because the disagreement between the two brothers was resolved fairly quickly.

The traditional view supported by Muslim sources is that al-Qadir in surrendering Toledo to Alfonso was promised Valencia in return. Such an agreement would not have been unprecedented in Ta'ifa politics. 'Aziz Ibn Ishaq al-Barzali seems to have offered Carmona to the Banidhi al-Nunids in return for a safer domain and was given the fortified city of al-Mudawwar[517] to rule within the

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[515] ibid. Part III, p.93

[516] Anon: Fragment B, Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.3, p.304.

[517] Ibn al-Khatib: A'mal al A'lam, p.273

Toledan A'mal. Ibn Bassam, when discussing the fall of Valencia, states that Alfonso had reached an agreement with the deposed al-Qadir to "return" Valencia to him, in return for al-Qadir having allowed Alfonso to take Toledo, between the fall of Toledo and the death of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz.[518] One assumes that the use of the term "return to him" (yu'idu lahu) in reference to Valencia referred to the fact that Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was meant to be ruling Valencia in the name of the Bani dhi al-Nunids and had broken off from the Toledan sphere of influence.

However, this story should be treated with some caution. Ibn Bassam's book which contains the earliest surviving account of the incident was written twenty five to thirty years after the fall of Toledo, although he clearly had access to several eyewitnesses of some of the major events of the last quarter of the century. Nonetheless, the time gap between the fall of Toledo (25 May) and the death of Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz (4th June) mentioned in the above paragraph was only 9 days, hardly enough time to hatch strategic plots, so that the timing of such a deal as that, put forward by Ibn Bassam seems improbable. This leaves open the possibility that such a deal was struck prior to Alfonso's entering Toledo, but the account seems to confuse al-Qadir's pressure on Valencia when he was in Cuenca (during the rule of al-Mutawakkil in Toledo) at a time when he owed Alfonso no

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[518] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.93

favours, and his advance on Valencia after the fall of Toledo to Alfonso. Finally, in part IV of al-Dhakhira, Ibn Bassam, when describing the embassy of Toledan elders to Alfonso and their capitulation, makes no mention of such a deal.[519] Indeed, the tone of that last paragraph seems to suggest that the negotiations were more between the elders of Toledo (who had forced al-Qadir out of the city earlier and presumably remained powerful even after his return with the help of Alfonso) and Alfonso rather than between the latter and
al-Qadir.

Alfonso did use al-Qadir to gain control of Valencia soon after the fall of Toledo, but it may be that it was an arrangement arrived at after the fall of Toledo when Alfonso considered what action he might take with its deposed ruler (whom he himself had placed back in power earlier) rather than a bargain struck before the fall of the city. For those looking back at that episode (even a few years later) and having seen al-Qadir installed in Valencia by the man who deposed him from Toledo, the logic for assuming that such a deal was struck must have been very compelling.

The anonymous author of the history of Valencia (published as Fragment B at the end of Ibn 'Idhari's al-Bayan) mentions that 'Uthman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz ruled for

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[519] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part IV, pp.165-167

nine months,[520] that is until February, 1086. It is then that the "people" of Valencia must have realised that al-Qadir was advancing on their city with a Castilian force led by Alvar Fáñez.[521] Fearing the wrath of Alfonso, they deposed 'Uthman Ibn 'Abd Al-'Aziz.[522] The episode demonstrated both the power of the "people" of Valencia, to effectively elect to change allegiance to an invading lord and oust their ruler, and the lack of support for the new dynasty in the city. As al-Qadir entered Valencia with the support and protection of Alvar Fáñez, Alfonso had succeeded not only in regaining the ancient Visigothic capital of Spain and with it control of the middle march, but he also managed to install a puppet regime in Valencia thus cutting Zaragoza off from the south. The upper march was therefore by the beginning of 1086 totally surrounded by hostile forces. The diplomatic efforts of the Bani Hud to play off their enemies one against the other while attempting to keep open their lines southwards were dashed,

Alfonso then moved to deliver what he must have hoped would be the <u>coup de grace</u> against the upper march and launched a campaign against Zaragoza. However, while Alfonso was besieging the city, news arrived of the landing of the Almoravids in the south and their alliance with the southern Ta'ifas. Realising that the greatest threat to him

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[520] Anon: Fragment B; Ibn Idhari:<u>al-Bayan</u>, Vol.3, p.304

[521] Ibn al-Kardabus: <u>Tarikh al-Andalus</u> p.84 (although he puts the date at 1085)

[522] Anon: Fragment B; Ibn 'Idhari:<u>Al-Bayan</u>, Vol 3, p.304.

came from the new Berber invasion, Alfonso lifted his siege and moved southwards, giving Zaragoza badly needed breathing space.[523]

The arrival of the Almoravids changed the dynamics of politics in the Peninsula. They were to contain Alfonso's advance and helped save Zaragoza from being captured both in the immediate sense (the lifting of Alfonso's siege) and in the longer term, by engaging Castile's resources in a protracted confrontation and diverting them away from the upper march for the following quarter of a century.

6. 4 The Advent of the Almoravids

It is not clear whether the dynamics of Ta'ifa politics would have allowed for a unity to be effected either by one Ta'ifa, in essence, taking over the others, or by a form of a grand coalition; a united front capable of withstanding the Castilian onslaught. Judging by the Ta'ifa's reaction to both Barbastro and Toledo, this latter appears unlikely.

The fall of Toledo did, however, stress for the lords of the Ta'ifas the extent of their predicament. The fall of the central march was in itself a major setback,

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[523] Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus p.84; Also Alfonso X: Primera Crónica General pp.556-557: Also Ibn Khaldun, al-Tarikh, vol.IV, p.382

but it also must have appeared as if it were the beginning of an unthinkable disaster; namely the takeover of all Muslim Spain by Castile. One can argue that such a fear could only have been formulated with hindsight once the Christian advance became clearly entrenched. However, the well known story attributing to Ibn 'Abbad of Seville the statement that he would rather be a camel-herd than a swine-herd- i.e. that he preferred subjugation by the Berbers to subjugation by Castile- when he wrote to invite Yusuf Ibn Tashfin to cross to Muslim Spain, implies that such a concept had entered Spanish Muslim consciousness by the last quarter of the century.[524] The decision of the Ta'ifas, led by the Bani 'Abbad of Seville, to send embassies to the Almoravids asking for help underlined this shift. The Ta'ifa lords, and in particular, the Bani 'Abbad, had previously viewed the Almoravids as a possible threat to be guarded against.[525] The attitude of those

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[524] Ibn Khallikan: Wafayat al-A'yan, section on Yusuf Ibn Tashfin quoted as appendix 1, Ibn Idhari, Al-Bayan, vol.4, p.114. This short summary of the reasons leading up to the involvement of Ibn Tashfin in Muslim Spain was clearly written with hindsight, and forms a very good historical analysis, but sees the Ta'ifas as being pincered between the Christians in the north (al-Ifranj) and the Almoravids in the south (p.112). His source was a book titled Al-Mughrib 'an Sirat Muluk al-Maghrib, by an unknown author and written in 599/20 September 1202- 9 September 1203 in Iraq (p.111). Presumably, that author used other earlier sources, and the story certainly seemed to have been in circulation in north Africa, for it was quoted by Ibn al-Khatib A'mal al-A'lam, p.281. As to why Ibn Bassam does not relate such a quote, it is probably because he viewed it as critical of his main audience, the Almoravids.

[525] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part II, p.40. Al-Mu'tadid, al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad's father, on hearing of the rise of the Almoravids in north Africa ordered that Gibraltar be fortified on the seaward side.

Ta'ifa lords, not of Berber origin, to the Almoravids was also not helped by their general suspicion of Berbers, especially as the fitna and collapse of the Caliphate seems to have been viewed as a Berber-induced catastrophe. In other words, by calling on the Almoravids for help, the lords of the Ta'ifa must have realised that they were, giving up some, if not all, of their power. They probably hoped that they would be allowed to continue to hold office within an Almoravid hegemony. Nonetheless, the fall of Toledo seems to have alerted them to the fact that they had little choice, as the issue began to take on Muslim/Christian connotation rather than those of inter-Ta'ifa conflict. This was not because the Ta'ifas suddenly became aware of a "Christian" identity to the Castilian campaign which was different from what they had seen up to 1085 but simply that the possible outcome of the continual inability to withstand Castilian military pressure in the wake of the fall of Toledo forced such a perspective, since that advance threatened to wipe out Muslim power from the Peninsula altogether.

One of the interesting aspects of the Almoravid invasion of Spain was the importance of finding a legitimate framework for their interference in Spanish Muslim affairs. Not only were they invited to cross and aid the Spanish Muslims by the Ta'ifas themselves, they also had the added legitimacy derived from their

acknowledgment of the 'Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad.[526] With the collapse of Umayyad hegemony in Spain the 'Abbasids had a valid claim for allegiance from the Peninsula (the only rival Caliphate remaining being the Shi'ite Fatimids of Egypt). In some ways the eventual occupation of Spain by Almoravids could be seen as the final victory in the 'Abbasid campaign against the Umayyads which had started with the 'Abbasid rebellion over three centuries previously.

Although the Almoravids may have been perceived as a threat by some of the Ta'ifas prior to the fall of Toledo, it seems unlikely that they would have been able to launch a concentrated campaign against the Iberian Peninsula prior to the mid 1080's. Not only was Yusuf Ibn Tashfin engaged in consolidating his own power base within the movement (there was at least one, half-hearted, attempt to wrest it away from him[527]), but he was also concentrating on extending the power of the Almoravids in north Africa. Indeed, the first crossing seems very much to have had the mark of an reconnaissance trip in which Yusuf assessed the military situation in the peninsula, including, probably, the power base (both military and political) of the Ta'ifas. His advantage over them was

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[526] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan Vol. 4, p.28. See also M.'Abd al-Jalil 'Kaifa Sa'ada al-Fuqaha' al-Andalusiyyun Yusuf ibn Tashfin 'ala Khal' Muluk al-Tawa'if', Actas del IV Coloquio Hispano-Tunecino, ed.M.Marin, pp.7-24.

[527] Ibn 'Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.4, pp.29-30

not simply a superior and motivated military force, with a wealth of combat experience, but also the fact that, aside from those Ta'ifa rulers who acknowledged Baghdad, he could claim greater legitimacy (as a representative of the 'Abbasids) than the Ta'ifas.

It is interesting, although perhaps not altogether surprising, that the Bani Hud did not seem to be represented among those who welcomed Yusuf on his first crossing to the Peninsula.[528] It was a reasonable enough excuse that they were besieged in Zaragoza. However, even after Alfonso lifted his siege, they do not appear to have tried to join the force of the Almoravid/Ta'ifa alliance assembling in the south. Indeed, for the following ten years, the attitude of the Bani Hud to the Almoravid/Castilian conflict seems to have been one of non-involvement. Nor, it seems, did Rodrigo Diaz become involved in this conflict.

When Alvar Fáñez, with his troops in Valencia shoring up the al-Qadir's regime, heard of Alfonso's move south to meet the Berber threat, he left the city to join his King[529] and made it in time to join the Castilian forces before the engagement at Zallaqa. This last point is mentioned merely to show that it was logistically possible for a military force from the north to make it to

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[528] Anon: Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya, p.67

[529] Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p.92.

the lower march in time for the confrontation, and that while the absence of both the Bani Hud and of Rodrigo Diaz from the battle, could be seen as partly due to their concentration on bolstering up the defences of the upper march following the lifting of Castile's siege of Zaragoza, it surely was also as a sign of their choosing not to join the conflict. Having said that, Alvar Fanez's route would have been more direct than that of the Bani Hud, as he only had to travel west to meet the remainder of Alfonso's army in the middle march before the march south. Nonetheless, one can not but feel that if either Rodrigo or the Bani Hud had seriously intended to join either side, getting to the lower march in time for the battle would not have proved a serious logistical problem.

One of the earliest extant Muslim description of Zallaqa is in a letter written by Ibn al-Qusayra, an ambassador of the Bani 'Abbad to the Almoravids, in which he describes the battle. This was written on the morning of the next day, Saturday, and is partly quoted by Ibn Bassam.[530] In essence, it describes, how after appeals for assistance from the Bani 'Abbad, carried to him by the letter's author, Yusuf crossed over and met with the forces of the Ta'ifas at Badajoz. They then decided to move towards Coria, and were intercepted by Alfonso. After an initial engagement Yusuf, leading the Almoravids, joined the fray in earnest and the Christians were defeated

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[530] Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part II, pp.241-244

with few casualties on the Muslim side. For the rest of that day and the following night, the Muslims engaged in mopping-up operations. The author was unsure whether Alfonso had fallen in battle or not. This version of events is echoed by other Muslim sources, although the first Muslim contingent to clash with the Castilian army in battle is identified as that of Seville under al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad.[531]

Ibn al-Kardabus, writing in the second half of the C12 and away from the influence of the Almoravids also described the battle. He, however, records that Alfonso first clashed with al-Mu'tamid and his Sevillian forces who acquitted themselves well. Rather than coming to al-Mu'tamid's immediate relief, Yusuf is quoted as saying "leave them a while to death, for both parties are enemies". [532] Whether this was a later embellishment or a genuine quote, Yusuf's actions in the peninsula very clearly demonstrated that his primary aim was to conquer a new domain for his movement, and not, as later Almoravid propaganda liked to suggest, to selflessly defend a Muslim province against Christian invasion. Zallaqa convincingly halted the southern advance of Castile and as the Almoravids gradually occupied most of the remaining Ta'ifa territory, the dynamics of the conflict changed into one

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[531] For a fuller description of the battle and the days leading up to it see the description in al-Rawd al-Mi'tar published as Appendix 2, Ibn Idhari: Al-Bayan, Vol.4, pp.130-140.

[532] Ibn al-Kardabus: Tarikh al-Andalus, p.94.

between two centralised powers with efficient military machines. The only exception to this shift to a confrontation between two large powers in the last fifteen years of the century was the upper march and its southern anchor, Valencia.

Part II

6.5 An Active Policy of Non-Involvement.

The period immediately following the defeat of the Castilian forces at Zallaqa was one of uncertainty, not only for Castile, but also for the Ta'ifas. The Almoravids, under the command of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin chose not to press their advantage further, choosing instead to return to north Africa. A cynical interpretation of their actions would be that having seen the state of the Ta'ifa kingdoms, they decided to leave them without further aid to increase their weakness, in the hope of finding them an easier prey to conquer later. One can certainly see a pattern where Almoravid aid always seemed to come too late to save a Ta'ifa under threat, but just in time to establish their own power (although arguably, this tactic failed in the case of Toledo, which they were unable to reconquer). An example of such Almoravid tactics will be looked at when discussing the seige of Valencia. The Ta'ifas who had cooperated with the Almoravids were left in a situation where they felt more secure in relation to the northern threat, but as the force of Castile was simply halted and not actively pushed back beyond the middle march, their strategic position remained perilous. For Zaragoza, the situation remained a dangerous one with Alfonso still in command of Toledo and in control of

Valencia under al-Qadir. It was at this juncture that Rodrigo chose to leave Zaragozan service and return to Castile. Whatever the motivation behind this move, the honeymoon with Alfonso was to be a short one.

The Almoravids returned to the peninsula, clearly intent this second time on securing control over some of the Ta'ifa kingdoms, and engaged once more with the forces of Castile in a minor skirmish at Aledo in June 1089. Once again, there is no mention of Zaragoza among those welcoming the Almoravids on their second crossing.[533] The Zaragozan forces were notable by their absence from this engagement and so was Rodrigo Diaz. Menéndez Pidal's defence of Rodrigo and his explanation as to why he failed to join Alfonso's forces on the expedition to relieve the siege was, to say the least, improbable.[534] Alfonso once again fell out with Rodrigo. The latter once again left the service of Castile and turned towards the upper march.

Al-Musta'in II in the period immediately following the defeat of the Christians at Zallaqa, found that the pressure on the upper march had abated to some

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[533] Anon: al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya. Appendix 3 Ibn Idhari:al-Bayan, Vol.4, pp.141-3

[534] The argument is put forward that Rodrigo did come to Aledo, but failed to meet up with Alfonso's forces. Menéndez Pidal: La España del Cid pp.257-9. Huici Miranda did not accept those arguments:Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región, Vol.2, pp.19-20.

degree. With hindsight, one can perhaps deduce that the withdrawal of the Almoravids following their victory was partly because the expedition, from their point of view was to some degree one of reconnaissance. One can further speculate that their reasons for not pressing their advantage had something to do with Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's ambition to take over as much of Muslim Spain as possible so that part of what he hoped to do was to exert enough force to halt the Castilian advance but at the same time leave the Ta'ifa lords weak enough to be in constant need of Almoravid aid. This, however, is speculation although it is based on the history of the Almoravid movement's involvement in Muslim Spain as it was to develop in the last two decades of the century. Al-Musta'in II, could probably guess at Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's motivation, but he could not possibly judge the full extent of the latter's ambition in the peninsula.

Zaragoza's distance from the south, in some ways a source of weakness when it came to confronting the Christian north, afforded al-Musta'in II the option not to form an immediate policy vis-a-vis the Almoravids. He could speculate as to the reasons for their return to north Africa following Zallaqa; he undoubtedly felt relief that they did so, but he could choose to ignore them. If they returned to the peninsula and started moving north in a way which he perceived to be threatening, he would have time enough to face that threat by the time they neared his

domain. The lords of the southern Ta'ifas, on the other hand, had no such option. When Yusuf returned on his second crossing in the campaign against Aledo, they had to make the choice of either meeting him and joining his force, and thus in some way accepting that his authority was expanding over the peninsula, or refusing to meet him and thus leaving themselves open to his wrath and to allegations that they were not committed to fighting the Christians. In fact, neither option offered any protection from the expansionist Almoravids. Abdullah Ibn Ziri of Granada, a kinsman of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, suffered the same fate as that of Ibn 'Abbad of Seville who had originally invited the Almoravids as well as that of minor lords who had accepted their authority. They all lost their city-states in time. Al-Musta'in II, on the other hand chose simply neither to welcome Yusuf on his second crossing nor to join the campaign; nor does it seem did he chose openly to speak out against them.

For Zaragoza, the advent of the Almoravids and their defeat of Alfonso VI diverted Castile's attention away from the upper march at a time when, with Toledo under their control and Valencia owing allegiance to them, the march was completely surrounded and vulnerable. This afforded the march some breathing space. Zaragoza, under al-Musta'in II, did not possess the military and economic resources to mount a campaign against Castile or even Toledo. Nor apparently did it have the more limited

resources needed to repeat the successful campaign against Valencia to wrench it into its own sphere of control. Al-Musta'in II therefore concentrated on consolidating his power within the march.

At the same time, the defeat of Alfonso VI and his preoccupation with the Almoravids sent a different signal to other northern Christian powers, including Aragón and Barcelona.. They saw this as an opportunity to reassert their claims over the upper march. Aragón in particular which had in the course of the C11 viewed the upper march as rightfully forming part of its area of influence, had witnessed its old rival Castile almost take this prize from it. The defeat of Castile at Zallaqa and the implication of Castilian weakening which this defeat signified, however, allowed Aragón to resume its old ambitions in the upper march. In 1087 Sancho Ramírez I took Estuda and followed it up two years later by taking Monzon[535] (where the besieged population of Barbastro had fled after its fall). Aragón was therefore driving a wedge through the middle of the upper march in an attempt to consolidate its southern thrust. In the same year 1089, Sancho Ramírez built a fortress, el-Castellar, to keep up the pressure against Zaragoza itself.[536] That Al-Musta'in II could not stop this advance or indeed hinder the building of al-Castellar was a sign of Zaragoza's

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[535] C.J. Bishko: The Spanish & Portuguese Conquest p.403.

[536] ibid.

increasing weakness and its inability to mount a convincing defense against the north. Part of the reason for Zaragoza's weakness was that the march remained split with al-Musta'in's uncle, al-Mudhaffar, holding out in Lérida. By 1091, both Zaragoza and Lérida were forced to pay tribute to Count Armengol IV of Urgel.[537]

At the same time, Rodrigo Diaz had also, for reasons of his own, not been involved in Castile's great forays against the Almoravids. His disagreement with Alfonso VI persisted and he again went into exile. This exile, after the battle for Aledo, was different for Rodrigo Diaz from earlier ones. This was partly because the Almoravids had entered into the political arena of Muslim Spain. However, part of the difference lay in the apparent weakening of the political power of the upper march. While one is reluctant to see Rodrigo being treated as an equal by al-Musta'in II, their relationship in this later exile was somewhat different from that of his first exile. In the first exile, while Rodrigo seems to have acted as the commander of several Zaragozan expeditions, he and his men seem to have formed part of a Zaragozan force made up in part of Muslims of the upper march. He, however, was clearly acting then as Zaragoza's man. The tone of both Muslim and Christian sources suggest that by the last decade of the C11, Rodrigo's force consisted

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[537] G.Zurita Y Castro: Anales de la Corona de Aragón, p.125.

entirely of Christian followers.[538] While he seems to have continued to act in accordance with the interests of the upper march, the tone of the texts suggests a change in the way in which his relationship with Zaragoza was perceived. This change seems to be related to the fact that he appears to have had more independence in his actions culminating in his ability to occupy and maintain his own city-state.

6. 6 The Founding of the Last Ta'ifa.

The advent of Rodrigo's heavy cavalry to the upper march gave al-Musta'in II the opportunity to again direct his attention south towards Valencia. While Alfonso VI had been subdued to an extent by the defeat at Zallaqa, al-Musta'in II must have been aware that any respite which the upper march received was in danger of being temporary. Zaragoza remained locked in a strategic vice with its only outlet being east along the Ebro valley to Tortosa and the sea. Al-Musta'in II needed to reopen his lines south as a means of countering the pressures from the north and from Castile. He would have also been aware that the Castilian force under Fáñez sent to bolster al-Qadir were withdrawn prior to Aledo which gave him a window of opportunity to try to shift Valencia back into Zaragoza's political sphere

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[538] Ibn al-Kardabus in his book records that in his final siege of Valencia, the Cid's band was joined by Muslim renegades, many of whom had renounced Islam. Tarikh al-Andalus,p.103. However, it is clear that these renegades were not part of a Zaragozan force, but formed part of the Cid's independent troops.

either by treaty or by force if need be.

Furthermore, the political uncertainty in the south increased the strategic importance of Valencia to the upper march. Al-Musta'in II might not have realised the full extent of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's expansionist ambitions, but he would have been at least suspicious of the new Berber influx into the peninsula, especially if one considers that Ibn Hayyan's view of the fitna being the fault of the Berbers (which was discussed earlier) reflected to some degree a wider consensus among Spanish Muslims on the subject. Valencia therefore came to represent in Zaragozan political thought not only a potential anchor against the north (which was the traditional way in which the upper march viewed its southern neighbour) but also a potential buffer against any possible danger from the south. Al-Musta'in II might have chosen to pursue a policy of non involvement, but if he could secure Valencia, either directly or indirectly, by having it placed in friendly hands, he would have established for the upper march what in modern military terminology might be called an early warning system and a line of first defence against any possible Almoravid attack.

With this Zaragozan political perspective in mind, one can turn to Ibn Bassam's description of the events leading to the campaign against Valencia:

> And when Ahmad bin Yusuf bin Hud, who rules to this day the march of Zaragoza, felt the armies of the Emir of the Muslims coming from every quarter...he lionised a dog from

> among the Galecians named Roderic and called the Campeador....and it was the banu Hud who in the past had revived him from his slumber...and directed him at the states of the peninsula...and this man among them [i. e. al-Musta'in II] thought fit, when he was frightened of the demise of his rule and felt the ending of his line, to put him [i.e. Rodrigo] between himself and the armies of the Emir of the Muslims and so made easy for him (watta'a lahu) the land of Valencia and gathered money for him.[539]

Clearly Ibn Bassam was writing for an audience which was antagonistic to the Hudids and his language (abusive about Rodrigo, dismissive about al-Musta'in II) betrays his political stance, yet one can see that for a near-contemporary audience there was at least one view that saw the campaign against Valencia as part of a Zaragozan foreign policy which was aimed at creating a buffer against the advance of the Almoravids. If one then looks at the earlier Zaragozan foreign policy and the Hudids' use of Rodrigo in implementing it, one can arrive at the conclusion that such an interpretation also fitted a Zaragozan perspective of march politics and suited the military and strategic purposes of the upper march.

What Ibn Bassam fails to mention at this juncture was that the Hudids were by the early 1090's trying to build bridges with the Almoravids. Al-Musta'in II seems to have moved away from his original policy of non-alignment and was trying to negotiate with Yusuf an agreement similar in principal to the agreements reached between the upper march and the Caliphate in which the upper march

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[539] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, pp.94-95.

acknowledged the central authority but in return for acting as a bulwark against the north was allowed to maintain its autonomy.[540] However, any such agreement was short-lived. In a letter replying to correspondence from al-Musta'in,[541] Abu Bakr Ibn Abu Marwan (a Cordovan civil servant working for the Almoravids) claimed that al-Musta'in II had reneged time and time again on his original promises and further asserted that had al-Musta'in II been able to defend the march he would have some support to his argument (this no doubt being a dig at the loss of certain forts to Aragón). The letter goes on to say that Yusuf was not interested in personal power but in the defence of Islam. What the letter implies is a breakdown in negotiations between the upper march and the Almoravids (carried it seems via the Cordovan civil service) and reasserts in no uncertain terms Yusuf's claim to the region for the defense of Islam. One could therefore argue that having seen the growing power of the Almoravids in the peninsula, al-Musta'in II at first tried to negotiate with them. However, given the tone of this later letter, he would have become keenly aware that the Almoravids did not seem interested in reaching an accommodation with him. This would have made the issue of Valencia and its importance as a buffer against the south all the more urgent for Zaragoza.

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[540] Anon: Al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya; Appendix 3 in Ibn Idhari: al-Bayan, Vol.4, pp.144-145.

[541] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira Part II, pp.545-548.

Moreover, the failure to reach an accommodation with the Almoravids was not the only factor which made the securing of Valencia a matter of urgency and importance in Zaragozan foreign policy. If the strategic importance of Valencia to the upper march was apparent to the lord of Zaragoza, it was no less apparent to the enemies of the upper march. There seems to have been at least one attack on Valencia by al-Mundhir.[542] This attack was repulsed by Rodrigo as was the attempt on Valencia by the Count of Barcelona[543] In a sense, by intervening to protect Valencia against such attacks, Zaragoza was declaring that it had an interest in the city; one which it was willing to fight to protect. The tone of the various sources suggests that the forces of Zaragoza, represented by Rodrigo, not only protected Valencia from the attentions of non Zaragozan parties, but also sought to maintain a constant pressure on the city, either to weaken it as a prelude for a takeover or in an attempt to force it into Zaragoza's camp. Indeed, the anonymous author of al-Hulal al-Mawshiyya attributes Yusuf's second crossing to the peninsula in part to the continuous harassment by Rodrigo of the city.[544] What brought the crisis to a head, however, was al-Qadir's inability to govern his new city-

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[542] Alfonso X: Primera Crónica General p.559; the chronicle identifies the attacker as the king of Tortosa and Denia. However, Tortosa seems to have been within the A'mal of Zaragoza and the reference is probably to al-Mundhir of Lerida.

[543] ibid p.561.

[544] Anon: al-Hulal al- Mawshiyya, p.81.

state and the coup against him by the judge Ibn Jihaf.

The catalyst for the rebellion against al-Qadir seems to have been that he instigated unspecified changes in customary laws (Ahkam) which led to resentment, one presumes on the part of the "people" or the influential element in Valencian society, against the new ruler. There was also an element of disquiet about his allegiance to Alfonso VI and a fear that al-Qadir might hand over Valencia to him as he had handed over Toledo.[545] No doubt such grievance and resentment could find expression more freely once the force of Castilian cavalry which had propped up the regime of al-Qadir had left the city. Finally, there was an element of a carry-over of Toledan politics and grievances finding expression in the Valencian political arena. Presumably, al-Qadir was accompanied on his transfer to Valencia by an element of the Toledan influential class who must have carried with them the remnants of Toledan factional politics. Ibn Jihaf might have represented the "people" of Valencia, but al-Qadir was assassinated on the night of the coup on 23rd Ramadan 485/-27 October 1092[546] by a member of the Toledan al-Hadidi clan, seeking revenge over the death of the wazir al-Hadidi[547] who was killed by the al-Qadir when he had first assumed power. It is ironic that this first of al-Qadir's blunders would come to haunt him at the end of his

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[545] Anon:Fragment B; Ibn Idhari: Al-Bayan Vol. 3, p.305.

[546] ibid.

[547] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.96.

life.

The rebellion of Ibn Jihaf, or rather his coup, against al-Qadir had another dimension. It was conducted with the assistance of a troop of Almoravid horse, seemingly sent to Valencia for this purpose.[548] The presence of this troop had two implications. First, it lent legitimacy to the rebellion since it would appear that Ibn Jihaf was acting on behalf of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin. It is interesting to note that even during the last part of the century, when political power was very fluid and when no clear central authority existed, it was still important for Spanish Muslims to cling to references of legal authority for their framework of political power. Yusuf himself claimed that he represented the 'Abbasid Caliph, and in the more local context of Valencia, Ibn Jihaf represented not so much a rebellious populace, but the authority of Yusuf and therefore by extension of the 'Abbasids. Secondly, the presence of the Almoravid horse made it clear that the coup had wrenched Valencia from the Castilian sphere of influence and placed it with the Almoravid political sphere. This was a blow directed partly against Castile,

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[548] ibid. pp.96-97. Ibn al-Khatib:A'mal al-A'lam p.234 names the commander of this troop as Ibn 'A'isha, who was of Valencian origin and who figures in the later Almoravid involvement in Valencian affairs. Huici Miranda accepted Menéndez Pidal's argument that the Cid saw al-Qadir as the legitimate ruler of Valencia Historia Musulmana de Valencia y su Región, vol.1, p.261. He believed that al-Qadir wrote to the Cid asking for aid. Vol.2, p.52. This seems to be based on the Primera Crónica General. However, Ibn Bassam, whose friend Ibn Tahir was in Valencia at the time, makes no mention of such an appeal, and on balance, it seems like a later addition, and rightly forms part of the myth of the Cid.

but was also an aggressive move against Zaragoza, since it denied Zaragoza the chance to secure Valencia.

Ibn Jihaf, however, appears to have been as incompetent a ruler as al-Qadir, and the Almoravid troop soon left him[549] It is not clear why they did so. Nonetheless, this withdrawal fits within a wider pattern of Almoravid political behaviour in the peninsula. Like Yusuf's first campaign, this limited involvement served to weaken Castile's grip on Valencia, but the Almoravids chose not to remain long enough to allow Ibn Jihaf to consolidate his power base in the city-state. One can conjecture that they hoped to leave him weak enough to allow them to physically take control of the city at a later date with minimal resistance from the "people" of Valencia.

The deposing of al-Qadir and the involvement of the Almoravids in the coup led to an intensification of political activity in the region. Alfonso VI, having seen Valencia thus slip out of his control seems to have launched a campaign after the Almoravid cavalry had left, aiming to bring Valencia back within Castile's sphere again. In the meantime, Zaragoza acted to stop him from again establishing a cordon around the upper march. While Alfonso VI was besieging Valencia, Rodrigo Diaz conducted a campaign against Castile itself forcing Alfonso to lift his siege and return to defend his own domain. Ibn al-Kardabus mistakenly places this campaign while al-Qadir

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[549] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III,p.97.

was still in power:

> And when Alfonso advanced on Valencia, the Campeador was angered, for he was preparing its submission to him, with al-Qadir acting as his agent (_'Amilahu_),and so he gathered a force and attacked Castile, where he burnt and destroyed. This was the main reason why Alfonso's army lifted the siege from Valencia.[550]

Despite Ibn al-Kardabus' apparent mistake as to the timing of the siege of Valencia and Rodrigo's actions to lift it, it is clear that his actions were perceived to be directed against Alfonso and to protect the Cid's own plans for controlling the city. Interestingly, the Menéndez Pidal school of thought would point out that Rodrigo never acted against Castile and in particular against Alfonso VI directly. This incident, however, is an example of such direct action. It was accepted military conduct that to relieve a besieged city one either attacked the besiegers or their domain thus forcing them to lift the siege and return to defend their own territory. In this action, Rodrigo clearly intended to harm and succeeded in harming Castile's policy in the east of the peninsula and in so doing was acting in the best interests of Zaragoza. Once the Castilian siege was lifted, Rodrigo intensified his campaign against Valencia for the best part of two years, now clearly intent on outright conquest.[551]

Ibn al-Kardabus records that Rodrigo's campaign against Valencia lasted for twenty months. This seems to

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[550] Ibn al-Kardabus: _Tarikh al-Andalus_, pp.99-100.

[551] ibid. p.103.

agree with a contemporary account by Ibn 'Alqama who records that Rodrigo resumed his campaign against Valencia in 486/1 February 1093-21 January 1094. It is now accepted that part of the reason for such a long siege was that Rodrigo was not interested in taking the town by force and sacking it in the manner of the campaign for Barbastro. Rather, he aimed to take it over as a "going concern", which meant that he wanted to force his will on its people without damaging the infra-structure of the town or of the surrounding A'mal. Nor did he want the population to leave. The main reason behind such a strategy was that he wanted to establish himself as ruler of a populated and wealthy city-state; in other words, he was establishing himself as a ruler of a new "Ta'ifa". The concept of a Christian lord ruling a Muslim city-state would have been novel, to say the least, and the "people" of Valencia were not willing to comply, despite Rodrigo's close association with Zaragoza.

Rodrigo's strategy was to lay a complete and tight siege around the city cutting it off from its surrounding province and from the rest of Muslim Spain in an attempt to force the city to its knees through economic hardship. One interesting aspect about this campaign was that Rodrigo did not conduct it under the banner of political expediency, but rather he followed the convention of Muslim Spain in the C11 and found a legally acceptable reason (or at least a legally passable excuse) for launching a concentrated attack on the city itself.

Ibn 'Alqama, whose contemporary account or history of Valencia is lost except for fragments quoted by other sources, records that when Rodrigo left the area of Valencia in Sha'ban 485/6 September-4 October 1092, he left in Valencia some supplies and the city, it seems, also owed him the payment of a Paria.[552] When he returned to the city once Ibn Jihaf had conducted his coup he demanded the return of supplies and the payment of monies owed.

There are some interesting differences between the account given by Ibn 'Alqama and quoted by Ibn 'Idhari and the account given by Ibn Bassam, who had access to the eyewitness account of his friend Ibn Tahir who also lived through the siege and the occupation by Rodrigo. The account in al-Bayan records that after Rodrigo demanded his stores and money, he increased the pressure on Ibn Jihaf, who, confident of the Almoravid support, did not comply. Rodrigo even apparently threatened to avenge the death of al-Qadir. The source then suggests that Rodrigo changed tack, promising support if Ibn Jihaf expelled the Almoravid force. These exchanges are not mentioned by Ibn Bassam. More significantly, al-Bayan records that following appeals from Valencia an army from the Almoravids led by Abu Bakr ben Ibrahim did try to relieve the city, but for some reason retreated.[553] Ibn Bassam, writing earlier and for an Almoravid audience records no such

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552 Ibn 'Alqama;quoted by Ibn Idhari:Al Bayan, Vol.4, p.31.

553 ibid p.33.

attempt. In fact he tries to make excuses for Yusuf's inability to relieve the city because of its distance and the lack of resources.[554] The most likely explanation for the difference between the two sources is that Ibn 'Idhari starts the section on Valencia by quoting the contemporary account of Ibn 'Alqama, then shifts to another later account which refers to the later Almoravid attempt to retake the city from Rodrigo after his occupation and mistakenly attributes that attempt to the time when Rodrigo was still laying siege to the city, although the second Almoravid campaign against Valencia is recorded by Ibn 'Idhari in some detail a few pages later.

If one accepts that Ibn Bassam's account is the more accurate one, one could construct an argument which places the Almoravid refusal to help within the wider pattern of their policy of minimal interference whereby the ultimate aim of their limited help was to take over the distressed provinces themselves. (A similar case is that of Majorca, which suffered a ten-month siege by the Count of Barcelona, but despite repeated calls for help by its ruler Mubashsher, Yusuf's relief managed to arrive after the island had fallen,[555] so that the ensuing liberation did not give Majorca back to its ruler, but placed it within Almoravid control).

Both accounts agree as to the severity of the siege. The people of the city were not allowed to leave to

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554 Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.98.

555 Ibn Khaldun:al-Tarikh, Vol. IV, p.355.

the surrounding countryside on pain of mutilation or even death. This kept up the economic pressure on the city which ran out of food so that people ate rats, skins and Haram meat (it is not clear what this refers to; presumably, the city could not have had many pigs, so that the reference is probably to eating dead, as opposed to slaughtered, animals). One of the interesting points about this siege is that for it to be so effective against a port city, one presumes that it included a naval element (otherwise the city could have had access to supplies via the sea route). No reference is made in the Arabic sources to the naval element of the siege. Moreover, since Rodrigo's force seems to have been composed mainly of mounted troops, it is unlikely to have had direct control of any naval forces. Two solutions suggest themselves to this problem. The first is that the besieging army somehow gained control of the port-although there is no reference to this action either. Alternatively, that Rodrigo's siege was assisted by Zaragozan naval forces. Given the proposition that Rodrigo's siege was made as part of Zaragozan foreign policy, a sound argument could be made for the second alternative. Zaragoza had a naval force based in Tortosa which it could have made available for this purpose, although this second proposition remains a matter of conjecture.

The long siege finally weakened the city enough (by then it was suffering from spreading disease as well as famine) for its "people" to ask Ibn Jihaf to surrender. At

first Ibn Jihaf asked for a truce at the beginning of Jamadi al-Awla 487/19 May- 17 June 1094 to call for help from Zaragoza and Murcia. None arrived and the city surrendered at the end of the month, Ibn Jihaf having extracted several conditions for himself and the populace.[556] Rodrigo then put Ibn Jihaf on trial. Ibn 'Alqama stated that the charge was Ibn Jihaf's rebellion against al-Qadir. Ibn Bassam on the other hand only mentions that Ibn Jihaf was executed for keeping back a part of al-Qadir's treasure which Rodrigo had asked for. Whatever the specific reason for the execution, it is clear that Rodrigo sought to find a "legal" basis for ridding himself of the deposed ruler of the city.

Ibn Bassam's witness (presumably Ibn Tahir) also reported hearing Rodrigo exclaiming : "A Rodrigo helped the conquest of this island and a Rodrigo will save her".[557] If one accepts this quote as genuine and not a later embellishment by Ibn Bassam, it would indicate that although Rodrigo was working within the framework of Zaragozan foreign policy, he was aware of the Christian/Muslim dimension of the conflict and was expressing a sentiment relating to the ideals of the reconquest. This ties in with sentiment of Alvar Fanez reported by 'Abdullah, the prince of Granada, as well as

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[556] Ibn 'Alqama; quoted by Ibn 'Idhari, Al-Bayan Vol.4, pp.38-39. Ibn Bassam states that the city fell in 488, i.e. the following year (Part III,p.98), which is presumably an error on the part of a later copyist.

[557] Ibn Bassam: Al-Dhakhira, Part III, p.99.

the sentiment of the unnamed Christian in Barbastro with whom a Jewish emissary was trying to negotiate the release of captive Muslim women, and would suggest that by the end of the century there was a transition towards a "mentality" of reconquest. However, the politics leading to the conquest of Valencia would also suggest that such a mentality managed to evolve and coexist with the older pattern of alliance with Muslim rulers within a framework of regional politics which was not necessarily bound by the Christian/Muslim dimension. In other words one can see a transition towards a new politics of religious confrontation, but also that the transition was gradual and that during the time it evolved the lines separating the old political world-view and the new were not rigorously defined.

The Almoravids reacted to the fall of Valencia in the same way they had reacted to the fall of Majorca. Within two months of Rodrigo's victory they had managed to amass a large army to advance on the city. Interestingly, Ibn Bassam does not mention this episode as his Almoravid audience would have found it embarrassing. All that he would say was that the fall of the city became the main concern of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin who sent forces, the war being undecided until the city was liberated. This was one way of glossing over the only major defeat the Almoravids suffered in the peninsula. Ibn 'Alqama's account, however, is more detailed. The Almoravid army, commanded by Yusuf's nephew advanced on the city in Sha'ban/16 August-13 Septem-

ber having gathered in Murcia. Rodrigo responded to the news of the impending attack by confiscating all weapons from the population of the city. Significantly, the Almoravid army was joined by forces from Lérida (hoping no doubt to benefit from the defeat of Rodrigo by extending Lérida's authority over the whole of the upper march) and from Tortosa which seems to have turned against Zaragoza and joined what must have been perceived as the winning side. Clearly, even at this stage the inter-march politics still played a major role in shaping the response of a march to outside events. Equally, the importance of Valencia to Zaragoza must have been very clear. Both the lords of Lérida and Tortosa seem to have thought that the defeat of Rodrigo at the hands of such a large army (said to contain four thousand horse) was inevitable and that with the fall of Valencia, al-Musta'in II would also fall, opening the way for new deals with the Almoravids to agree a new lord to rule the upper march.

Rodrigo, however, defeated the attacking army, partly through ruse (releasing the women of the city into the lines of the besieging army, where they were then attacked and raped by the "lower elements" of the attacking army -without the commander knowing, naturally- thus causing confusion among the support element of the attacking force as well as causing resentment among the Muslim inhabitants of Valencia against their saviours) and partly through a daring military manoeuvre. On 8 Shawal/21 October, he circumvented the main body of the Almoravid

army and attacked the heart of its encampment. The Almoravids thus attacked from the rear assumed that they were being attacked by a relieving Christian force, possibly that of Aragón (Rodrigo had spread rumours to the effect that Aragón would come to his aid) or even Alfonso. Fearing a flanking movement they fell back in confusion retreating to Denia then to Jativa.[558] Intriguingly, Alfonso is recorded as having been halfway to Valencia when he heard of this victory and changed course towards Granada. It is not clear whether his aim was to help Rodrigo repel the attack, or whether he was employing a tactic similar to that of the Almoravids and hoping that by repelling the attack on Valencia he would be able to take over the city himself and thus realise his strategy of extending his control east cutting Zaragoza off, a strategy which had been thwarted by Rodrigo a few years earlier.

The resounding defeat of the Almoravid army established Rodrigo Diaz as the ruler of Valencia. He did not hold Valencia as part of any Christian kingdom. At the same time, his connections with Zaragoza continued and placed him as an ally of the upper march, but his rule was independent of al-Musta'in II. He was in effect an independent Ta'ifa lord himself -the last to be established in the peninsula in the C11.

At this juncture it might be profitable to

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[558] Ibn 'Alqama;quoted by Ibn Idhari and Ibn Idhari's own account; Al-Bayan, Vol. 4, pp.40 and 34-37 .

examine briefly his unusual title el-Cid. The title is derived from the Arabic al-Sayyed.[559] In modern usage the term now denotes an equivalent of the German Herr although as late as the middle of this century, it was a title reserved for the gentry.[560] In the C11 the title would have been reserved for members of the Arabic lordly class. For a non-Arab Christian to hold such a title would have been highly irregular. The two contemporary Arab sources never refer to him with this title. Ibn 'Alqama simply calls him Rodrigo (Ludhriq), while Ibn Bassam acknowledges his title Campeador (Kanbiatur). Both would have considered it ridiculous that he should be called (al-Sayyed). Two possible explanations for this title present themselves. One is that he was awarded the title while in the service of Zaragoza, possibly during his first exile when he helped save the Hudid dynasty from being overrun. One could make out an argument that the Hudids to reward him made him an honourary Sayyed, rather in the way in which the British Empire awarded titles to members of its colonies who had served it well. The connotation of the title would also imply a linkage to the Bani Hud as they themselves were Asyad. This would have been highly unusual, but in a sense it could be seen as an upgrading and extension of the Mawla system whereby non-Arabs were allowed to

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[559] There is a possibility that the term Cid was based on the Arabic word Siyyed meaning wolf, but this seems unlikely.

[560] One of the first edicts of the 1952 military coup in Egypt was to give every citizen the right to call himself al-Sayyed.

associate themselves with certain "sponsoring" Arab tribes and which was in use from the early days of Islam. The other explanation was that the title was used by his Christian followers to describe an unusual situation. Rodrigo held no formal high noble title from Alfonso, nor did he hold Valencia as a fief from Castile. Yet, he clearly was the absolute ruler of a fair sized city-state. At the same time he could not be called a king. This lack of formal title to describe his power might have led his followers to adopt an Arab title to describe his lordship over what was in essence a Muslim city-state. Both these suggestions are conjecture and it may be that the title was added later on as an element of the myth, although that does not explain the unusual usage.

6. 7 Conclusion

It is clear that the power of the upper march was in decline from the mid 1080's. The fall of Toledo, with the resultant shift of Valencia into the Castilian sphere of influence were major blows to Zaragozan security as was the intervention of the Almoravids. The pressure against the march which had always been present was thus intensified with the introduction of two new dynamic forces into the political arena. This decline can be seen in the way in which the upper march had to increasingly resort to diplomacy, as opposed to military action, to safeguard its interests. In a sense, the fact that by the 1090's Rodrigo was no longer acting as part of a Zaragozan army,

but as an autonomous ally was indicative of this decline. Al-Musta'in also seemed unable to meet the pressure from his traditional enemies in Aragón and Barcelona.

In addition, the upper march had been unable to resolve the issue of succession effectively. Each time the lord of Zaragoza died, the march was divided, presenting each successive heir with the difficult task of reuniting it through military action or diplomacy or both. Like the other Ta'ifas, the Bani Hud never resolved the issue of kingship, despite their use of Caliphal titles. This lack of cohesion was an in-built source of weakness for the march which became exacerbated as the political and military pressures on it grew.

Overall, one has the feeling that al-Musta'in II was having to conduct his policy within increasingly narrowing parameters which placed the upper march in the grips of a vicious circle. The weaker it became, the harder it was for Zaragoza to exercise proper economic and political control over its A'mal which led to further weakness. In some ways directing Rodrigo towards Valencia and allowing him to become lord of the city was an act of desperation. Nonetheless, al-Musta'in had managed to respond to the crises facing his city-state with the maximum effectiveness possible given the ever decreasing resources at his disposal.

The conquest of Valencia did break the cordon placed around Valencia and the resounding defeat of the Almoravid army did act as a successful buffer against their

expansion northwards. This allowed Zaragoza to re-enter negotiations with the Almoravids with a stronger hand and to reassert its authority -to a very limited degree- over parts of the march. However, the situation in 1094 was far from promising. Although Rodrigo controlled Valencia and part of the countryside around it, his control did not extend over the whole of the state. The Almoravids may have failed to capture Valencia, but they controlled Jativa (the other main city in the A'mal) and its surrounding country-side. The Almoravids also controlled Denia, thus taking over this city-state, and the revenue it had provided, away from Zaragoza. So that, although the state of Valencia did offer the buffer which Zaragoza hoped for, it was a weaker and smaller buffer than that which had existed under the Bani 'Amir a quarter of a century earlier.

Zaragoza itself suffered territorial losses, partly as a result of a reversal of the expansion south (with the loss of Denia) but also partly as a result of a steady loss of territory to the north, especially to Aragón. Moreover, the apparent inability of Zaragoza to meet the challenges from the north and its vulnerability to advances from the south weakened the hold of the city over the main centres in its A'mal as was demonstrated by the moves of Lérida and more significantly of Tortosa against Zaragoza's interests during the Almoravid attack on Valencia. Nevertheless, through the resourceful use of diplomacy and warfare, including the use of Rodrigo and his heavy cavalry, the lords of Zaragoza did manage to

survive the major crises which faced them in the last two decades of the century. At a time when the power structure was shifting against the Ta'ifas and towards the two new major centres of power in the peninsula (Castile and the Almoravids), Zaragoza managed to remain, against all odds, an independent Ta'ifa. The success of their policy in Valencia, although limited to a great extent, did allow them to establish a buffer against the expanding Almoravids and broke the Castilian cordon which had begun to strangle the upper march.

Despite being outflanked by the fall of the middle march in 1085, and with some help from Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, the Bani Hud managed to become the only Ta'ifa to survive, albeit briefly, into the C12.

Conclusion

The study of medieval Spanish Muslim history is restricted by the lack of charter evidence. What survives of such evidence is normally through copies in literary anthologies. The bulk of extant historical sources tend to have been compiled at later dates and were attempts at writing complete "histories" of Muslim Spain, so that, the information which they do provide is more concerned with the general history and events of the peninsula as a whole.

However, the period following the collapse of the Umayyad Caliphate in the second decade of the eleventh century provides a window through which some of the structures of Spanish Muslim society can be glimpsed. This is not because the nature of the evidence changed but because the history of the peninsula following the fragmentation of the Umayyad state was, necessarily, determined by the actions of its component provinces. Studies of this period have previously tended to rely on later sources, such as Ibn 'Idhari. These later sources, tended to try to relocate material from earlier sources within a narration of a general history of Muslim Spain which was very much influenced by the political outlook formulated after the start of the Spanish reconquest.

This thesis, by contrast, has made greater use of eleventh century sources, notably Ibn Bassam's literary

work al-Dhakhira. The structure of al-Dhakhira (the division of the work into books looking at the literary achievements of each of the regions within Muslim Spain) as well as Ibn Bassam's use of long quotes from the contemporary Ibn Hayyan's lost work, al-Matin, provides an insight into some of the workings of the regional elites of Spanish Muslim society outside Cordova. By using these earlier sources, the study has tried to re-examine the events in Muslim Spain during the Ta'ifa period, especially those relating to Zaragoza and Valencia, from an eleventh century perspective.

It has been argued in the thesis that the Spanish Muslim elite of the eleventh century believed that Umayyad government had provided a framework for the relationship between the government in Cordova and the provinces. This was a framework in which the legitimate ruler of Muslim Spain appointed (or in some cases, confirmed) a provincial governor. The appointment extended legitimacy to the governor, both in terms of his relationship with the A'mal and with other provinces. In return, a governor declared allegiance to the Caliph and sent Cordova a portion of the tax revenue collected. It was further suggested that whether such a theoretical system corresponded with reality or not is less significant than the fact that it was believed to have existed. Furthermore, the proposition has been made that there was a belief among the Spanish Muslim elite of the period that the rule of the 'Amirids had

destroyed this legitimate structure.

The thesis puts forward the proposition that an understanding of this theoretical structure has direct bearing on understanding the history of the Ta'ifa period because many of the actions of the Ta'ifa rulers were concerned with establishing an alternative to this structure in a period when Cordovan central power disappeared.

It has been argued that the fact that the majority of the Ta'ifa rulers continued to acknowledge some form of Caliphal rule for much of the century, at least in theory, demonstrates that they continued to believe that legitimacy derived from such an acknowledgement was important. It was also shown that the relationship between each city and its A'mal clearly became more unstable during the Ta'ifa period. Several examples to support this view were examined including the almost constant rebellion of Lérida, as well as the occasional rebellion of Jativa. It has been suggested that in the absence of a legitimate Cordovan government, the relationship between the lord of a province and lesser lords in his A'mal became increasingly defined by the ability of the main cities forcibly to maintain their authority over the A'mal.

The Umayyad system was also seen to have provided the basis for the legitimate appointment of rulers for each

province. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Cordovan government, groups of disbanded soldiers such as the Zirids established themselves as lords of provinces, while elsewhere, members of the local elite such as the Tujibids took over the reins of government. Even when some form of stability returned to the Muslim Spain towards the middle of the century, it seems that new dynasties could be established with relative ease, through a combination of force and support from the local elite. Examples of such take overs have been looked at including the establishment of the Hudids in Zaragoza as well as the establishment of the 'Amirids in Valencia.

The study has also tried to demonstrate that the relationship between provinces became increasingly unstable, as each behaved as an independent entity. Rivalries between provinces had existed previously, but the Umayyad government had ensured that such rivalries did not degenerate into constant feuding. As the century progressed, the Ta'ifas increasingly involved the Christian states in their inter-provincial wars. It was shown that at the beginning, there was clearly some disquiet at such involvement, but that gradually, Christian involvement became more frequent and gained greater acceptance. In such an uncertain climate, the lords of the Ta'ifas tried to elevate marriage alliances to a new level of importance in an attempt to introduce an element of stability in their relationship with one another. There is evidence that such

matrimonial alliances did not always work. Nevertheless, that the Ta'ifa lords saw some value in such alliances, seems clear from the fact that they remained a feature of, for example, Zaragozan/Valencian politics until the end of the century.

The methods used by the Ta'ifa lords to consolidate their power within each city-state have been explored. The case has been made that these reflected the tools used by the Cordovan government to extend its authority over the whole of the peninsula in the previous century. Even before the extent of the disintegration of the Spanish Muslim state became fully evident, governors were issuing new coinage to replace that of the Caliphate. This was the earliest positive action taken by the emerging Ta'ifa lords as a result of their independence.

The Ta'ifas also developed their local provincial chanceries into more complex bureaucratic apparatuses in the image of the civil service that had served the government in Cordova. Perhaps one can question whether it is appropriate to see these chanceries as a civil service. They were clearly much smaller in size than the Cordovan civil service. However, the men who established those chanceries were originally the product of the Cordovan civil service, and it was shown that they clearly saw themselves as ministers (wuzara'). Their chanceries dealt not only with the pre-Ta'ifa provincial problems related to

the collection of the tax revenue and the exercise of provincial government, but as the century progressed, they had to deal with relations between the different Ta'ifas, which had by then started behaving towards each other as independent states. In this sense, it is argued that they can be seen as smaller versions of the Cordovan civil service. It has also been argued that good ministerial advice was seen to be an important tool of Ta'ifa government.

Surprisingly, perhaps, the military element was shown to have had very little involvement in domestic provincial politics during the Ta'ifa period. A distinction has to be made between the period immediately following the collapse of Cordovan government when the disbanded armies of the 'Amirids, whether Slavs or Berbers, participated in the politics of the peninsula, in the sense that some established themselves as independent Ta'ifas, and the period following that, by which time the leadership of these groups were behaving as independent Ta'ifas. There is little evidence that, once the Ta'ifas were formed, the military element within each province played an important role in internal or domestic politics (the main exception being the rebellion of Jativa against 'Abd al-'Aziz). It does not seem, for example, that in the rebellions in the upper march, the military formed an independent force to be reckoned with within the internal politics of the Zaragozan state. It has been suggested that this may be related to

the fact that Ta'ifa lords (rather like the Umayyad Caliphs before them) kept relatively small standing armies.

What the study has attempted to show is that the element in society which, by contrast, clearly enjoyed a considerable amount of power in the cities were the elite, mostly referred to as the Ahl. It has been suggested that these included members of locally important families as well as members of the local judiciary and civil service. The power of this stratum is evidenced by the fact that they could help local figures or even outsiders to become Ta'ifa lords (as in the case of Sulayman Ibn Hud in Zaragoza). Equally, this group could engineer the removal of a Ta'ifa lord, as seen in the cases of Valencia and Toledo. In the case of Toledo, it was the Ahl and not al-Qadir who seemed to have conducted the negotiations for surrender with Alfonso VI. While little direct evidence about this group survives, it is probably correct to assume that they were made up of factions and did not consist of a single coherent group within each city.

The power of this group continued to play an important role in Ta'ifa politics right up to the fall of the final independent Ta'ifa in the second decade of the twelfth century, when the constant advance of Aragon into the upper march led to their asserting their power over the Hudid dynasty. Despite accepting the legitimacy of the succession of 'Abd al-Malik while his father was alive in

503/31 July 1109-19 July 1110,[561] 'Abd al-Malik needed to renew the allegiance of the Ahl following the death of al-Musta'in II in a campaign against Alfonso I of Aragon to relieve the pressure on Tudela[562] in January 1110.[563] When 'Abd al-Malik tried to revive relations with Aragon in an attempt to counter the increasing threat from the Almoravids, the Ahl of Zaragoza, in a move that paralleled those of the Ahl of Valencia and Toledo in the second half of the previous century, removed their allegiance from him and invited a new ruler, the Almoravid commander of Valencia Muhammad Ibn al-Haj,[564] while 'Abd al-Malik fled to Rueda.[565] This marked the final defeat of the Hudid Ta'ifa, although they continued to play an important role in the history of Muslim Spain, especially in the period following the collapse of Almoravid rule later in the century.[566]

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561 Ibn Idhari:Al-Bayan,vol.4,p.53.

562 ibid.

563 B.F. Reilly:The Contest of Christian and Muslim Spain,p.131.

564 It is perhaps a further indication of the growing strength of 'Ali Ibn Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, that Ibn 'Aisha seems to have been removed from the post of governor of Valencia by this time. Cf footnote 566 below for reference in al-Mughrib.

565 Ibn Idhari:Al-Bayan,vol.4,pp.53-55. This agrees with the information in Ibn Sa'id:al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maghrib, vol.2, p.438. However, Ibn al-Kardabus in his book mistakenly records that 'Imad al-Dawla lost Zaragoza to Alfonso I of Aragon, Tarikh al-Andalus, pp.117-119.

566 Ibn Sa'id:Al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maghrib, vol.2.,p.438. Interestingly, Ahmad, 'Imad al-Dawla's son, surrendered Rueda to Alfonso VII of Castile in 1131, in return for a fief in Alfonso's territories. Ibn al-Kardabus:Tarikh al-Andalus,pp.120-121.

It is the traditionally held view that the Ta'ifa lords following the collapse of the government in Cordova worked at, and were successful in, establishing themselves as rulers of independent units that functioned completely outside the framework of traditional or legitimate Spanish Muslim government. The evidence advanced for supporting such a view relies not only on the actions of these lords during their period of rule, both towards each other and towards the northern Christian states, but also on the fact that they chose to adopt Caliphal titles; an action which later Muslim historians viewed as preposterous. The case against the Ta'ifa lords for adopting such a practice was put forward by Ibn al-Kardabus in a speech which he attributed to Alfonso VI:

> How can I spare [such] a degenerate people, each of whom awards himself the titles of their Caliphs and kings (Mulukihim) and princes (Umara'ihim); al-Mu'tadid, al-Mu'tamid, al-Mu'tasim, al-Mutawakkil, al-Musta'in, al-Muqtadir, al-'Amir and al-Ma'mun, while none can lift a sword to defend themselves.[567]

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[567] Ibn al-Kardabus:Tarikh al-Andalus, pp.88-89. There are several reasons why I doubt the authenticity of this quote. First, it is unlikely that Alfonso would have felt outrage at the adoption of Caliphal titles by the lords of the Ta'ifas - such a feeling is a product of a Muslim education. Secondly, in an earlier passage, he calls the Ta'ifa lords rebels which would imply that Alfonso believed the legitimate government of Muslim Spain to have been that of the Umayyads. Finally, the listing of the different titles adopted by the Ta'ifas and the general tone of the quote seem to suggest a Muslim perspective formed after the start of the Spanish reconquest. Ibn al-Kardabus does not provide a source for this quote. Interestingly, it is in this section that Ibn al-Kardabus makes reference to Alfonso VI calling himself the Emperor of the two Religions (al-Inbaratur dhi al-Millatayn)-see p.252 above.

However, as this study has tried to demonstrate, the adoption of Caliphal titles was a gradual extension of a practice first started by the 'Amirids and in its early form signified no more than an attempt by the Ta'ifa lords to bestow upon themselves grand ministerial titles in the manner of the 'Amirids. Even when the Ta'ifa lords dropped the ministerial (Hajib) from their titles and called themselves simply al-Musta'in or al-Muqtadir, they continued to acknowledge, at least de jure, some form of Caliphal authority, be it that of the pretender in Seville, or of the 'Abbasid in Baghdad.

By looking at the development of the Ta'ifas in Zaragoza and Valencia in the eleventh century, it has been argued that there was no clearly defined break between a unified Spanish Muslim state and a conscious move towards independent regional entities. The Spanish Muslim elite believed that the reasons leading to the collapse of Cordovan hegemony were the result of changes instigated by the 'Amirid rulers. Much of the actions of this elite, at least in the upper march, during the early part of the century was related to an attempt at reversing these changes. Even when the Umayyad Caliphate was abolished altogether, there was (with the single exception of al-Ma'mun of Toledo) no expression of a political outlook that viewed regional rule as existing outside the framework of a Caliphate. However, the lords of the Ta'ifas were at the same time also reacting to the political situation in the

peninsula where there was a vacuum in central authority. The relationship of each ruler with his A'mal, with his Muslim neighbours and with the Christian states had to be moulded within this new political reality and the Ta'ifa rulers, therefore, increasingly, exercised independent authority.

By the middle of the century, as a new generation born after the collapse of the Caliphate came to power, the memory of the Cordovan government became dimmer in the minds of the Spanish Muslim elite, but there continued to be a dichotomy in their outlook, so that while the lords of the Ta'ifas seemed to exercise completely independent authority within their city-states, they continued at the same time to acknowledge, even if in a weak and titular manner, an allegiance to a Caliphal political system. It has been argued that this dichotomy in outlook played an important role in shaping the political actions of the ruling elite during the century, both in terms of "domestic" issues and in matters related to their relations with other states in the peninsula.

This might help explain why the Hudids continued to divide their realm after the death of each ruler of the Zaragozan state among several successors, thus weakening the political structure previously created and launching the march into civil strife, as each tried to oust his brothers and gain control of the whole march. Such a

division must be seen as unusual, given that there was a clear precedent in Muslim Spain of the succession to the throne by a single ruler, established and practised by the Umayyad state. The case has therefore been put that while on the one hand the Hudids can be seen to have clearly behaved as rulers of an independent state in almost all aspects of government from the early part of the century, one can argue that on the other hand, in terms of establishing a method of succession, the Hudids failed to resolve the question of whether what they ruled was, in law, a state to be handed down to a single successor, or a thaghr, to be viewed as a legacy, which was to be divided among several sons. At the same time, other Ta'ifa rulers, such as the dhi al-Nunids in Toledo seemed to have been comfortable with the concept of handing over the state to a single successor.

The difference in the way in which the issue of succession was resolved by the Ta'ifas demonstrates that there was no clearly defined division between the two political world-views in the minds of the Spanish Muslim elite during the century. Rather, that both, a theoretical belief, even if only a weak and tenuous one, in the necessity for all authority to exist within the framework of a Caliphal government, and a practical exercise of authority, completely independent from any such framework, continued to co-exist and to help shape the political actions of the Spanish Muslim elite throughout this period.

A good example of this can be seen in the fall and reconquest of Barbastro. It has been argued that from a purely "Zaragozan" perspective, al-Muqtadir was attempting to use all available means, including abandoning a city to the attacks of a Christian expedition, to force the A'mal of the upper march to acknowledge only his authority. In addition, the study has aimed to show that Ibn Hayyan, while understanding the local politics that shaped al-Muqtadir's decision to abandon the city, criticised al-Muqtadir's action on the grounds that it was al-Muqtadir's duty to protect the whole thaghr, as in the days of the Umayyad Caliphate. This might have been partly because Ibn Hayyan saw this attack, not simply as a local skirmish with Aragon, but as an attempt by Christendom, represented by Sahib Roma, to attack Muslim Spain as a whole. The response of the other Ta'ifas towards the fall of Barbastro also shows a co-existence of both political views referred to above. On the one hand, we are informed that on hearing of the fall of the city all Ta'ifa rulers strengthened the fortifications of their cities, which is what one would expect as a reaction from city states which had started to function as isolated independent units. However, al-Mu'tadid of Seville, sent a force to help the Zaragozan forces liberate the town. It might have been a small force that had no more than a symbolic value, but this symbolic dimension is important in that it shows that as late as 1065, the Spanish Muslim elite still felt that

they should, at least in theory, present a united front against incursions from the north.

By the second half of the century, most Ta'ifas not only used Christian forces against their Muslim neighbours in inter-Ta'ifa conflicts, but also paid Parias. This was not, as some historians have asserted, an act of vassalage, which was a system alien to the Spanish Muslim elite, but a form of protection money to ward off the mounting military pressure especially, but not exclusively, from Castile. Nonetheless, when the power of Castile began to make serious encroachments into Muslim lands, the Ta'ifas reacted in a manner more reminiscent of the pre-Ta'ifa period. Whether al-Mu'tamid of Seville actually said that he would rather be a camel herd than see Christian dominion is not as important as the fact that after the fall of Toledo he chose to invite the Almoravids to cross to Spain to defend Spanish Islam, despite a deep-seated and historically based mistrust of the Berbers of north Africa. Al-Mu'tamid might have hoped to be allowed to remain as ruler under an Almoravid hegemony, but that in itself points to the fact that he was willing to revert to a system of government that was closer to the older Umayyad one than that which typified the Ta'ifa period.

Nor can this act of inviting the Almoravids be seen simply as a clear break with Ta'ifa politics and a shift back to the older system of a single Spanish Muslim

state. Even after the advent of the Almoravids, the Hudids continued to behave as independent rulers, conducting a Zaragozan based policy towards Castile, Aragon and the Almoravids. However, following the fall of Valencia in Ramadan 495/ June-July 1102,[568] they attempted to establish a relationship with the Almoravids similar to that which had existed between the upper thaghr and Cordova in the days of the Umayyads. In return for acknowledging Yusuf as the legitimate ruler of Muslim Spain, the Almoravid army was stopped from attacking Zaragoza and the Hudids held the upper march as a buffer[569] against the Christians, receiving occasional support when faced with concerted attacks on them such as the Castilian campaign for Calatayud in the following year.[570] The Almoravids accepted this arrangement because Yusuf was consolidating his own dynasty and needed to have the representative of the upper march as one of the witnesses for the charter appointing 'Ali as successor.[571] For a brief period, the Hudids and the Almoravids seemed as if they had re-established something approximating the Umayyad system.

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568 Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, Part III,p.101.

569 Ibn Sa'id:Al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maghrib,vol.2,p.437.

570 Ibn Idhari:Al-Bayan,vol.4,p.44. Incidentally, a further sign of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin's willingness to try to build support among the Spanish Muslims for his dynasty at this stage was that after the occupation of Valencia he chose to appoint a local supporter, Abu 'Abdullah Ibn 'Aisha, as governor of Valencia, rather than a north African commander. Ibn Bassam:Al-Dhakhira, part III, pp.887-890 and Ibn Sa'id:Al-Mughrib fi Hula al-Maghrib, vol.2, pp.314-315.

571 Ibn Idhari:Al-Bayan,vol.4,pp.42-43.Al-Hulla al-Siyara' suggests that the charter was drawn up by Ibn Razin.

A similar pattern of a tension between presenting a united front towards the Muslim south and behaving as independent kingdoms with often conflicting policies can be seen in the politics of the Christian elite in the north. After Fernando I had established a greater Castile, he chose to divide it at his death (perhaps partly because of the influence of Navarrese inheritance laws[572]) among his three sons, which led to a period of in-fighting between the three that eventually resulted in Alfonso VI succeeding to the whole kingdom after a brief period in exile. Even with the ascendancy of Castile to a position of dominance among the northern Christian states, inter-Christian rivalry continued to play an important part in the politics of the region. At the start of the century, some of these states, such as Castile, were in need of aid from Muslim states such as Zaragoza (whose ruler had helped arrange the wedding alliance between Castile and Barcelona). This pattern of Muslim involvement in inter-Christian rivalries was similar to that which developed later in the century with the Christian kingdoms being involved in inter-Ta'ifa conflict. However, by the end of the century, Ta'ifa power was so weakened that their involvement in inter-Christian conflict became much more limited. Nonetheless, the political manoeuvrings of Aragon, even to the extent of increasing Papal involvement in the peninsula, were clearly

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572 B.F. Reilly: The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VI 1065-1109, pp.14-15.

aimed against Castile. The north, even after the ascendancy of a greater Castile, and despite the profound changes in society which were taking place, reflected in the spread of Cluniac reforms, a movement towards a closer alignment with the rest of Europe and the gradual development of a reconquest mentality, continued to behave not as a single entity, but as several independent and rival states.

Even the nobility of Castile itself did not present a single "Christian" or even Castilian front to the "Muslim" south. It has been argued above that Rodrigo Diaz, traditionally presented as the hero of the Castilian Christian reconquest, behaved in reality in the first instance, as a soldier of the Ta'ifa of Zaragoza and later as an independent ruler who acted in the interests of his own "Ta'ifa", often against the interests of Castile, and was to the end a better ally to the Muslim Hudids than to any Christian state.

The rulers of the Ta'ifas, with very few exceptions,[573] have traditionally been presented as the villains of the period, whose selfish pursuit of personal power led to the fragmentation of Muslim Spain, which led, in turn, to the beginning of the Spanish Christian advance southwards. What this study has tried to demonstrate is that the Ta'ifa rulers were neither villains nor heroes,

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573 Notably Dr. A. Azzam's romantic biography of al-Mu'tamid of Seville, Al-Mu'tamid Ibn 'Abbad, Cairo, 1959.

but representatives of an elite that tried to react to a period of political instability caused partly by the actions of the 'Amirid government and partly by the growing powers of Castile. To this end they utilised, often in the most efficient manner possible, the tools of government at their disposal; the bureaucracy, the limited military forces of Muslim Spain, and diplomacy. In many profound ways, they came to see themselves as totally independent rulers, and yet in an equally important sense, their political outlook continued to be influenced by the belief that an ordered Muslim world could only exist under a Caliphal system of government. By the eleventh century, this Caliphal system was weakening everywhere in the Muslim world, and the actions of the Ta'ifa rulers reflect the attempt of the lordly Muslim class at coming to terms with such a profound ideological change. In an absolute sense, the Ta'ifa rulers failed. Zaragoza and Toledo both fell by the end of this period, which broke the back of the defences of Muslim Spain. They were slow to realise the threat from the changes in the north, and particularly the growing power of Castile. However, the changes to the political map of the peninsula were also the result of the dynamic rule of Fernando I and Alfonso VI in Castile, as well as the actions, and occasional inactions, of the Almoravids when they eventually interfered. The failed final attempts of the Hudids at reaching an understanding, similar to that which they believed existed under the Umayyad system of government, with the new Almoravid power

at the turn of the century shows, that while the Hudids, by then the last surviving Ta'ifa, continued to try to order their world in the mould of a political structure that had existed in the tenth century, this structure was no longer appropriate for the situation in the peninsula by the end of the eleventh century.

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